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Summary of the Thesis
The aim of the research reported in this thesis was to enhance our understanding of 
why individuals differ in their so-called social value orientation (SVO), i.e., their preferences 
for allocating resources equally or unequally between themselves and another person. By 
comparison with ‘proself’ individuals, ‘prosocials’ prefer to allocate resources equally. This 
has been linked to their greater sympathy with or empathy for other people. In the current 
research I propose that the anticipation of cooperative or competitive emotions may underlie 
these different preferences. To measure anticipated emotions about allocating resources fairly 
or unfairly, I developed a reliable and valid measure, as reported in Chapter 2. This measure 
was used to investigate whether anticipated emotions mediate the relation between SVO and 
allocation behaviour. I found that anticipated emotions did account (at least in part) for the 
relationship between SVO and allocation behaviour. This pattern of mediation was consistent 
in two cultural settings: Western European (UK, reported in Chapter 3) and Asian (Malaysia, 
reported in Chapter 4). I also examined whether participants’ allocation behaviour would 
differ as a function of whether the receiver was a member of the allocator’s ingroup or 
outgroup. Surprisingly, no such differences were found. Nevertheless, there was some 
evidence that individual differences in social dominance orientation are related to 
participants’ allocation behaviour, with anticipated emotion again mediating the relation. In 
Chapter 5, I experimentally manipulated anticipated emotion in an effort to show that this 
proposed mediator has a causal impact on allocation behaviour. Two experimental studies 
yielded evidence that manipulating anticipated emotion had a significant impact on allocation 
behaviour, and that the normally observed relation between SVO and allocation behaviour 
was eliminated by this manipulation. Overall, this thesis provides compelling evidence that 
anticipated emotion is a key psychological mechanism that helps to explain individual 
differences in allocation behaviour. 
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Chapter 1 1
1 Chapter 1: General Introduction
1.1 Social Value Orientation in Decision Making
Imagine you have a cookie and you have to divide the cookie between yourself and a 
random stranger. How would you divide this cookie? A cooperative or generous person 
would divide it equally or even give more to the stranger. An individualistic or selfish person 
would give the stranger less or perhaps retain the entire cookie for him/herself. This example 
illustrates the role that individual differences can play in decision making. 
Individual differences in attitudes to being cooperative or individualistic in allocation 
behaviour are commonly referred to as social preferences, social motives, other-regarding 
preferences, welfare trade-off ratios, or social value orientation (SVO) (Murphy, Ackermann, 
& Handgraaf, 2011). Hereafter, I will use SVO to refer to individual differences in allocation 
preference. I will now introduce the construct of SVO and discuss its role in decision making, 
particularly in the context of resource allocation behaviour between oneself and another 
person. 
1.2 Social Value Orientation (SVO) 
Early researchers investigating SVO argued that it reflects the motives underlying 
allocation behaviour in social dilemmas (Messick & McClintock, 1968). Messick and 
McClintock (1968) developed a measure that would reflect people’s social motives. They 
created a decomposed game in which participants had to choose between different amounts 
of tokens allocated to oneself and to an anonymous other. From the participants’ choices, the 
researchers were able to identify that individuals have different motivational orientations 
when it comes to allocating payoffs in economic games. The first motivational orientation is 
the individualistic approach, whereby the allocator seeks a higher amount of payoffs for 
him/herself and allocates little or nothing at all to the receiver (own gain). The second 
category of motivational orientation is one in which the allocator seeks to maximise both 
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their own payoff and the receiver’s payoff (joint gain). The third motivational orientation is 
one in which the allocator aims to maximise the difference between his/her payoff and that of 
the receiver (relative gain). As research on SVO developed, individuals in these three 
motivational orientations came to be classified as individualists, prosocials, and competitors, 
respectively (Van Lange, De Bruin, Otten, & Joireman, 1997). However, because 
individualists and competitors tend to exhibit small differences in behaviour, they are 
commonly combined and labelled as proselfs (Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009). Also, 
researchers have found that in the general population, there are only a few individuals who 
are categorised as competitors (Au & Kwong, 2004). More specifically, Au and Kwong 
(2004) reported that people were mostly categorised as prosocials (46%), followed by 
individualists (38%), with the remaining group of competitors (12%) being much smaller. 
Unlike proselfs, prosocials are co-operators by nature and seek equality or maximisation of 
joint outcomes (Van Lange, De Cremer, Van Dijk, & Van Vugt, 2007). 
1.2.1 SVO as a Stable Personal Preference 
SVO has been defined as a stable preference for certain divisions between oneself and 
another person (Messick & McClintock, 1968). Given that there are differences in these 
personal preferences in resource allocation decisions, it seems reasonable to ask why this is 
the case. Through genetic architecture research on prosocial behaviour, researchers have 
argued that SVO can be linked to biological and environmental influences. Researchers found 
that in a population of twins aged 2 to 9 year olds from a non-western sample 55% of the 
variance in the children’s prosocial behaviour was due to heritability (Hur & Rushton, 2007). 
In the same study, when researchers studied twins raised in a non-shared environment, 
whereby one twin is raised in a different family and environment from their other twin, 45% 
of the variance in the children’s prosocial behaviour was influenced by non-shared 
environment factors (Hur & Rushton, 2007). These percentages presented here are based on a 
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non-western sample which are reportedly within the same range as twin studies done on a 
western population sample (Hur & Rushton, 2007). This suggests that prosocial behaviour of 
both non-western and western population is influenced by both genetics and environmental 
factors. 
Although twin studies suggest that genetic influences are a greater influence than 
environmental factors in prosocial behaviour, the percentage of variance in twins’ prosocial 
behaviour attributable to environmental factors is substantial and cannot be dismissed (Knafo 
& Israel, 2009; Plomin, 2001). Researchers have suggested that SVO is shaped by social 
interactions throughout life (Van Lange et al., 1997). Research findings suggest that children 
who have secure rather than insecure attachment with their primary caregiver during their 
childhood develop a sense of interdependence. This then leads to an increase in trust and 
cooperative behaviour that is linked to prosociality (Van Lange et al., 1997). Another finding 
is that prosociality increases with age (Knafo & Israel, 2009; Van Lange et al., 1997). 
Bogaert, Boone and Declerck (2008) suggested that older people are more prosocially 
orientated because they have achieved accomplishments and have fewer needs in life as 
compared to younger people. Thus, older people perhaps do not find the need to compete and 
therefore are more cooperative towards other people. 
Van Lange and colleagues (1997) also found that prosocials reported having more 
siblings than did individualist and competitors. These authors argued that larger families will 
face many conflicts and may learn how to overcome this by having prosocial attitudes. This 
is also in line with research showing that individuals from cultures with high levels of 
collectivism, as compared to individualistic cultures, have a stronger tendency to behave in a 
prosocial manner (de Guzman, Do, & Kok, 2014; Rao & Stewart, 1999). Together, these 
results provide important insights into how SVO is shaped by genes and social environment.
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1.2.2 SVO in Real Life Dilemmas
Field studies have shown that SVO relates to behaviour in everyday social dilemmas. 
For example, in a study investigating commuting decisions, prosocials preferred to commute 
by public transport and were more concerned about the impact on the environment, as 
compared to proselfs (Van Vugt, Meertens, & Van Lange, 1995). The impact on the 
environment can be viewed as a type of collective outcome of the commuting decision made, 
suggesting that prosocials are more considerate and cooperative towards protecting or 
preserving the environment as compared to proselfs. 
In another study, SVO was measured to examine its utility in predicting donation 
behaviour (Van Lange, Bekkers, Schuyt, & Van Vugt, 2007). Van Lange and colleagues 
(2007) asked participants to complete a questionnaire about their past and future donation 
behaviour, and found that prosocials were more involved than proselfs in different types of 
donation activities, such as buying lottery tickets for a good cause, donating used goods to 
charity shops, and buying goods from charity events or “third world shops”. Their 
participants were also asked to indicate to what kind of organisations they would make 
donations to. This revealed that prosocials support a wider range of good causes than 
proselfs. Van Lange and colleagues (2007) suggest that the various forms of prosocial 
behaviour can be explained by two underlying goals in that prosocials try not only to enhance 
other people’s outcome but also to enhance equality in the outcomes. For example, prosocials 
are more likely to make donations not only to help others (e.g., the poor and the ill) in need 
but also to reduce the difference in outcomes between themselves and others. These goals are 
mainly the ultimate difference between prosocials and proselfs. 
1.2.3 The Role of Dispositions in Prosocial Behaviour
There are different theoretical perspectives that could account for individual 
differences in prosocial behaviour, including the Big Two (Bakan, 1966), Schwartz’s model 
Chapter 1 5
of values (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995), and work on narcissism (Kohut, 1966). The Big 
Two distinguishes two ways of processing social information: the perspective of the self 
(agency) and the consideration of other (communion) (Bakan, 1966). Agency can be 
described as having individualistic, self-maximizing and dominance characteristics in 
pursuing goals (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007). Communion, on the other hand, describes a 
disposition that takes into account the well-being and interests of others in the process of goal 
attainment (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007). Research has shown that those high in communion 
act in a more prosocial manner, whereas those high in agency act in a more proself manner 
(Bakan, 1966; Gebauer, Sedikides, & Lüdtke, 2014; Wiggins, 1991).
The Schwartz model of values (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995) integrates different 
types of values (e.g., power, achievement, benevolence) into a single model that consists of 
two dimensions. The dimension that is particularly relevant here is the self-transcendent 
versus self-enhancement dimension. The self-transcendent pole of this dimension comprises 
universalism and benevolence values which are related to consideration for the community, 
and this dimension has been shown to predict prosocial behaviour (Lönnqvist, Verkasalo, 
Wichardt, & Walkowitz, 2013). The self-enhancement pole of this dimension, on the other 
hand, comprises values that prioritise achievement and power, and is related to characteristics 
associated with proself motivations (Lönnqvist et al., 2013). These values have been found to 
have explanatory power on allocation behaviour in economic games (Chuah, 2010).
Turning to narcissism, prosociality is (negatively) correlated with this construct 
(Sakalaki & Sotiriou, 2012). Generally, narcissists are individuals who are self-absorbed and 
oblivious to the needs of others (Caligor, Levy, & Yeomans, 2015). Narcissists’ opportunistic 
behaviour has also been found to be related to a higher level of creativity in order to achieve 
a desired goal (Liu, Chiang, Fehr, Xu, & Wang, 2017). For example, narcissists may act in a 
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cooperative way, in contrast to their more usual “competitive” behaviour, as a strategy to 
achieve a desired goal (Liu et al., 2017). 
As noted above, there is evidence that the Big Two and certain values in Schwartz’s 
model are relevant to prosocial behaviour (Gebauer et al., 2014; Lönnqvist et al., 2013). 
Similar to SVO, they both describe dispositions that lead to more prosocial or more proself 
behaviour. The narcissistic personality type, on the other hand, is only relevant to greater 
proself behaviour. This makes narcissism a less relevant construct for the purposes of my 
research. Although I could have elected to use agency versus communion or self-transcendent 
versus self-enhancement values for my research, I chose to focus on individual differences in 
SVO because SVO is directly related to preferences for outcomes, whereas the Big Two and 
Schwartz’s model of values are more general models that describe a wider range of 
behavioural tendencies. Focusing on SVO would therefore strengthen the argument that 
anticipated emotions are a proximal predictor of allocation behaviour, without invoking more 
distal processes.
1.2.4 SVO and Social Dilemmas 
Over time, researchers have used different social dilemmas to investigate the link 
between SVO and cooperation. Individual differences in SVO have commonly been 
demonstrated to affect behaviour in experimental social dilemmas like the prisoner’s 
dilemma, the public goods dilemma and the common goods dilemma (Balliet et al., 2009). 
Since prosocials tend to choose options that maximise the joint outcome of themselves and 
others, they cooperate more with one another than proselfs in a social dilemma. However, 
proselfs tend to choose outcomes that benefit themselves and thus are more attracted in not 
cooperating in a social dilemma. Balliet and colleagues (2009) proposed that the influence of 
SVO on behaviour in social dilemmas is moderated by several factors. One of these factors 
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that is relevant for the current topic is whether the social dilemma is a give-some or take-
some dilemma which I discuss below.
Among the studies using the prisoner’s dilemma, public goods dilemma and/or 
common goods dilemma that Balliet and colleagues (2009) reviewed, the relation between 
SVO and allocation behaviour was stronger in the prisoner’s dilemma and the public goods 
dilemma than it was in the common goods dilemma. The prisoner’s dilemma and the public 
goods dilemma are give-some dilemmas, which are loss-framed dilemmas. For example, in 
the public goods dilemma, the participants/allocators are given a specific amount of 
tokens/resources and they are asked to contribute to a common resource pool. The 
accumulated resources in the pool is then multiplied by a certain factor and divided equally 
among the players. The dilemma is loss-framed because the player has to give up some of his 
or her resources in order to make a potential gain. However, the common goods dilemma is a 
take-some dilemma that has a gain frame. Participants in this dilemma are given the chance 
to harvest or consume as much as they want from a shared resource until there are no 
resources left. Balliet and colleagues (2009) argued that differences in the effect of SVO on 
cooperative choices between these two kinds of dilemma can be explained as individuals 
being more sensitive to losses than gains. The difference in prosocial and proself allocation 
behaviour is seen more distinctively in a loss frame than in a gain frame because the equality 
norm is less salient in a give-some dilemma (loss framed) than in a take-some dilemma (gain 
framed). In dilemmas where equality norms are less salient SVO becomes more predictive of 
allocation behaviour (de Kwaadsteniet, van Dijk, Wit, & de Cremer, 2006).
Other economic games that have loss frames and have been used to investigate the 
relation between SVO and allocation behaviour are the Ultimatum Game (UG; Güth, 
Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982) and the Dictator Game (DG; Kahneman, Knetsch, & 
Thaler, 1986). The UG and DG are similar types of economic games that involve two players 
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who have distinct roles. One is the allocator who has to make an allocation between 
him/herself and another person (the receiver). What differs between the two games is the role 
of the receiver: in the UG, the receiver can either accept or reject the allocation. If the 
receiver accepts the allocation, both allocator and receiver end up with the allocation as 
proposed. However, if the receiver rejects the proposed allocation, both the allocator and the 
receiver end up with nothing. In the UG, the allocation therefore contains a strategic 
component. The allocator has to estimate the level at which his or her offer might be rejected 
by the receiver. In the DG, on the other hand, the receiver has no choice and simply has to 
accept the allocation made by the allocator. The DG is therefore considered to be a ‘purer’ 
measure of fairness in allocation behaviour, because no strategic component is involved and 
it is therefore assumed that allocators behave in accordance with their allocation preferences, 
without fear of an offer being rejected. 
Researchers have found that it is common for allocators to divide their allocation 
equally (50:50) in both the UG and the DG (Camerer, 2011). Because of the strategic 
component that is present in the UG, it is interesting to see how this affects the behaviour of 
allocators. According to research by E. Van Dijk, De Cremer, and Handgraaf (2004), the 
‘fair’ allocation made by allocators in the UG may reflect a selfish self-interest, driven by 
fear of rejection, or it could be a reflection of “true fairness”. E. Van Dijk and colleagues 
(2004) manipulated the amount that both the allocator would get if the receiver rejected the 
allocation in a UG. In the first condition, both the allocator and receiver would get nothing if 
the receiver rejected the allocations and so participants would experience ‘fear of rejection’. 
In the second condition, allocators and receivers would get 10% less than what the allocator 
had proposed if the offer was rejected and so the cost of rejection was lower. The researchers 
found that prosocials and proselfs differed more in the condition where the cost of rejection 
was lower. The results suggest that making “strategically” fair allocations, based on self-
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interest, applied to proselfs but not to prosocials (E. Van Dijk et al., 2004). It was reasoned 
that proselfs were acting “fairly” in order to avoid rejection and in a way that would best 
serve their own interests (E. Van Dijk et al., 2004). 
On the basis of the research described above, social motives (e.g., prosocial versus 
proself orientations) can be teased apart using different social dilemmas. There is good 
evidence that these social motives underlie the decisions how to allocate resources between 
self and other. More specifically, prosocials tend to be cooperative when allocating resources. 
This cooperative behaviour sets apart prosocials from proselfs, in that proselfs tend to behave 
in a more individualistic and competitive manner. 
As discussed above, SVO is a stable preference that is shaped by both genetic and 
environmental factors. Regardless of whether differences between prosocials and proselfs 
have their origins in genetic and/or environmental factors, my concern in the current thesis is 
with the psychological correlates of these differences. If prosocials are more concerned about 
the interests of the other person (the receiver) than proselfs, it seems likely that this concern 
will be manifested in emotions. It is quite common to hear someone say, “I help others 
because seeing them suffer upsets me and if I do not help them, I might feel guilty or 
regretful.” To what extent do prosocials and proselfs use emotions to guide their behaviour 
when making resource allocations between themselves and others? What role do emotions
play in deciding an individual’s prosocial behaviour? In the example just cited, we see a 
prosocial individual’s behaviour is shaped by his or her emotions. His or her sympathy for 
the plight of a needy other and the anticipation of future negative emotions appear to 
motivate the helping behaviour. In the next section of this chapter, I will turn to another 
central construct related to my main research question, namely anticipated emotion and its 
role in decision making and allocation behaviour. 
Chapter 110
1.3 Anticipated Emotions in Decision Making
Setting SVO to one side, I will discuss the role of emotions in decision making by 
specifically focusing on anticipated emotions. Referring back to the cookie example that was 
given at the start of this chapter, think about the emotions that come into play in the process 
of deciding how to split a cookie between yourself and another person. In relation to this 
example, individuals might anticipate feeling proud if they were to split the cookie equally 
but they might also anticipate regret about not keeping more for themselves. Here I would 
like to advance another central construct of my thesis, namely anticipated emotions and their 
role in decision making – particularly in resource allocation behaviour. I will identify 
theoretical perspectives that are relevant to this construct and also seek to pinpoint the 
specific anticipated emotions that are relevant to resource allocation decisions, namely 
anticipated pride, regret and guilt. 
Common sense and evolutionary logic suggest that our current emotional states direct 
the way we behave (DeWall, Baumeister, Chester, & Bushman, 2016). The ‘fight or flight’ 
concept coined by Walter Cannon (1915) is a commonly cited example of behaviour being 
caused by current emotional states that influence our motor responses. According to the fight 
or flight concept, when we are faced with danger, we can either confront the source of danger 
(fight) or run away from it (flight) (Cannon, 1915). Anger would typically cause one to fight 
and fear would typically cause one to flee (Russell, 2003, 2009). These scenarios are 
examples of how emotions can have a direct influence on behaviour. However, if one were to 
encounter an animal but does not yet know whether it is dangerous, it is less clear what 
emotions the individual would experience and how the fight or flight system would respond. 
Baumeister, Vohs, De Wall and Zhang (2007) proposed a dual-process model in 
which they distinguish between “conscious emotion,” which functions when an individual is 
aware of his/her emotional state, and “automatic affect,” which functions without intention 
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and unawareness. The “conscious emotion” often occurs after an action has been undertaken 
and triggers cognitive processing of the action, which leads to physiological changes that 
then activate motor responses. “Automatic affect,” on the other hand, is based on past 
emotional experiences that are stored in memory. Unlike “conscious emotion,” “automatic 
affect” informs subsequent behaviour very rapidly because past emotional situations, 
physiological changes and motor responses are already associated and connected in our 
brains. The current affect combined with past emotional experiences would allow individuals 
to anticipate emotional outcomes in order to make decisions. In a fast-changing situation, 
automatic affect provides an effective way to survive. 
1.4 Theoretical Perspectives on Emotions and Behaviour
From the above discussion, it follows that there are two kinds of links between 
emotions and behaviour. According to the emotion-as-direction perspective, current emotions 
guide behaviour directly (DeWall et al., 2016). This perspective has been studied extensively, 
but may not be applicable to all situations. Take for example, the scenario where anger causes 
people to fight and fear causes an individual to flee. If an individual is faced with a bully in 
school, s/he might experience fear, which may cause him/her to flee, or s/he may feel angry 
about being bullied, which may cause him/her to stay and confront the bully. In these 
examples, current emotion shapes subsequent behaviour. However, if s/he stopped to 
consider the consequences of fighting, such as both parties getting hurt, s/he might be less 
likely to confront the bully; likewise, s/he might anticipate feeling regret if s/he were to be 
teased for running away from the bully, and this might make her less likely to flee. Thus 
anger may lead someone to aggress and fear may lead someone to flee, but the anticipation of 
future emotions, such as regret, may also play a role in shaping behaviour. According to 
Baumeister and colleagues (2007), emotions may induce behavioural tendencies but it may 
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not always translate into actual behaviour. This brings us to the second theoretical 
perspective, namely the emotion-as-feedback perspective (DeWall et al., 2016). 
The emotion-as-feedback-perspective describes how anticipated emotions guide 
behaviour (DeWall et al., 2016). For example, if a student were to cheat during an exam and 
got caught, s/he would presumably experience regret about having cheated. However, if s/he 
had anticipated feeling this regret before actually engaging in the cheating, s/he may not have 
cheated in the first place in order to avoid experiencing this regret. The emotions that were 
anticipated in relation to the potential consequences of cheating would have changed the 
behaviour of the student. This assumes a cognitive process whereby the conscious emotions 
that were experienced as a result of an earlier action (or inaction) are stored in memory and 
provide information when a similar situation arises in the future. This information is then 
used to guide future behaviour. 
The emotion-as-feedback perspective is compatible with the view that emotions arise 
from cognitive appraisals, whereby individuals’ evaluations (or appraisals) of specific events 
give rise to certain emotions (Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel-Schetter, DeLongis, & Gruen, 
1986). According to appraisal theory emotions are based on individual interpretations of 
current situations and/or how the immediate environment affects the individual (Ellsworth & 
Scherer, 2003). This helps to explain why different individuals can experience different 
emotions when exposed to the same set of circumstances. This is relevant to individual 
differences in SVO because we can assume that individuals who differ in SVO also differ in 
how they appraise a given situation, which in turn will give rise to different emotions and 
thereby to different behaviours.
Of the two perspectives discussed above (the emotion-as-direction and emotion-as-
feedback perspective), the latter is the more relevant one for the purposes of this thesis. 
Indeed, it has been argued that anticipated emotions have a stronger effect on behaviour than 
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currently felt emotions (Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2015; Mellers & McGraw, 2001). 
A recent meta-analysis found that although the emotion-as-direction perspective has been 
investigated more than the emotion-as-feedback perspective, a significant influence on 
behaviour was found in only 22% of the emotion-as-direction perspective studies, whereas 
87% of the emotion-as-feedback studies found a significant influence (DeWall et al., 2016). 
This suggests that individuals routinely use anticipated emotions to guide their behaviour, 
seeking to avoid negative emotions (e.g., regret, disappointment and guilt) and to increase 
positive emotions (e.g., pride, satisfied and pleased) (Van Der Schalk, Bruder, & Manstead, 
2012).
Emotions can be categorised as positive or negative in valence (Russell, 2003). 
However, Pfister and Böhm (2008) argued that the structure of emotions may be more 
complex than this and that it might not be possible to group them in this way. For example, 
for someone who is angry, the anger may represent hostility and therefore be classed as 
negative, but at the same time, the anger may be felt as pleasurable as it makes the individual 
feel strong (Pfister & Böhm, 2008). Thus the positive and negative aspects of emotions are 
not always mutually exclusive, and it may therefore be unduly simplistic to distinguish 
emotions on the basis of their positive or the negative valence (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; 
Zeelenberg, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Pieters, 2008). Instead, individual emotions have 
distinct features and functions. In the current thesis, I will focus on distinct anticipated 
emotions, namely anticipated pride, regret and guilt that are deemed relevant emotions in the 
context of resource allocation behaviour.
To study psychological factors in resource allocation behaviour, economic games 
such as the UG (Güth et al., 1982) and DG (Kahneman et al., 1986) are commonly used. 
According to Kahneman and Tversky (1974), decision makers rely on heuristics to make 
their decisions. A heuristic is a rule of thumb that facilitates the decision making process, 
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when the decision may involve several options and it would be effortful (or in some complex 
cases even impossible) to work out all of the possible permutations. The psychological game 
theory (Geanakoplos, Pearce, & Stacchetti, 1989) uses mathematical models to explain the 
strategies available to an individual according to the payoffs available to him/herself and the 
game opponent. In this decision process, participants may be influenced by the emotions they 
anticipate when behaving one way or another, as a result of cognitive appraisals about the 
options available (see also Chang & Smith, 2015). These anticipated emotions can be 
regarded as heuristics that shape future decisions. 
In the next section, I will review decision-related emotions (pride, regret and guilt) 
and discuss how these emotions are relevant to resource allocation decisions. 
1.4.1 Decision-Related Emotions
Pride. Pride is often considered to be a pleasant emotion that is related to positive 
behaviour (Van Osch, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2018). People who experience pride tend 
to describe themselves using positive adjectives, such as accomplished, confident, and 
fulfilled (Van Osch et al., 2018). The nonverbal expression of pride (“small, non-Duchenne 
smile, head tilted slightly back, a visibly expanded posture, and arms either raised above the 
head with hands in fists or at sides with hands placed firmly on the hips” (Tracy, Robins, & 
Lagattuta, 2005, p. 251)) is recognized cross-culturally by children and adults (Tracy & 
Robins, 2008; Tracy et al., 2005; Van Osch, Breugelmans, Zeelenberg, & Fontaine, 2013). 
Pride is a “self-conscious” emotion which requires self-evaluation (Tracy, Shariff, & Cheng, 
2010); it involves both the “I” to evaluate the self and also the “me” that is evaluated. Pride 
can be distinguished into two distinct forms: authentic pride that results from internal, 
unstable and controllable causes (e.g., I got first place in the test because I practised hard), 
and hubristic pride that results from internal, stable and uncontrollable causes (e.g., I got first 
place because I am the best in everything I do) (Tracy & Robins, 2007). Tracy and Robins 
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(2007) argue that pride serves two primary social functions. First, authentic pride can 
reinforce prosocial behaviour, for example people who experience authentic pride attribute 
positive outcomes to their own efforts and this could motivate the goal to become better at 
something (Tracy & Robins, 2007). Second, hubristic pride enhances social status by 
informing the individual and others of the individual’s success. In this case, a feeling that 
results from an event that could trigger authentic pride develops into something more boastful 
(Tracy & Robins, 2007). Although the expression of hubristic pride can enhance someone’s 
social standing in some observers’ eyes, it is less likely than its authentic counterpart to 
generate prosocial outcomes. 
One group of researchers (Dorfman, Eyal, & Bereby-Meyer, 2014) investigated 
whether pride led to prosocial behaviour, although they did not distinguish between authentic 
and hubristic pride. Participants were asked to write about an event that would be a source of 
pride or joy before playing an economic game. In the control condition participants skipped 
this writing task and proceeded to the economic game immediately. This was a social 
dilemma task in which participants played a fishing game with another virtual player. On a 
computer screen, participants were told how many fish they had caught in each trial (there 
were 60 trials) and they were asked to return some (any amount of) fish to the lake. The rule 
of the game was that the number of fish in the lake should not be lower than 70. To make the 
game believable, participants were prompted with a message that the fish in the lake were 
reaching the cut-off amount of 70 fish after a certain number of trials. Participants in the
pride condition behaved more cooperatively by returning more fish to the lake than 
participants in the joy and control conditions. This suggests that prosocial behaviour is more 
likely when the concept of pride has been activated. 
The study by Dorfman and colleagues’ (2014) shows that experienced pride can 
increase prosocial behaviour. Other research has shown that the anticipation of pride also 
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leads to more prosocial behaviour in the context of pro-environmental behaviour (Onwezen, 
Antonides, & Bartels, 2013; Rezvani, Jansson, & Bodin, 2015) and in volunteer recruitment 
(Boezeman & Ellemers, 2008). However, the study by Dorfman and colleagues did not 
manipulate the source of pride or what it was that the participants were proud about. People 
can be proud about prosocial behaviour, but it is equally conceivable that they can be proud 
about competitive achievements. Van Der Schalk, Bruder and Manstead (2012) indeed 
showed that participants who anticipated pride about being fair were more likely to act fairly 
towards an anonymous other in an UG, but participants who anticipated pride about being 
unfair acted less fairly towards the anonymous other. These studies reveal that pride is a 
relevant emotion in the context of both fair and unfair allocation decisions and in the current 
thesis I therefore investigate the effect of anticipated pride on decision making in economic 
games.
Regret. Regret is a negative emotion that we experience when “realizing or imagining 
that our present situation would have been better, had we decided differently” (Zeelenberg & 
Pieters, 2007). Along similar lines, Kahneman and Tversky (1982) defined regret as a special 
form of frustration that is felt when one imagines making a decision that would produce a 
more desirable outcome than the one resulting from the actual decision made. Savage (1951)
proposed the ‘minimax’ regret principle which states that, in decision making, an individual 
will compute the maximum regret that they would experience for each option and then 
choose the option that would evoke the minimum amount of regret. Within the field of 
economics, it is proposed first that people experience both regret and rejoicing, and second 
that people try to anticipate these experiences of regret and rejoicing when making decisions 
under uncertainty (Loomes & Sugden, 1982). Research on regret in decision making has 
since expanded into many different fields beyond economics and psychology. For example, 
in the field of medicine, the role of regret has encouraged patients to think more elaborately 
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on future risks and non-risks if they do not proceed with breast surgical treatment (Speck, 
Neuman, Resnick, Mellers, & Fleisher, 2016; S. Van Dijk, Van Roosmalen, Otten, & 
Stalmeier, 2008) and in relation to nutrition, the anticipation of regret reduces the 
consumption of processed meat (Carfora, Caso, & Conner, 2017). 
In the current research, we focus on the role of anticipating regret in decision making. 
The fear of future regrets influences decision makers’ behaviour (Janis & Mann, 1977). 
Several studies have shown that people tend to avoid regret by modifying their choices (Van 
de Ven & Zeelenberg, 2011; Van Der Schalk et al., 2012). In these studies, anticipated regret 
refers to the difference between the outcome chosen and the alternative outcomes that could 
have been chosen. For example, by comparing how much regret one would feel when acting 
unfairly with the regret that one would feel when behaving fairly. Because individuals try to 
avoid feeling regret they should be more likely to treat other individuals fairly if they believe 
that the regret they would experience when acting unfairly would be greater than the regret 
they would experience when acting fairly. On the other hand, they should be more likely to 
treat another person unfairly if they anticipate that the regret from acting fairly would be 
greater than the regret from acting unfairly. The tendency to avoid feeling regretful is known 
as regret aversion (Van de Ven & Zeelenberg, 2011).
Guilt. Guilt is a feeling that occurs when you believe that you have done something 
bad (Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994) or when you think that you have violated 
social norms and/or your own moral values (Berndsen & Manstead, 2007; Kugler & Jones, 
1992). Emotions that are related to guilt are sometimes treated as interchangeable with shame 
(Haidt, 2003) and embarrassment (Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). Tangney and 
colleagues (2005) argued that shame results from a negative behaviour that is attributed to a 
bad self, whereas guilt results from negative behaviour that is attributed to something more 
specific and circumstantial. Embarrassment and shame are similar in the sense that when 
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people experience these emotions, they will tend to hide from other (Tangney et al., 2005). 
However, because these emotions are experienced after engaging in a wrongdoing or is 
anticipated when contemplating engaging in a wrongdoing, for the purposes of the research 
reported in this thesis I grouped guilt, shame and embarrassment together as guilt. My 
concern is with how anticipated guilt alters behaviour, specifically allocation behaviour in 
economic games. 
Research has shown that when individuals experience guilt, they alter their behaviour 
and become more prosocial in the future in order to avoid feeling guilty again (Baumeister, 
Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2006). However, what happens 
when an individual anticipates guilt upon a future action? According to Massi Lindsey and 
colleagues (2007), anticipated guilt can be activated by imagining a potential wrongdoing (or 
failing to act in a righteous way), and individuals can avoid this future guilt through altering 
their future behaviour. For example, in a study that investigated whether guilt proneness 
would decrease re-offending in a prisoner population, Tangney and colleagues (2014) first 
interviewed prisoners shortly after being incarcerated and had a follow-up interview one year 
after they were released into the community. In the first interview, the prisoners completed 
measures of shame- and guilt proneness and externalization of blame using the Test of Self-
Conscious Affect (Socially Deviant Version) (TOSCA-SD; Hanson & Tangney, 1996). At 
the follow-up interview, participants were asked what type of offences they had committed 
and charged for (if any) and offence records were also used. As predicted, it was found that 
prisoners with higher guilt proneness were less likely to reoffend compared to their less guilt 
prone counterparts (Tangney et al., 2014). This suggests that thinking of the guilt that would 
be aroused from reoffending prevented convicted criminals from reoffending. 
As guilt is a moral emotion (Malti & Krettenauer, 2013) and is linked to empathy, it 
can be argued that it enhances the likelihood of engaging in prosocial behaviour (Kochanska 
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& Aksan, 2006). Research has shown that anticipated guilt is indeed a strong predictor of 
prosocial behaviour. For example, anticipation of guilt increases the intention to register as an 
organ donor (Wang, 2011) and it also increases pro-environmental behaviour (Schneider, 
Zaval, Weber, & Markowitz, 2017). 
Emotions in decision making. The decision-related emotions discussed above, all have 
relevance to prosocial behaviour. I also reviewed research showing that the relation between 
emotion and behaviour is well explained by the emotion-as-feedback perspective. This 
perspective argues that previous experiences of emotion are stored in memory and are then 
activated when similar situations are encountered in the future, allowing individuals to 
anticipate how they would feel if they were to act the same way. This enables individuals to 
modify their behaviour in order to pursue or to avoid certain emotional experiences (Maitner 
et al., 2006; Van Der Schalk et al., 2012). It could be argued that the influence of anticipated 
emotion allows a more reasonable decision to be reached (Baumeister et al., 2007). This 
demonstrates how anticipated pride, regret and guilt guide behaviours and the importance of 
considering anticipated emotion in decision making. 
1.5 Mediating Role of Anticipated Emotions
As discussed in the above individual differences in SVO influence allocation 
behaviour (Balliet et al., 2009; Messick & McClintock, 1968). Although the relationship 
between SVO and allocation behaviour is well established, SVO is commonly measured by 
asking participants to choose a preferred division of resources between themselves and an 
anonymous other. These measures are therefore very similar in form to the decisions that 
have to be made in economic games, where an individual is asked to divide resources 
between him/herself and another person. In some sense, SVO and resource allocation 
decisions in an economic game can both be seen as an expression of the individual’s 
preferences. It could be argued that the SVO measures commonly used in the literature do not 
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shed much light on the psychological processes that are responsible for differences in 
allocation behaviour. It has been proposed that the greater tendency of prosocials to engage in 
cooperative or prosocial behaviour is due to sympathy and/or empathy (Eggum et al., 2011; 
Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008). This raises the question of whether prosocials and proselfs 
make different use of anticipated emotions to guide their behaviour. Although (as discussed 
above) there is evidence that anticipated emotions influence allocation behaviour (Mellers & 
McGraw, 2001; Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008), to my knowledge the relation between SVO 
and allocation behaviour and the relation between anticipated emotions and allocation 
behaviour have thus far been studied independently. If both SVO and anticipated emotions 
predict allocation behaviour, what is the relation between these two constructs, and how do 
they jointly determine allocation behaviour? It seems plausible that the psychological 
mechanism underlying differences in the preference for allocations of prosocials and proselfs 
is differences in anticipated emotion (Chapter 3 discusses this topic more comprehensively). 
The central research question in this thesis is whether anticipated emotions mediate the 
relationship between SVO and allocation behaviour. Below, I provide an overview of how 
the subsequent chapters in this thesis address this main research question. 
1.6 Overview of Subsequent Chapters
1.6.1 Chapter 2
Previous studies have shown that SVO is predictive of the extent to which people 
engage in cooperative or competitive behaviour in social dilemmas (Mellers & McGraw, 
2001; Van Der Schalk et al., 2012). The current measures of social value orientation (SVO) 
involve choosing between different options regarding how a certain amount of resource is to 
be divided between the self and another person. Use of these measures has demonstrated that 
SVO is a stable individual difference that captures preferences in social decision making 
(Messick & McClintock, 1968) and that there is a relation between SVO and emotional 
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processes in decision making (Messick & McClintock, 1968; Murphy et al., 2011; Van Lange 
et al., 1997). However, these SVO measures do not provide any real insight into the different 
psychological motivations underlying decision making. The aim of the studies reported in 
Chapter 2 was to develop a measure that would reliably and validly measure anticipated 
emotions about fair and unfair allocations, so that I could then go on to examine how this 
measure, which I call the Index of Cooperative and Competitive Emotions (ICE) measure, is 
related to SVO and to allocation behaviour. Chapter 2 provides a detailed discussion of the 
development of the new measure, including evidence of its psychometric properties. 
1.6.2 Chapter 3
In Chapter 3, I addressed my main research question, namely does anticipated 
emotion mediate the relationship between SVO and allocation behaviour? The aim of the 
studies reported in Chapter 3 was to investigate whether individual differences in allocation 
behaviour can be explained in terms of anticipated emotions. In these studies I measured 
participants’ anticipated emotions using the newly developed ICE measure discussed in 
Chapter 2, participants’ SVO using the SVO Slider Measure (Murphy et al., 2011) and 
allocation behaviour using economic games (the UG and the DG). The mediating effect of 
anticipated emotions on the relation between SVO and allocation behaviour was tested in two 
different populations (psychology students and business students).
1.6.3 Chapter 4
According to Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), individuals derive part 
of their identity from the groups they belong to and in order to feel positively about 
themselves, they will search for attributes that positively distinguish their ingroup from other 
groups. This search for positive ingroup distinctiveness should be especially evident in an 
intergroup setting, where individuals are more keenly aware of their group membership 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Consistent with this reasoning, researchers have found that 
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participants are more generous to ingroup members than to outgroup members when 
allocating resources, reflecting ingroup favouritism (Ben-Ner, McCall, Stephane, & Wang, 
2009). In the studies reported in Chapter 3, participants were asked to allocate tokens 
between themselves and an anonymous other whose group identity was unknown. However, 
in the studies reported in Chapter 4, the receivers’ ethnic identity was systematically varied in 
a cultural context where ethnic identity is a salient social issue. My aim was to see whether 
allocation behaviour would differ as a function of the match or mismatch between allocator 
and receiver ethnic identity. Malaysian participants were recruited for these studies due to the 
multi-ethnic composition of the Malaysian population, which creates an ideal platform for the 
investigation of intergroup effects on resource allocation behaviour. Additionally, the aim of 
the studies in Chapter 4 was to see if the findings of Chapter 3 would replicate in a non-
western sample. 
1.6.4 Chapter 5
The findings reported in Chapters 3 and 4 showed that anticipated emotions played a 
mediating role in the relationship between SVO and allocation behaviour (as predicted). In 
particular, I found that participants who are high in SVO (and therefore prosocial), anticipate 
more cooperative than competitive emotions and that this (at least in part) can account for the 
fact that they give more tokens to others than participants low in SVO (proselfs). However, to 
what extent do these anticipated emotions causally influence allocation behaviour? Although 
the evidence from the mediation analyses reported in Chapter 3 is consistent with the view 
that allocation behaviour is influenced by anticipated emotions, the story would be more 
compelling if anticipated emotions could be experimentally manipulated and differences in 
allocation behaviour would result from it. This was the central aim of the two studies 
reported in Chapter 5. Participants were instructed to down-regulate or up-regulate their 
anticipated emotions prior to taking part in resource allocation. The studies aimed to show 
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that participants would allocate less tokens in the down-regulation condition and allocate 
more tokens in the up-regulation condition than in the control condition. The studies also 
aimed to examine whether emotion regulation moderates the influence of SVO on allocation 
behaviour. It is expected that findings would show that prosocials would become less 
prosocial when asked to down-regulate their emotions, while proselfs would become more 
prosocial when asked to up-regulate their emotions. 
1.6.5 Chapter 6
To conclude the thesis, in Chapter 6 I summarize the findings of the studies reported 
in the earlier chapters and discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings. 
Every study has its limitations, and here I discuss the key limitations in terms of 
methodological and theoretical issues of the studies reported in the previous chapters. Finally, 
I discuss how future research could build on the current findings. 
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2 Chapter 2: Development of the Index of Cooperative and Competitive Emotion 
(ICE) Measure
2.1 Introduction
Anticipated emotion plays an important role in resource allocation behaviour. 
Researchers have shown that when people face an allocation decision they consider the extent 
to which the outcome of the decision will make them feel positive or negative (Van Der 
Schalk et al., 2012). When considering these emotional consequences of their decisions, these 
anticipated emotions motivate them to behave either fairly or unfairly to another person. This 
shows that individuals strive to feel positive rather than negative when making a decision and 
that this is reflected in their decision making. Here, I propose that differences in social value 
orientation (SVO) may be related to the extent to which individuals anticipate positive and 
negative emotions about fair or unfair decisions. 
2.1.1 The development of SVO measure
Previous studies have shown that SVO is a stable preference in allocation behaviour 
(Messick & McClintock, 1968). Different researchers have developed well-known measures 
to determine an individual’s SVO, for example, the decomposed game (Messick & 
McClintock, 1968), the Triple Dominance Measure (TDM) (Van Lange et al., 1997) and the 
SVO Slider Measure (SVO-SM) (Murphy et al., 2011). Use of these measures reveals that 
SVO is an underlying motivation of cooperative and competitive behaviours in resource 
allocation and social dilemmas. However, none of these measures takes into account the 
proposed anticipated emotion as a psychological mechanism that reflects these differences in 
preferences and mediates their impact on decision making. Here, the nature of each of these 
measures is discussed, followed by an explanation of the development of a new measure that 
focuses on anticipated emotions as a psychological construct that may be responsible for 
individual differences for prosocial and competitive motivations in resource allocation. 
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Early studies done by Messick and McClintock (1968) showed that SVO is an 
important motivation underlying cooperative and competitive behaviour in social dilemmas. 
Messick and McClintock (1968) demonstrated the three motivational orientations: 
individualist (focus on own gain), prosocial (focus on joint gain) and competitive (focus on 
relative gain) by using decomposed games (deviced by Pruitt, 1967). Participants played the 
decomposed game consisting of 80 different two-choice matrices that depicted divisions 
between self and an imaginary ‘other’ person. Those completing the measure were told that 
they would not meet or interact with the ‘other’ person. With the different configurations of 
the 80 different two-choice matrices depicting six classes (calculated using an algebraic 
permutation of the three motives outcome), Messick and McClintock (1968) manipulated the 
information given to the participants after each condition. There were three conditions, 
whereby participants received their own cumulative score, the joint cumulative score of both 
players, or the difference between their own and the other’s cumulative scores in the game. 
This was done to isolate the social motives underlying allocation behaviour. The researchers 
demonstrated that these decomposed games can assess individual motivational orientations 
and these orientations are affected when certain information is given to the participants. For 
example, when participants were given information on the relative score achieved, they 
tended to maximise the difference between themselves and the other player’s scores, 
compared to participants who were only given information about their own cumulative score 
or the joint cumulative score. 
In later research, SVO was also measured using a similar decomposed game but here 
the game was modified into a more concise measure referred to as the Triple Dominance 
Measure (TDM) (Van Lange et al., 1997). Van Lange and colleagues (1997) reduced 
Messick and McClintock’s (1968) decomposed games to nine items and simplified the 
choices provided in each item. In the TDM each item involves the allocation of a number of 
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points between the responder and an imaginary ‘other’ person. The three options represent a 
competitive choice (which maximizes the difference between the responder and the ‘other’), 
an individualistic choice (which maximizes the individual gain for the responder) or a 
prosocial choice (which involves an equal distribution of points and maximizes the joint 
gain). In this way, the researchers framed the options in such a way that each item 
represented one SVO. They recruited participants on campuses (e.g., in cafeterias and 
libraries). Participants were classified as prosocial, individualist, or competitor if at least six 
of their responses were consistent in terms of preference. They identified 248 participants as 
prosocial, 164 as individualistic, 46 as competitors, and 115 participants could not be 
classified. Although this measure is a simplified and concise measure as compared to 
Messick and McClintock’s (1968) measure of SVO, the TDM is not capable of identifying 
everyone’s SVO, because as we have just seen, 20% of participants were left unidentified. 
A measure that addresses some of the shortcomings of the TDM is the SVO-Slider 
Measure (SVO-SM) developed by Murphy and colleagues (2011). This measure consists of 
15 items and each item has 9 options. Across the 9 options, a continuum of joint payoff is 
presented to the participants whereby they are able to indicate which allocation they prefer. 
Unlike the decomposed games and the TDM, the SVO-SM treats SVO as a continuous rather 
than categorical variable. The SVO-SM is scored in such a way that a single index of a 
person’s SVO is computed by taking the mean allocation for self and the mean allocation for 
the other, which is converted to an SVO ‘angle’. Thus, this measure is more sensitive to 
subtle individual differences, because it measures SVO on a continuous scale rather than as a 
categorical division. This makes use of information that would be lost when converting a 
continuous variable to a categorical variable. 
The three measures discussed above capture SVO in terms of choices between 
different options regarding how resources should be divided between self and another person. 
Chapter 2 27
These measures have demonstrated that SVO is a stable individual difference that captures 
preferences in social decision making. Another line of research has demonstrated that there is 
a relation between SVO and emotional processes in decision making (Zeelenberg et al., 
2008). In a study by Nelissen and Dijker (2007), it was found that the induction of fear only 
affected prosocials, leading them to behave less cooperatively in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (a 
type of social dilemma). The researchers noted that fear is related to avoiding risk or loss in a 
social dilemma context. By inducing fear, they argued that individuals would behave less 
cooperatively in order to avoid losses. However, this should only affect individuals who are 
not already motivated to not cooperate. This explains why it was only prosocials who were 
affected by the fear induction. By contrast, the induction of guilt only affected proselfs, such 
that they behaved more cooperatively in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Nelissen and Dijker (2007)
argued that a guilt induction would lead participants to take the other person’s interests into 
account. However, prosocials already have a dispositional tendency to cooperate, so inducing 
guilt would not increase prosocials’ cooperation. Because proselfs do not have a tendency to 
cooperate in social dilemmas, inducing guilt should trigger proselfs to think about the other 
player and behave more cooperatively. This example shows that emotions interact with 
dispositional preferences in social dilemma situations. More specifically, the induction of fear 
and guilt before making a decision leads the individual to consider features of the decision 
(the possibility of loss, or the interests of the other person) that they might not normally take 
into account. 
2.1.2 Measuring anticipated emotion as a psychological mechanism of the differences 
in SVO
The anticipated emotions that I will focus on in my thesis in relation to resource 
allocation decision making are pride, regret and guilt. Anticipating feeling proud about being 
fair can lead people to share more resources with another person, whereas anticipating feeling 
Chapter 228
proud about being unfair can lead people to share less of their resources (Van Der Schalk et 
al., 2012). Research has also shown that there is a link between the consideration of pride and 
cooperative behaviour in social dilemmas (Dorfman et al., 2014). Anticipated regret and guilt 
about being fair can lead people to share fewer resources, whereas anticipated regret and guilt 
about being unfair can lead people to share more resources (Ketelaar & Tung Au, 2003; Van 
Der Schalk et al., 2012). These results show that anticipated emotions can both increase and 
decrease cooperative and competitive behaviours. 
The literature reviewed above shows that anticipated emotions can be predictive of 
cooperative and competitive behaviour. Anticipated pride about being fair and anticipated 
guilt and regret about being unfair could be classified as cooperative emotions. Similarly, 
anticipated pride about being unfair and anticipated guilt and regret about being fair can be 
classified as competitive emotions. The aim of the studies reported in this chapter is to 
develop a measure that captures the anticipated emotions relevant to decision making in a 
single measure. Such a measure should be able to capture the psychological motivation 
underlying decision making that is not captured by SVO measures. I will refer to this 
measure as the Index of Cooperative and competitive Emotions (ICE) measure. This index is 
specifically designed to capture the cooperative and competitive emotions that are anticipated 
by an individual when this person considers making a fair or unfair division of resources. 
In previous research, anticipated emotions have normally been evaluated by asking 
participants to rate the emotions that they expect to feel in a certain imaginary situation on a 
scale running from 1, not at all, to a higher number indicating very much (C. M. Brown & 
McConnell, 2011; Van Der Schalk et al., 2012). For example, in the studies by Van Der 
Schalk and colleagues (2012), anticipated emotions were measured by providing participants 
with allocation scenarios and asking participants how would they feel in each of two 
scenarios, one in which they divided the allocation equally and another in which they divided 
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it unequally favouring themselves. Participants rated the extent to which they would feel 
either proud or regretful in each scenario on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). 
In this chapter, a detailed discussion of the new measure is provided, along with 
evidence of its psychometric properties. The aim of Study 1 was to develop a reliable and 
valid ICE measure. In Study 2, I was interested in the stability of the ICE measure by 
examining the correlation between SVO and ICE measure when the measurement of SVO 
and ICE took place at two different time-points. In Study 3, the test-retest reliability of the 
ICE measure was examined by examining the correlation between two ICE measures that 
were administered at different time-points. Studies 2 and 3 draw on data from studies that 
will be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
2.2 Study 1
Study 1 was conducted to develop the ICE measure. The study used two different 
samples, psychology and business school students, with a view to exploring whether there are 
any differences between the two groups in anticipated cooperative and competitive emotions 
in relation to resource allocation behaviour. According to Van Lange, Schippers and Balliet 
(2011), there are more prosocials than individualists among psychology students and there 
are more individualists than prosocials among business students. Thus, I predicted there 
would be differences in the amount of cooperative and competitive emotions anticipated 
between these populations. 
2.2.1 Method
2.2.1.1 Design and participants
Sixty students from Cardiff University were recruited to participate in a study in 
exchange for £3. In addition, there was a lottery in which four participants could win up to a 
maximum of £30 in Amazon vouchers. The lottery is further explained in the Method section 
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(under Allocation Behaviour). Of the 60 students (43 females, 17 males; Mage= 22.03, SD = 
6.16), 30 were psychology students and 30 were business students. The questionnaire was 
administered online using Qualtrics. 
2.2.1.2 Materials
Index of Cooperative and Competitive Emotions (ICE) Measure. Participants 
were presented with six scenarios in each of which they had to imagine that they had made a 
division of tokens between themselves and an anonymous other (see Appendix A for details 
of how an item from the ICE measure was presented to participants). It was explained that the 
tokens were to be converted to points according to different exchange rates (1:1, 2:1 and 1:2), 
but the other person was not aware of these exchange rates. In this way, we created scenarios 
that differed in the level of fairness of the allocation: one altruistic (the receiver receiving 
twice as much as the participant), two fair (equal outcomes for both players), two unfair (the 
participant receiving twice as much as the other person), and one very unfair (participant 
receiving four times as much as the other person). The fair allocation conditions had two 
exchange rates: 1) 1:1, whereby a division of 18allocator:18recipient remained the same after 
applying the exchange rate; and 2) 1:2, whereby an allocation of 24allocator:12recipient resulted in 
an outcome of 24allocator:24recipient after applying the exchange rate. The unfair allocation 
conditions also had two exchange rates: 1) 1:1, whereby an allocation of 24allocator:12recipient
remained the same after applying the exchange rate; and 2) 2:1, whereby an allocation of 
18allocator:18recipient resulted in an outcome of 36allocator:18recipient after applying the exchange 
rate. The very fair allocation condition applied an exchange rate of 1:2 to a division of 
18allocator:18recipient which resulted in an outcome of 18allocator:36recipient. The very unfair 
allocation condition applied an exchange rate of 2:1 to a division of 24allocator:12recipient which 
resulted in an outcome 48allocator:12recipient.
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An example from the ICE measure is a scenario in which participants are asked to 
imagine that there are 36 tokens at stake, and the participant proposes taking 24 tokens for 
him/herself and giving 12 tokens to the anonymous other. With an exchange rate of 2:1, the 
participant would receive 48 points and the anonymous other would receive 12 points. This 
depicts the very unfair allocation scenario. 
Participants are then asked to rate how they would feel about the allocation in the 
scenario, using a scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). The ten emotions that were 
measured were pleased, proud, satisfied, regretful, sorry, disappointed, embarrassed, foolish, 
guilty, and ashamed. Theoretically, these ten emotions were chosen to capture three emotion 
constructs: pride, regret and guilt. The terms pleased, proud and satisfied were expected to 
cluster together and index pride; the terms regretful, sorry, and disappointed were expected 
to cluster together and index regret; and the terms embarrassed, foolish, guilty, and ashamed
were expected to cluster together and index guilt. These expectations were based on the 
shared positive valence of the terms pleased, proud and satisfied (Tracy & Robins, 2007; Van 
Osch et al., 2018); the shared counterfactual character of regretful, sorry, and disappointed
(where the person experiencing the emotion can imagine a better state of affairs if he or she 
had acted or chosen differently) (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007); and the shared self-blame 
character of the terms embarrassed, foolish, guilty and ashamed (where the person appears to 
feel that he or she is responsible for bringing about an unwanted state of affairs) (Haidt, 2003; 
Niedenthal et al., 1994).
Social Value Orientation. Participants' SVO was assessed using the SVO-SM 
(Murphy et al., 2011). As noted above, the SVO-SM consists of 15 items and each item 
involves 9 allocation options. Participants are expected to choose the most preferred 
allocation between themselves and the recipient (an anonymous other). From participants' 
choices, an SVO ‘angle’ can be computed. Larger angles reflect greater prosociality. 
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Specifically, altruists would have an angle greater than 57.15°; prosocials would score angles 
between 22.45° and 57.15°; individualists would have angles between -12.4° and 22.45°; and 
competitive individuals would have an angle less than -12.04°. In this study, I treat the SVO 
angle score as a continuous variable. 
Allocation behaviour. The Dictator Game (DG; Kahneman et al., 1986) and the 
Ultimatum Game (UG; Güth et al., 1982) were used to measure allocation behaviour. In both 
games, the participant played the role of allocator and was given a total of 30 tokens to divide 
between him/herself and an anonymous other. Participants were also asked to state the 
minimum offer that they would accept if they were in the role of the recipient in the UG. The 
participants were told that the tokens had real monetary value, in the sense that at the end of 
the study, two pairs of participants would be randomly selected and would be paid out 
according to the allocation made in the economic games. For the pair of participants chosen 
under the DG, the payout would simply be based on the allocator’s proposal. For the pair of 
participants chosen under the UG, the minimum that the player would accept as a recipient 
was used to determine the outcome of the UG. For example, if the participant selected as the 
allocator had proposed 20allocator:10recipient, and the minimum acceptable offer indicated by the 
recipient was 15allocator:15recipient, then the pair would receive nothing, but if the minimum 
acceptable offer indicated by the recipient was 25allocator:5recipient then the pair would receive 
the amount of money proposed by the allocator. 
2.2.1.3 Procedure
Participants first completed a consent form. Next, they completed a demographic 
questionnaire (assessing age, gender, self-reported fluency in English, university course and 
year of study). Participants then completed the ICE measure, reporting their anticipated 
emotions for the six different allocation scenarios, which were presented in a randomized 
order. Then they made their own allocations in each of two economic games, the DG and the 
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UG, which were presented in a counter-balanced order. Next, participants responded to an 
attention check that tested whether participants were actually paying attention to the content 
of the questionnaire. Specifically, the attention check asked them to skip a question and move 
onto the next phase of the questionnaire. If participants clicked on any of the response 
options, it would show that they had not read the full question carefully and they would fail 
the attention check. Participants then completed the SVO-SM, followed by the TDM. 
Participants were next asked to state the minimum offer that they would accept if they were 
the recipient rather than the allocator. Next, participants were asked if they had taken their 
participation in the study seriously. Finally, participants were thanked, debriefed and received 
their reward.
2.2.2 Results
2.2.2.1 Data treatment 
Out of 60 participants (28 Psychology students and 27 Economics students), data 
from 55 participants (Mage = 21.64, SD = 5.15) were retained for analysis. There were 15 
Males and 40 Females. Data from participants who admitted that they had not been serious in 
answering the questionnaire (N = 1) and from those who took longer than 2.5 times the 
median response time (Mdn = 20.42, N = 4) to complete the study were dropped. 
2.2.2.2 Factor analysis
Principal component analysis was used to group emotion items of the different ICE 
scenarios into factors. We conducted six exploratory factor analyses with Varimax 
(orthogonal) rotation, one for each of the scenarios. For example, in one factor analysis we 
included the emotion items of the fair allocation scenario with an exchange rate of 1:1, and in 
another factor analysis we included the emotion items of the fair allocation scenario with an 
exchange rate of 1:2. 
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For all factor analyses, a three-factor solution was specified, in accordance with the 
theoretical arguments given above. It was also the case that the ‘elbow’ in the scree plots 
tended to occur after the first three factors. The items satisfied, proud and pleased loaded 
consistently on one factor in all six analyses (see Tables 2.1 – 2.6). This factor was labelled 
pride. The ways in which the remaining items loaded on the other two factors suggested that 
these could be labelled as guilt and regret. However, the item loadings for these two factors 
were less consistent than they were for the pride factor. For factor labelled guilt, the emotions 
that loaded consistently on this factor were guilty, ashamed and embarrassed. For the factor 
labelled regret, the emotion that loaded consistently on this factor was disappointed. 
Regretful, foolish and sorry were the three emotion items that did not consistently load on the 
same factors in the different analyses. Therefore, I excluded foolish and sorry from the ICE 
measure. Regretful was retained in the measure on theoretical grounds, given that it 
represents one of the key emotions that I was aiming to assess. In order to arrive at a balanced 
number of items (2) for each factor, I also decided to eliminate satisfied from the pride cluster 
and embarrassed from the guilt cluster. This left pleased and proud as the items capturing 
pride, regretful and disappointed as the items capturing regret, and guilty and ashamed as the 
items capturing guilt.
Because the ICE measure was developed to predict behaviour in DG and UG, the very 
fair and very unfair scenarios from the ICE measure were not included in further analyses. 
This was because it was felt that the exchange rates in the ICE measure should reflect those 
used in the DG and UG. Also, the use of different exchange rates increased the complexity of 
the ICE measure. Furthermore, the variation in exchange rates appeared to be redundant 
according to the factor analyses because it is evident that the factor structure remained 
broadly consistent across all allocation condition scenarios. Thus, there was no added benefit 
of using the different exchange rates. 
Chapter 2 35
For each of the three resulting factors, internal consistency was investigated by 
calculating Cronbach’s alpha. The resulting values for each cluster in the ICE measure were 
as follows: anticipated pride (pleased and proud; fair, a = .86; unfair, a = .81), anticipated
regret (regretful and disappointed; fair, a = .73; unfair, a = .81) and anticipated guilt (guilty 
and ashamed; fair, a = .56; unfair, a = .92). 
Table 2.1. Factor loadings and communalities based on a principal components analysis with 
varimax rotation for 10 items of the fair scenario with the exchange rate 1:1 ratio in Study 1 
(N = 55)
Item Loadings Communality
Guilt Pride Regret
Embarrassed .921 -.164 .093 .884
Ashamed .921 -.164 .093 .884
Guilty .875 .015 .109 .778
Sorry .711 .058 .169 .537
Pleased -.087 .912 -.192 .876
Satisfied -.031 .903 -.290 .900
Proud -.064 .900 .128 .830
Regretful .173 -.125 .857 .780
Disappointed -.023 -.128 .757 .590
Foolish .291 -.011 .746 .642
Eigenvalue 3.824 2.319 1.558
% of Total Variance 38.243 23.191 15.576
Total Variance 77.011%
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Table 2.2. Factor loadings and communalities based on a principal components analysis with 
varimax rotation for 10 items of the unfair scenario with the exchange rate 1:1 ratio in Study 
1 (N = 55)
Item Loadings Communality
Guilt Pride Regret
Sorry .878 -.177 .233 .857
Ashamed .874 -.106 .262 .843
Regretful .847 -.208 .110 .774
Guilty .829 -.281 .317 .866
Embarrassed .824 -.272 .336 .865
Pleased -.250 .840 -.261 .835
Satisfied -.107 .802 -.347 .775
Proud -.213 .795 .221 .726
Foolish .474 .026 .744 .779
Disappointed .343 -.378 .676 .717
Eigenvalue 5.776 1.540 .722
% of Total Variance 57.760 15.400 7.217
Total Variance 80.377%
Table 2.3. Factor loadings and communalities based on a principal components analysis with 
varimax rotation for 10 items of the fair scenario with the exchange rate 1:2 ratio in Study 1 
(N = 55)
Item Loadings Communality
Guilt Pride Regret
Ashamed .910 -.047 -.034 .832
Guilty .892 .035 .109 .809
Foolish .716 -.279 .019 .591
Embarrassed .685 .094 .291 .563
Satisfied .001 .917 -.231 .894
Pleased -.118 .882 -.253 .857
Proud -.053 .845 .009 .716
Regretful .069 -.036 .882 .785
Disappointed .071 -.355 .636 .535
Sorry .330 -.137 .344 .246
Eigenvalue 3.423 2.306 1.100
% of Total Variance 34.224 23.057 10.996
Total Variance 68.278%
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Table 2.4. Factor loadings and communalities based on a principal components analysis with 
varimax rotation for 10 items of the unfair scenario with the exchange rate 2:1 ratio in Study 
1 (N = 55)
Item Loadings Communality
Guilt Pride Regret
Guilty .899 -.126 .233 .878
Sorry .896 -.009 .148 .825
Ashamed .844 -.198 .278 .829
Embarrassed .693 -.098 .403 .653
Satisfied -.185 .828 -.185 .754
Proud .021 .821 .068 .679
Pleased -.170 .818 -.235 .754
Foolish .223 -.056 .919 .897
Disappointed .474 -.224 .629 .670
Regretful .494 -.192 .553 .587
Eigenvalue 4.959 1.763 .804
% of Total Variance 49.590 17.627 8.045
Total Variance 75.262%
Table 2.5. Factor loadings and communalities based on a principal components analysis with 
varimax rotation for 10 items of the very fair scenario with the exchange rate 1:2 ratio in 
Study 1 (N = 55)
Item Loadings Communality
Regret Pride Guilt
Regretful .854 -.044 -.153 .755
Disappointed .703 -.378 .279 .715
Sorry .693 .179 -.003 .512
Foolish .598 -.276 .345 .553
Satisfied -.146 .865 .012 .770
Pleased -.260 .864 .028 .814
Proud .239 .695 -.079 .546
Ashamed .204 -.070 .866 .796
Guilty -.158 .071 .815 .694
Embarrassed .571 -.087 .575 .665
Eigenvalue 3.364 1.882 1.572
% of Total Variance 33.644 18.821 15.721
Total Variance 68.185%
Chapter 238
Table 2.6. Factor loadings and communalities based on a principal components analysis with 
varimax rotation for 10 items of the very unfair scenario with the exchange rate 2:1 ratio in 
Study 1 (N = 55)
Item Loadings Communality
Guilt Pride Regret
Guilty .858 -.296 .155 .848
Ashamed .850 -.293 .259 .876
Sorry .836 .041 .360 .831
Regretful .797 -.266 .343 .824
Embarrassed .758 -.376 .326 .823
Pleased -.216 .856 -.251 .843
Satisfied -.177 .840 -.376 .878
Proud -.215 .837 .174 .778
Foolish .393 -.062 .788 .779
Disappointed .458 -.268 .679 .743
Eigenvalue 5.997 1.566 .657
% of Total Variance 59.973 15.658 6.570
Total Variance 82.201%
2.2.2.3 The index of cooperative and competitive emotions (ICE) 
I created index-scores for cooperative and competitive emotions (ICE scores) by 
calculating the difference between responses on items relating to the fair and the unfair 
scenarios, in such a way that higher scores always reflected more cooperative emotions. 
Specifically, to calculate ICE-pride, the score for anticipated pride about being unfair was 
subtracted from the score for anticipated pride about being fair, while for ICE-regret and 
ICE-guilt, the scores relating to fair scenarios were subtracted from the scores relating to 
unfair scenarios. These indices can be interpreted in such a way that a negative score means 
anticipating more competitive emotions, having a positive score means anticipating more 
cooperative emotions, with a zero indicating no difference in the anticipation of cooperative 
and competitive emotions. 
Based on the distributions of each ICE as shown in Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, 
participants had on average a positive score on these indices on average. This suggests that 
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they generally anticipated more cooperative emotions than competitive emotions with respect 
to resource allocation behaviour. The distribution of ICE-pride appears to have a fairly 
normal distribution, as compared to ICE-regret and ICE-guilt. Scores for ICE-pride, ICE-
regret and ICE-guilt were strongly and significantly correlated (see Table 2.7). This provided 
a rationale for averaging the three indices into a single ICE measure. Thus, an overall ICE 
score was computed, which will be referred to as ICE-PRG (see Figure 2.4 for the 
distribution of scores on this measure). 
Figure 2.1. Distribution of ICE-Pride scores (Study 1).
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Figure 2.2. Distribution of ICE-Regret scores (Study 1).
Figure 2.3. Distribution of ICE-Guilt scores (Study 1).
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Figure 2.4. Distribution of ICE-PRG scores (Study 1).
Table 2.7 reveals that ICE-PRG is positively related to SVO and allocation behaviour 
in both DG and UG. This is also depicted in Figure 2.5. In line with my expectations, this 
suggests that the more prosocial someone is, the more this person anticipates experiencing 
cooperative emotions. Also, ICE-PRG and the tokens allocated to the receiver in both DG 
and UG are significantly positively correlated. This shows that people who anticipate 
cooperative emotions share more resources with another person. Both of these relationships 
are consistent with the theoretical rationale given in the introduction to this chapter. This 
suggests that the ICE measure exhibits reasonably good predictive validity. However, given 
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the correlational nature of these findings, causality cannot be inferred. These relationships 
will be further explored in Chapter 3.1
Figure 2.5. The significant positive correlation of SVO and ICE-PRG (Study 1).
2.2.2.4 Psychology versus business students
To investigate whether psychology and business students differed in their anticipated 
emotions, we conducted a t-test. Psychology (M = .74, SD = .97) and business (M = .91, SD = 
1 SVO was also assessed with the Triple Dominance Measure (TDM) (Van Lange et 
al., 1997). The TDM consists of nine items and each item involves a 3-options allocation that 
corresponds to prosocial, individualistic and competitive orientations. An individual needs to
select at least six similar options in order to be classified into a particular category. A Pearson
chi-square showed that there is a significant association between both SVO SM and TDM, 
c(2) = 15.652, p < .001. This significant association shows that the SVO-SM and TDM 
classify participants’ SVO in similar ways. For analysis purposes, I have decided to use 
SVO-SM instead of the TDM because the SVO-SM yields a continuous measure.
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1.01) students did not differ in their anticipated emotions (ICE-PRG), t(53) = .65, p = .521. 
Furthermore, results showed that psychology (M = 29.59, SD = 14.16) and business (M = 
27.51, SD = 14.05) students did not differ in SVO, t(53) = -.55, p = .587. 
An exploration of the allocation behaviour data showed that the average number of 
tokens allocated to the receiver in both DG and UG were not normally distributed, 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov: DDG (55) = .28, p < .001 and DUG (55) = .34, p < .001. Using a Mann 
Whitney test, the two groups of students, psychology (MDG = 11.48, SDDG = 5.87, MdnDG = 
15.00; MUG = 14.04, SDUG = 4.78, MdnUG = 15.00) and business students (MDG = 9.64, SDDG
= 6.06, MdnDG = 15.00; MUG = 12.82, SDUG =4.60, MdnUG = 15.00) also did not differ in 
terms of their allocation behaviour towards others in the DG, U = 308.00, Z = -1.262, p = 
.207, or the UG, U = 355.00, Z = -.450, p = .653.
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Table 2.7. Correlations, Means and Standard Deviations of Social Value Orientation (SVO) 
Angle, ICE-Pride, ICE-Regret, ICE-Guilt, ICE-PRG scores and Tokens Allocated to the 
Receiver in the Ultimatum Game and Dictator Game (Study 1)
SVO 
angle 
score
ICE-
Pride
ICE-
Regret
ICE-Guilt ICE-PRG
Tokens 
allocated to 
receiver in 
UG
Tokens 
allocated 
to 
receiver 
in DG
SVO 
angle 
score
ICE-
Pride
.269* -
ICE-
Regret
.277* .771*** -
ICE-
Guilt
.261 .670*** .667*** -
ICE-
PRG
.317* .937*** .888*** .834*** -
Token
s 
allocat
ed to 
receiv
er in 
UG
.509*** .303* .225 .137 .268* -
Token
s 
allocat
ed to 
receiv
er in 
.445** .373** .360** .225 .375** .559*** -
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DG
M 28.51 .94 .43 1.12 .83 13.42 10.55
SD 15.01 1.33 .91 1.02 .99 4.68 5.99
Note. N = 55
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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2.2.3 Discussion
Anticipated emotions play a role in decision making. Thus, it was considered 
important to develop a measure that captures the anticipated emotions component that 
presumably drives individual differences in preference in resource allocation behaviour. In 
order to achieve this goal, the ICE measure was developed. Preliminary examination of the 
data suggested that the ICE measure could be adjusted to create a short and concise measure. 
Firstly, the number of emotions that were measured in each item of the ICE measure could be 
reduced. According to the factor analyses, pleased, proud, regretful, disappointed, guilty, and 
ashamed should be the emotions retained in the ICE measure. This is beneficial in terms of 
reducing the redundancy of measuring many similar items. Also, the extreme scenarios such 
as the very fair and very unfair allocation condition scenarios can be eliminated in order to 
reduce complexity. By reducing the number of items and also eliminating the extreme 
scenarios, I could produce a more concise measure that nevertheless captures what the ICE 
measure was intended to assess.
Furthermore, it was decided that because of the difference in the nature of the DG and 
UG, whereby the UG has a strategic component while the DG is thought to be a purer 
measure of fairness of allocation behaviour, the instructions in the scenarios of the ICE 
measure should reflect the type of game. For example, if the allocation behaviour is measured 
using the UG, the instructions in the scenarios of the ICE measure should point out that the 
allocation proposed could be rejected or accepted by the anonymous other. This would 
emulate the strategic component that the game has and could be reflected in the emotions 
anticipated by participants. In the same way, if the allocation behaviour is measured using a 
DG, the instructions in the scenarios of the ICE measure should reflect the DG, making it 
clear that the allocation has to be accepted by the anonymous other, regardless of the amount 
proposed. By adapting the instructions used in the ICE measure to reflect those used in the 
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game in which allocation behaviour is measured, the ICE measure should be a better measure 
of the anticipated emotion that would be experienced in the real economic games. 
Although it was expected that psychology students would be more prosocial than 
business students, and would therefore anticipate more cooperative emotions and less 
competitive emotions, the results showed that there were no differences between the two 
groups in terms of their anticipated emotions. Results also showed that participants did not 
differ in their SVO angle or in their allocation behaviour to others in the DG and the UG. 
This suggests that the absence of a difference in ICE-PRG should be interpreted in light of 
the lack of difference in SVO and allocation behaviour between psychology and business 
students. Based on previous literature, psychology students are thought to have a tendency to 
behave cooperatively, whereas business students have a tendency to behave competitively, 
and this should be reflected in their allocation behaviour (Van Lange et al., 2011). However, 
this was not the case when comparing psychology and business students in this study in terms 
of SVO, ICE PRG and allocation behaviour. Given the modest number of participants 
recruited, it may be the case that the absence of differences is due to a lack of statistical 
power. The possibility that this lack of differences was due to a modest sample size is 
addressed in the next chapter, Chapter 3.
2.3 Study 2
2.3.1 Introduction
The aim of Study 2 was to assess the reliability and validity of the newly developed 
ICE measure. This study had two phases: Time 1 (T1) and Time 2 (T2). At T1, only SVO 
was measured. At T2, participants’ anticipated emotions were measured using the newly 
developed ICE measure, along with their allocation behaviour using only the DG. The 
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instructions used for the scenarios of the ICE measure were consistent with the instructions 
used for the DG. 
2.3.2 Method 
2.3.2.1 Design and participants
At T1, 200 Cardiff University psychology students (Mage = 18.90, SD = 1.55), of 
whom 26 were males and 174 were females, were recruited. At T2, 203 Cardiff University 
psychology students (Mage = 18.92, SD = .92), of whom 21 were males and 181 were females, 
were recruited. Participants who had completed the survey at T1 were invited to take part in 
an online study at T2. Data were collected online using Qualtrics. All participants who 
participated at T1 and T2 were awarded course credits upon completing each phase. 
Additionally, participants who took part in T2 were entered into a lottery in which two pairs 
of participants were randomly chosen to win a voucher worth £30. Allocation of the vouchers 
between the lottery winners was carried out in the same way as described in Study 1.
2.3.2.2 Materials
At T1, SVO was measured using the SVO-SM. At T2, anticipated emotions were 
measured using the ICE measure and allocation behaviour was measured using the DG. In 
this study, the ICE measure was adjusted based on the factor analytic results of Study 1, as 
described below. 
Index of Cooperative and Competitive Emotions (ICE) Measure. This ICE 
measure is an amended version of the ICE measure developed in Study 1. It consists of six 
items, in each of which participants are asked to imagine that they have made a division of a 
number of tokens between themselves and another anonymous person. In this version of the 
ICE measure, there was no variation in exchange rates. The proposed divisions between the 
allocator (participant) and the anonymous other in the scenarios represented fair (15:15; 
18:18; 21:21) or unfair (20:10; 24:12; 28:14) allocations. Participants were asked to rate how 
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they would feel about the allocation in each scenario, using a rating scale running from 1 (not 
at all) to 5 (very much). The six emotions that were measured were pleased, proud, regretful, 
disappointed, guilty, and ashamed. In addition, the instructions for the ICE measure were 
adapted in such a way that they made it clear that the receiver could not reject the allocation 
in each scenario (see Appendix B for details of how an item from the ICE measure in its DG 
version was presented to participants). 
2.3.2.3 Procedure
At T1, participants were given a unique code and completed the SVO-SM. At T2, 
which is in average five months later, participants completed the ICE measure and played the 
DG. At T2, participants were asked to report their demographics and also the unique code 
given to them previously at T1. This enabled me to match SVO angle scores at T1 with the 
data collected at T2 without breaking the anonymity of participants’ data. T2 participants 
then completed the ICE measure and made DG allocations in three separate games, such that 
their allocation of tokens between themselves and an anonymous receiver was measured 
three times.2 Participants were then asked if they had taken their participation in the study 
seriously. At the end of each phase, participants were thanked, debriefed and awarded course 
credits. 
2 Please note that different conditions were used at T2 to measure the effects of an 
emotion regulation manipulation. To maintain the focus of the current chapter on the 
development and validation of the ICE measure, the fact that there were different conditions
will be disregarded. The influence of these different conditions will be further discussed in 
Chapter 5. Also, in the present chapter allocations averaged across three DGs are used to 
assess allocation behaviour, in order to make the chapter more concise. 
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2.3.3 Results
2.3.3.1 Data treatment
First, out of 203 participants that took part in T2, data from only 170 participants 
(Mage = 18.93, SD = .93) were retained. There were 19 males and 151 females. Participants 
who responded more slowly than 2.5 times the median response time (Mdn = 8.23, N = 10), 
had duplicated identification numbers (N = 21), or who reported that they were not serious in 
answering the questionnaire (N = 2) were eliminated from the data analyses. We then 
investigated how many of the remaining participants at T1 had also participated at T2. This 
was the case for 111 (Mage=18.79, SD = .91), of whom 15 were males.
The internal consistency of each emotion cluster was analysed using Cronbach’s 
alpha. The three clusters are as follows: anticipated pride (pleased and proud; fair, a = .91; 
unfair, a = .87), anticipated regret (regretful and disappointed; fair, a = .88; unfair, a = .93) 
and anticipated guilt (guilty and ashamed; fair, a = .90; unfair, a = .94). 
2.3.3.2 The index of cooperative and competitive emotions (ICE) 
As in Study 1, three different indices, ICE-pride, ICE-regret and ICE-guilt, were 
created from the anticipated emotion scores. This was again achieved by calculating the 
difference in ratings of each anticipated emotion between the fair and unfair scenarios. As 
shown in Table 2.8, ICE-pride, ICE-regret and ICE-guilt are significantly and positively 
correlated. The three indices were therefore averaged to form ICE-PRG.
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Table 2.8. Correlations of ICE-Pride, ICE-Regret and ICE-Guilt, N = 170 (Study 2)
ICE-Pride ICE-Regret ICE-Guilt
ICE-Pride -
ICE-Regret .595** -
ICE-Guilt .595** .603** -
M .98 .57 1.33
SD 1.32 1.02 1.03
**p < .01
2.3.3.3 Correlations with SVO and allocation behaviour
Results showed that ICE-PRG and SVO scores are significantly correlated (see Table 
2.9 and Figure 2.6), showing that there is a relationship between anticipated emotions and 
SVO measured in average five months earlier. Moreover, ICE-PRG scores are significantly 
correlated with participants’ allocation behaviour (see Table 2.9 and Figure 2.7). This 
indicates that anticipated emotions are related to allocation behaviour in the DG. 
Figure 2.6. The significant positive correlation of SVO and ICE-PRG (Study 2).
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Figure 2.7. The significant positive correlation of ICE PRG and average tokens allocated to 
receiver (Study 2). 
Table 2.9. Correlations of SVO Angle (T1), ICE-PRG scores (T2) and Average Tokens 
Allocated to the Receiver (T2) (Study 2)
SVO angle score 
(T1)
(n = 111)
ICE-PRG 
(T2)
(N = 170)
Average tokens 
allocated to receiver 
(T2)
(N = 170)
ICE-PRG (T2) .341* -
Average tokens allocated to 
receiver (T2)
.290** .584** -
M 32.33 .96 10.76
SD 10.10 .98 5.12
*p < .05, **p < .01
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2.3.4 Discussion
The revised ICE measure showed that it had the same high level of internal 
consistency among the items in the measure as was observed in Study 1. In Study 1, 
anticipated emotions, SVO and allocation behaviour were collected at a single time-point. In 
the current study, SVO was measured at an earlier time-point than anticipated emotions and 
allocation behaviour. Despite this difference, the results of Study 2 were consistent with those 
of Study 1 in showing that anticipated emotions are significantly positively correlated with 
SVO. This suggests that shared variance between SVO and the ICE measure is stable across 
time, an issue that will be examined more closely in Study 3.
Despite the changes made to the initial ICE measure developed in Study 1, the results 
suggest that the ICE measure still has a predictive validity, in the sense that there was a 
significant relationship between anticipated emotion and allocations in the DG. There was 
also some evidence from this study that the individual differences captured by the ICE 
measure are relatively stable over time. This can be seen in the significant correlation 
between the ICE measure and SVO taken at two different time-points. Because SVO is a 
stable preference (Messick & McClintock, 1968), the fact that anticipated emotions were 
significantly correlated with SVO even when SVO was measured several months before the 
ICE measure points to the temporal stability of the underlying construct. As expected, the 
results showed that people who anticipate more cooperative emotions tend to have higher 
prosocial values, and also to make higher allocations to an anonymous other in the DG. These 
results are consistent with what was found in Study 1. This relationship indicates that people 
who anticipate feeling more cooperative emotions about resource allocation decisions tend to 
act more fairly or cooperatively than people who anticipate more competitive emotions about 
such decisions. 
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In order to examine the test-retest reliability of the ICE measure, in Study 3 I 
administered the ICE measure to the same participants at two different time-points. At T1, 
both SVO and anticipated emotions were measured using the SVO-SM and the ICE measure, 
respectively. At T2, participants’ anticipated emotions and allocation behaviour were 
measured using the ICE measure and DG, respectively. 
2.4 Study 3
2.4.1 Method
2.4.1.1 Design and participants
Data collected at T1 came from 233 Cardiff University psychology students.3 Data 
collected at T2 came from 240 Cardiff University psychology students (Mage = 18.78, SD = 
.94), of whom 32 were males and 206 were females. Participants who participated at T1 were 
invited to participate in the T2 study. At both time-points, the surveys were administered 
online using Qualtrics. Participants were awarded course credits upon completing each phase.
Additionally, T2 participants recruited were entered into a lottery in which two pairs of 
participants had a chance to win Amazon vouchers worth up to £30. Allocation of the 
vouchers between the lottery winners was executed in the same way as in Studies 1 and 2.
2.4.1.2 Materials
Materials used in this study were similar to those used in Study 2, and consisted of the 
ICE measure, the SVO-SM, and the DG. 
2.4.1.3 Procedure
At T1, participants were given a unique code and asked to complete demographic 
measures, the SVO-SM and the ICE measure. At T2, which was on average a month after T1, 
participants were asked to report their demographic data and their unique T1 code. As in 
3 Participants’ demographics (age and sex) were not collected at this time-point.
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Study 2, this unique code was used to match T1 data with T2 data without compromising the 
anonymity of participants’ data. Participants were then asked to complete the ICE measure. 
Then, participants made allocations in three consecutive DGs.4 After that, participants were 
asked if they had taken their participation in the study seriously. At the end of each phase, 
participants were thanked, debriefed and received their reward.
2.4.2 Results
2.4.2.1 Data treatment
Participants at T2 who took shorter or longer than 2.5 times the median response time 
(Mdn = 9.74, N = 23), had duplicated identification numbers (N = 4) or who reported not 
being serious in how they answered the questionnaire (N = 2) were eliminated from further 
data analysis. Data from 211 participants (Mage = 18.77, SD = .91) were retained. Of these, 
there were 153 participants (Mage = 18.54, SD = .87; 21 males, 131 females, and 1 
undisclosed) who had also taken part at T1.5
The internal consistency of each emotion cluster at T1 was analysed using Cronbach’s 
alpha. The three clusters are as follows: anticipated pride (pleased and proud; fair, a = .89; 
unfair, a = .90), anticipated regret (regretful and disappointed; fair, a = .92; unfair, a = .93) 
and anticipated guilt (guilty and ashamed; fair, a = .93; unfair, a = .94). 
For the ICE measure completed at T2, internal consistency was again analysed using 
Cronbach’s alpha. The results were as follows: anticipated pride (pleased and proud; fair, a = 
4 As in Study 2, different conditions were used in this study, as will be reported in 
Chapter 5. For the purposes of the current chapter, the influence of these conditions is 
disregarded, and allocation behaviour is assessed by averaging across the three games. 
5 Although 153 participants took part at both T1 and T2, data showed that 153 
participants completed the SVO measure but only 147 out of 153 participants completed the 
ICE measure.
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.90; unfair, a = .89), anticipated regret (regretful and disappointed; fair, a = .83; unfair, a = 
.92) and anticipated guilt (guilty and ashamed; fair, a = .72; unfair, a = .96). 
2.4.2.2 The index of cooperative and competitive emotions (ICE) 
ICE-Pride, ICE-Regret, and ICE-Guilt indices were created in a similar manner to 
how they were formed in Studies 1 and 2. The correlations between these measures are 
reported in Tables 2.10 and 2.11. There it can be seen that the measures were significantly 
correlated with each other, as they were Studies 1 and 2. As in Studies 1 and 2, the three 
subscales were averaged to form a single variable, ICE-PRG.
Table 2.10. Correlations of ICE-Pride, ICE-Regret and ICE-Guilt at T1 (Study 3)
ICE Pride ICE Regret ICE Guilt 
ICE Pride -
ICE Regret .553***
(n = 136)
-
ICE Guilt .512***
(n = 143)
.667***
(n = 140)
-
M 1.345 1.142 1.974
SD 1.258 1.148 1.139
***p < .001
Table 2.11. Intercorrelations of ICE-Pride, ICE-Regret and ICE-Guilt at T2, N = 211 (Study 
3)
ICE Pride ICE Regret ICE Guilt 
ICE Pride -
ICE Regret .609** -
ICE Guilt .564** .545** -
M 1.356 .908 1.741
SD 1.268 .958 1.095
**p < .01
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2.4.2.3 Correlations over time and with allocation behaviour
Table 2.12 shows the correlations between ICE and SVO measured at T1 and ICE and 
allocation behaviour measured at T2. There it can be seen that ICE and SVO assessed at T1 
were significantly associated with allocation behaviour at T2. Moreover, for the 147 
participants who completed the ICE measure both at T1 and at T2, there was a substantial 
correlation between their ICE scores, showing that the emotions that they anticipated 
experiencing when making resource allocation decisions remained stable over time (see 
Figure 2.8).
Figure 2.8. The significant positive correlation of ICE PRG taken at T1 and T2 (Study 3).
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Table 2.12. Correlations of SVO Angle Score (T1) and ICE-PRG (T1), ICE-PRG (T2) scores 
and Average Tokens Allocated to the Receiver (T2) in Study 3
SVO Angle 
Score (T1)
(n = 153)
ICE-PRG 
(T1)
(n = 147)
ICE-PRG (T2)
(N = 211)
Average Tokens 
to Receiver (T2)
(N = 211)
SVO Angle 
Score (T1)
-
ICE-PRG (T1) .374*** -
ICE-PRG (T2) .356*** .735** -
Average Tokens 
Allocated to 
Receiver (T2)
.271** .252** .360*** -
M 34.335 1.335 1.335 11.986
SD 8.052 .943 .943 3.993
**p < .01, ***p < .001
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2.5 General Discussion
The main purpose of the research reported in this chapter was to develop a measure of 
the emotions that individuals anticipate experiencing in social dilemmas involving the 
allocation of resources between self and other. The aim of Study 1 was to take initial steps in 
developing such a measure, which I called the Index of Cooperative and Competitive 
Emotions (ICE). The focus in Study 1 was on the internal structure of this measure, although 
I also examined the relationships between SVO, ICE, and actual allocation behaviour. The 
results showed that the ICE measure had satisfactory internal consistency, enabling me to 
create reliable indices of anticipated pride, regret, and guilt. It was also the case that these 
three indices were significantly interrelated, allowing me to create an overall index of 
cooperative and competitive emotions.
Furthermore, ICE scores and SVO scores were significantly related, suggesting that 
those who scored highly in prosociality as measured by SVO tend to also anticipate 
experiencing cooperative emotions when making resource allocation decisions. There was 
also a significant relationship between ICE and allocation behaviour, suggesting that the 
more cooperative emotions (e.g., pride about being fair and regret and guilt about being 
unfair) and the less competitive emotions (e.g., regret and guilt about being fair and pride 
about being unfair) individuals anticipate experiencing, the more tokens they allocate to 
others. On a broader level, this suggests that the kinds of emotion that people anticipate 
experiencing when making resource allocation decisions influences their allocation 
behaviour. This is in line with past studies showing that anticipated emotions guide behaviour 
(Baumeister et al., 2007). 
On the basis of the results of Study 1, the ICE measure was refined and used in Study 
2 to examine both its internal consistency and its relation to SVO and allocation behaviour. 
An additional feature of Study 2 was the fact that SVO was measured five months earlier on 
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average than the measures of ICE and allocation behaviour. The results of this study were 
consistent with those of Study 1 in showing good internal consistency of the ICE measure 
and significant relationships between ICE and SVO and between ICE and allocation 
behaviour. The fact that ICE was significantly related to SVO measured several months 
earlier suggests that the individual difference construct that is tapped by both SVO and ICE
has reasonable temporal stability.
Study 3 directly examined the temporal stability of the ICE measure over an average 
of one-month period, as well as again examining its relationship with SVO and allocation 
behaviour. The fact that the ICE measure showed a high test-retest reliability is further 
evidence of the temporal stability of the underlying construct. The fact that the ICE scores 
significantly predicted allocation behaviour on average one month later is evidence of the 
predictive validity of the measure.
In summary, the ICE measure developed in the research reported in this chapter has 
been shown to be internally consistent and temporally stable; it was found to be significantly 
related to a conceptually related measure; and it was significantly related to behaviour 
measured at the same time or at a later point in time. This demonstrates the measure’s 
reliability, construct validity, and predictive validity.
Although the results using the ICE measure were consistent across the three studies 
reported in this chapter, it should be noted that most of the participants in these studies were 
psychology undergraduate students (except for a few business students in the Study 1). 
Future studies should use the ICE measure to measure its validity using samples of 
participants with different background (e.g., non-student samples, or students with a different 
cultural background). These limitations are addressed in Chapters 3 and 4, where business 
students (Chapter 3) and Malaysians (both students and non-students; Chapter 4) completed 
the measure. 
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The main independent variable (IV), SVO, was defined as preferences for certain 
divisions of resources (Messick & McClintock, 1968) and was measured by the SVO-SM. 
The outcome or dependent variable (DV) was participants’ actual allocation behaviour, 
which was measured using economic games. A possible limitation of using these two 
measures is that they are similar with respect to the type of behaviour that they assess. It 
could therefore be argued that there is a high degree of overlap between the IV and DV. 
However, the percentage of shared variance between SVO and allocation behaviour in this 
study was in fact quite low (25%). Thus, in practice there was not a large overlap between 
participants’ SVO scores (IV) and allocation behaviour (DV) and there appears to be 
sufficient difference between preference for certain outcomes (as measured by SVO-SM) and 
actual allocation behaviour to reject the notion that the capacity of the SVO-SM measure to 
predict allocation behaviour is artificially inflated due to common method variance.
The choice of allocation behaviour in an economic game to assess prosocial 
behaviour was motivated by the fact that there is a sizeable body of previous research on the 
role of SVO and/or emotions in decision making using economic games (Balliet et al., 2009; 
Camerer, 2011; de Kwaadsteniet et al., 2006). Future research could examine other kinds of 
prosocial behaviour, such as measuring donations towards a charity organization (Van Lange, 
Bekkers, et al., 2007) or pro-environmental behaviours (Joireman, Lasane, Bennett, Richards, 
& Solaimani, 2001). In this way, such research could assess whether anticipated emotions 
mediate the relation between SVO and a wider range of prosocial behaviours, using more 
ecologically valid measures. Due to time constraints, I was not able to pursue this in the 
current thesis.
Past research has shown that SVO is a stable preference and that it predicts allocation 
behaviour (Messick & McClintock, 1968; Murphy et al., 2011; Van Lange et al., 1997). 
However, the SVO measures developed in the past (e.g. TDM and SVO-SM) took no account 
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of anticipated emotions. My argument is that anticipated emotions represent a psychological 
mechanism that can help to explain differences in preferences for resource allocation 
divisions. The ICE measure developed here supplements past SVO measures by taking 
anticipated cooperative and competitive emotions into account. Given that the ICE measure 
demonstrates good psychometric properties, later studies will examine more closely the 
relationship between SVO, anticipated emotions and allocation behaviour.
In sum, the fact that the ICE measure has good psychometric properties allows me to 
use the measure in subsequent studies to address the main research question of my thesis. In 
the next three empirical chapters, I used this measure to investigate whether anticipated 
emotions mediate the relation between SVO and allocation behaviour, and also to examine 
whether regulating these anticipated emotions moderates the relationship between SVO and 
allocation behaviour. In these later chapters, I will further explain how the ICE measure 
captures the relevance of anticipated cooperative and competitive emotions as the 
psychological mechanism underlying differences in SVO. 
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3 Chapter 3: Social Value Orientation and Anticipated Emotions in Resource 
Allocation Decisions
Previous studies have shown that individual differences in social value orientation 
(SVO) influence individuals’ allocation behaviour (Balliet et al., 2009; Messick & 
McClintock, 1968). There is also a growing field of research on anticipated emotions and its 
influence on allocation behaviour (Mellers & McGraw, 2001; Van Der Schalk et al., 2012). 
For example, the more pride you anticipate about being fair, the more resources you share 
with another person; and the more pride you anticipate about being unfair, the less resources 
you share with another person (Van Der Schalk et al., 2012). To my knowledge, the 
influences of SVO and anticipated emotions on allocation behaviour have thus far been 
studied separately. If both SVO and anticipated emotions predict allocation behaviour, what 
is the relation between these two constructs, and how do they jointly determine allocation 
behaviour? In this chapter, I address how individual differences in allocation behaviour can 
be explained in terms of anticipated emotions.
According to Messick and McClintock (1968), SVO refers to stable individual 
preferences in allocating resources between oneself and another person. Van Lange et al. 
(1997) proposed a measure of SVO and argued that it could be used to classify people into 
one of three orientations: prosocial, individualistic and competitive. Prosocials prefer to 
minimize the difference in outcomes between themselves and others (‘inequality averse’ 
prosocials) or to maximize both their own and others’ outcomes (‘joint gain maximizer’ 
prosocials). Individualists prefer to maximize their own payoff. Competitive individuals 
prefer to maximize the difference between their own and others’ outcomes by having a higher 
payoff than the other person. 
Previous research has established that SVO plays an important role in predicting 
allocation behaviour. For example, prosocials have been found to be more cooperative than 
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proselfs in a public goods dilemma (De Cremer & Van Lange, 2001). SVO has also been 
shown to predict whether individuals donate to environmental organizations as a pro-
environmental initiative (Joireman et al., 2001). 
According to Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall and Zhang (2007), it is the anticipation of 
emotional outcomes that shapes an individual’s decision making, in such a way that when an 
individual anticipates a negative emotion after a particular decision, he or she is likely to 
make a different decision in order to avoid this anticipated negative emotion (Baumeister et 
al., 2007). Loewenstein and Lerner (2003) have also argued that the predicted emotional 
consequences of decisions shape decision making because people choose outcomes that will 
increase the ratio of positive to negative feelings. Consistent with this argument, Kruger, 
Wirtz, and Miller (2005) found that students were likely to avoid changing their answers in a 
multiple choice test in order to avoid experiencing regret when discovering that their initial 
answer was correct. This was the case even when changing an answer would have increased 
the probability of getting it correct. Students anticipated that they would experience more 
regret if they changed their initial answer to an incorrect one than if they did not change their 
answer and their initial answer proved to be wrong. 
In the context of resource allocation decisions, Van Der Schalk and colleagues (2012)
found that people who anticipated pride about acting fairly allocated more resources to 
another person. Similarly, people who anticipated regret about acting unfairly allocated more 
resources to another person. In both cases, the anticipation of emotion seems to have shaped 
the decision about resource allocation, with individuals acting in a way that increased pride 
and reduced regret. Consistent with Baumeister and colleagues’ (2007) argument, it is the 
anticipation of emotional outcomes that appears to have shaped decision making. 
The literature reviewed in Chapter 1 and discussed above shows that the relation 
between SVO and allocation behaviour is well-established, but because SVO is often simply 
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measured by having participants choose between different divisions of resources, there is 
little insight into the psychological processes that are responsible for differences in these 
preferences (see the introduction to Chapter 2). SVO has been shown to be linked with 
emotions. For example, prosociality is positively related to empathy and sympathy (Eggum et 
al., 2011; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). Furthermore, prosocials have been found to be more 
concerned about others and to have a higher attachment to others, which suggests that – to 
some degree – feelings such as empathy and concern for others may be reflected in their 
preference for being equal in resource allocation (Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008). This 
suggests that prosocials are more likely than proselfs to experience ‘cooperative’ emotions 
such as pride when dividing resources equally, and regret and guilt when dividing resources 
unequally. It also suggests that the differential anticipation of such emotions may be the 
reason why prosocials and proselfs make different resource allocation decisions.
At the same time, it has been shown that anticipated emotions are related to allocation 
behaviour in such a way that cooperative emotions (e.g., pride about being fair; regret and 
guilt about being unfair) increase fairness, whereas competitive emotions (e.g., pride about 
being unfair; regret and guilt about being fair) decrease fairness. The studies reported in this 
chapter are designed to test the proposition that anticipated emotions are a psychological 
mechanism that drives these differences between prosocials and proselfs in allocation 
behaviour. 
In order to investigate this proposition, I investigated the relation between SVO, 
anticipated emotions and allocation behaviour. The fact that previous research has shown that 
prosocials have greater concern for others led me to predict that prosocials would anticipate 
more cooperative emotions (pride about acting fairly and regret and guilt about acting 
unfairly) and less competitive emotions (pride about being unfair and regret and guilt about 
being fair). Proselfs, on the other hand, would anticipate more competitive emotions and less 
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cooperative emotions. I also hypothesized that the anticipated emotions would mediate the 
relation between SVO and allocation behaviour. In particular, prosocials would anticipate 
more cooperative emotions and less competitive emotions, which would likely lead to a fairer 
distribution of tokens. On the other hand, proselfs would anticipate less cooperative emotions 
and more competitive emotions, which would likely lead to a less fair distribution of tokens. 
To test the above hypotheses, two studies were conducted, both of which were 
approved by the Ethics Committee of Cardiff University’s School of Psychology. In the first 
of these studies, participants were Psychology students. The second study was a replication of 
Study 1 conducted in another population in order to investigate the robustness of the findings. 
In each of the two studies reported below, I measured SVO using the ‘slider’ measure 
(Murphy et al., 2011), anticipated emotions using the ICE measure as described in Chapter 2; 
and resource allocation decisions were assessed using the Ultimatum Game (UG) (Güth et al., 
1982) and the Dictator Game (DG) (Kahneman et al., 1986). Both games entail dividing 
resources (e.g., tokens or money) between self (allocator) and another person (recipient). The 
key difference is that the UG involves a strategic component because the recipient can reject 
the division proposed by the allocator, whereas in the DG, the recipient has to accept the 
division proposed by the allocator. 
3.1 Study 1
3.1.1 Method
3.1.1.1 Design and participants
In Study 1, participants were 128 students (114 female, 14 male; Mage= 18.95, SD = 
2.15) recruited from the School of Psychology, Cardiff University. In exchange for their 
participation, participants were given two course credits and were automatically included in a 
lottery worth up to a maximum of £30 in Amazon vouchers. The lottery of £30 reflected their
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allocation made in either the DG or the UG. Further explanation of how these lotteries were 
conducted is given below. Data were collected online using Qualtrics.
3.1.1.2 Materials
Index of Cooperative and Competitive Emotions (ICE) Measure. This measure is 
the same as the one that was developed in Chapter 2 (see Appendices B). There were two 
versions of the measure, one reflecting the DG and the other reflecting the UG. In the items 
reflecting the UG, respondents are reminded that the recipient is able to reject the allocations 
made in the scenario, which would leave both allocator and recipient with no tokens. If the 
recipient accepts the proposed allocation, then both the allocator and recipient will get the 
tokens allocated in the scenario. For the items reflecting the DG, respondents are told that the 
receivers cannot reject the allocations made, and have to accept the allocation regardless of 
the amount allocated. For both the UG and DG versions, the measure consists of six 
allocation scenarios representing fair (15:15; 18:18; 21:21) and unfair (20:10; 24:12; 28:14) 
divisions of tokens. Participants were asked to imagine that they had made a specific division 
of tokens between themselves and another anonymous person. For example, in one item 
participants were asked to imagine that there are 30 tokens at stake, and that the participant 
keeps 20 tokens for him/herself and give 10 tokens to the anonymous person. Participants 
were asked to rate how they would feel about the allocation in each scenario, using a scale of 
1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). The six emotions that were assessed were pleased, proud, 
regretful, guilty, ashamed and disappointed. These emotions were chosen to capture three 
emotion constructs: pride, regret and guilt. The shared positive valence of the terms pleased
and proud were clustered together and index pride (Tracy & Robins, 2007; Van Osch et al., 
2018); the shared counterfactual character of regretful and disappointed (where the person 
experiencing the emotion can imagine a better state of affairs if he or she had acted or chosen 
differently) were clustered together and index regret (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007); and the 
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shared self-blame character of the terms guilty and ashamed (where the person appears to feel 
that he or she is responsible for bringing about an unwanted state of affairs) were clustered 
together and index guilt (Haidt, 2003; Niedenthal et al., 1994). These construction of these 
indexes resulted from the factor analyses reported in Chapter 2. 
Social Value Orientation. We assessed participants' SVO using the SVO Slider 
Measure (SVO-SM) (Murphy et al., 2011). This contains 15 items and each item has 9 
allocation options. Participants choose their most preferred allocation between themselves 
and the recipient (an anonymous person). For example, participants may choose an option 
representing 75 tokens allocated for themselves and 75 tokens for the anonymous person. 
From participants' choices, an SVO ‘angle’ can be computed. Larger angles reflect greater 
prosociality. Specifically, altruists would have an angle greater than 57.15°; prosocials would 
score angles between 22.45° and 57.15°; individualists would have angles between -12.4° 
and 22.45°; and competitive individuals would have an angle less than -12.04°. In the current 
research, I used the angle score as a continuous variable.
Allocation behaviour. The Dictator Game (DG; Kahneman et al., 1986) and the 
Ultimatum Game (UG; Güth et al., 1982) were used to measure allocation behaviour. In both 
games, the participant played the role of allocator and was given a total of 30 tokens to divide 
between him/herself and the anonymous other. Participants were also asked to state their 
minimum offer that they would accept if they were in the role of the recipient in the UG. The 
participants were told that the tokens had real monetary value. At the end of the study, two 
pairs of participants were randomly selected and were paid out according to the allocations 
made in the economic games, with each token being worth £1.00. For the pair of participants 
who were chosen under the DG, the payout was based simply on the allocator’s proposed 
allocation. However, for the pair of participants who were chosen under the UG, the 
minimum that the player stated that he/she would accept as recipient was used to determine 
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the outcome of the UG. For example, if the participant selected as allocator had allocated 
20allocator:10recipient, and the minimum acceptable offer that had been indicated by the recipient 
was 15allocator:15recipient, then the pair would receive nothing; but if the minimum acceptable 
offer indicated by the recipient was 25allocator:5recipient, then the pair would receive the amounts 
proposed by the allocator. 
3.1.1.3 Procedure
Participants first completed a consent form. After participants gave their consent to 
participate in the study, they completed a demographic questionnaire (measuring age, gender, 
fluency in English, course and year of study). Next, participants completed the two ICE 
measures. Order of presentation of these two measures was counterbalanced. The six 
allocation scenarios in each set were presented in a randomized order. Next, participants were 
asked to make their own allocations using two economic games, the DG and the UG (in 
counterbalanced order). Participants acted as the allocator, allocating tokens between 
him/herself and an anonymous other. Once they had made their allocations, they were 
presented with an attention check that tested whether participants were actually paying 
attention to the content of the questionnaire. The attention check consists of a question that 
asked participants to skip onto the next phase of the questionnaire. If participants clicked on 
any of the response options in the attention check question, this would show that they had not 
read the question carefully and that meant they failed the attention check. Next, participants 
completed the SVO-SM. Participants were then required to state the minimum offer that they 
would accept in the UG if they were in the role of the recipient. Next, participants were asked 
if they had taken their participation in the study seriously. Lastly, participants were thanked, 
debriefed and given their reward for participation. 
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3.1.2 Results
3.1.2.1 Data treatment
Data from 118 participants (105 female, 13 male; Mage = 18.95, SD = 2.22) were 
retained for analysis. Data from participants who failed the attention check (N = 7) or whose 
response time was longer than 2.5 times the median response time (Mdn = 14.65; N = 3) were 
excluded from analyses. Figure 3.1 shows the range of SVO scores. Note that the majority of 
the participants scored relatively highly, showing that the sample was generally prosocial. 
For the DG version of the anticipated emotion measure, the anticipated emotion items in the 
fair and unfair allocation behaviour conditions were combined to create an anticipated pride
scale (pleased and proud; fair, a = .90; unfair, a = .92), an anticipated regret scale (regretful 
and disappointed; fair, a = .90; unfair, a = .91) and an anticipated guilt scale (guilty and 
ashamed; fair, a = .91; unfair, a = .96).  For the UG version of the anticipated emotion 
measure, the anticipated emotion items in the fair and unfair conditions were also combined 
to create an anticipated pride scale (pleased and proud; fair, a = .89; unfair, a = .74), an 
anticipated regret scale (regretful and disappointed; fair, a = .89; unfair, a = .89) and an 
anticipated guilt scale (guilty and ashamed; fair, a = .92; unfair, a = .96). 
ICE scores were calculated as described in Chapter 2. For each of the three subscales 
(pride, regret, guilt), a difference score was calculated by subtracting responses on the fair 
items from responses on the unfair items (for regret and guilt) or vice versa (for pride) in such 
a way that positive scores reflected more cooperative emotions, zero reflected the fact that 
there was no difference in the anticipation of emotions when making equal or unequal 
allocations, and a negative score represented competitive emotions. This was done separately 
for each version of the ICE measure (UG and DG). Finally, I averaged the three ICE scores 
for each game to form DG-ICE-PRG and UG-ICE-PRG. The distributions of these final ICE 
scores showed that there were relatively few scores below the mid-point of the scale, with the 
Chapter 3 71
majority of participants expressing more cooperative emotions than competitive emotions 
(see Figures 3.2 and 3.3). 
Figure 3.1. Distribution of participants’ SVO scores (Study 1).
Figure 3.2. Distribution of ICE-PRG scores relating to the Dictator Game (Study 1).
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Figure 3.3. Distribution of ICE-PRG scores relating to the Ultimatum Game (Study 1).
3.1.2.2 SVO, Allocation Behaviour and Anticipated Emotions
The means, standard deviations of the constructs of interest and the correlations 
between them are presented in Table 3.1. All correlations were positive and highly 
significant. Exploration of the allocation data showed that the average tokens allocated to the 
anonymous other (the receiver) in each DG and UG were not normally distributed 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov: DDG(102) = 3.64, p < .001 and DUG(102) = 4.20, p < .001). 
Therefore, I decided to dichotomize allocation scores, classifying offers ³ 15 as fair and 
offers £ 14 as unfair. I then examined whether anticipated emotions mediated the relation 
between SVO and allocation behaviour. Using the PROCESS macro in SPSS, I ran two 
mediation analyses with SVO as the predictor, ICE-PRG as a mediator and the dichotomized 
averaged tokens allocated towards the receiver in DG and UG, respectively, as the outcome 
variable. 
The mediation analyses for both games showed that the total effects of SVO on 
tokens allocated in both DG (see Figure 3.4) and UG (see Figure 3.5) were significant and 
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positive. Consistent with the correlation analyses reported in Table 3.1, SVO was a 
significant and positive predictor of ICE-PRG for both games, bDG = .07, 95% CI [.048, .098] 
and bUG = .06, 95% CI [.040, .088], and ICE-PRG was significant and a positive predictor of 
allocations in both games, bDG = .67, 95% CI [.057, 1.275] and bUG = .83, 95% CI [.202, 
1.464]. More importantly, the indirect effects of SVO on allocation behaviour through ICE-
PRG were significant in both games, bDG = .05, 95% CI [.001, .113] and bUG = .05, 95% CI 
[.012, .114]. However, the direct effect of SVO on allocation remained significant, bDG = .25, 
95% CI [.080, .428] and bUG = .09, 95% CI [.007, .166], suggesting that ICE-PRG partially 
(rather than fully) mediated the effect of SVO and allocation behaviour. Post-hoc power 
analyses on both mediation analyses were carried out using online software called MedPower 
(Kenny, 2017, February). The results are summarised in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, where it can be 
seen that the achieved power was satisfactory. Given this, I aimed to recruit a comparable 
number of participants for Study 2.
Figure 3.4. Indirect effect of Social Value Orientation (SVO) on dichotomized averaged 
tokens allocated to the receiver in the Dictator Game (DG) through ICE-PRG. * p < .05, ** p
< .01, *** p < .001 (Study 1).
Chapter 374
Figure 3.5. Indirect effect of Social Value Orientation (SVO) on dichotomized averaged 
tokens allocated to the receiver in the Ultimatum Game (UG) through ICE PRG. * p < .05, ** 
p < .01, *** p < .001 (Study 1).
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Table 3.1. Correlations between social value orientation, cooperation and competitive 
emotions and tokens allocated in the Dictator and Ultimatum Game (Study 1)
SVO Angle DG ICE PRG UG ICE 
PRG
DG tokens 
allocated to 
receiver
UG 
token
s 
alloca
ted to 
receiv
er
SVO 
Angle
-
DG-
ICE-
PRG
.511*** -
UG-
ICE-
.403*** .806*** -
DG 
tokens 
allocate
.454*** .396*** .454*** -
UG 
tokens 
allocate
.393*** .424*** .406*** .610*** -
M 32.94 .97 1.02 11.74 13.51
SD 7.47 1.03 .98 4.73 3.10
Note. N = 118
*** p < .001 (2-tailed).
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Table 3.2. Post-hoc power analysis for the mediation of ICE-PRG on the relationship of 
Social Value Orientation (SVO) and dichotomized averaged tokens allocated to the receiver 
in the Dictator Game (DG).
Effect Partial r Power
Total effect .37 .98
SVO on ICE-PRG .36 .97
ICE-PRG on allocation behaviour in DG .28 .82
Direct effect .27 .79
Indirect effect .79
Note. Alpha for all power calculations set to .05. N = 102.
Table 3.3. Post-hoc power analysis for the mediation of ICE-PRG on the relationship of 
Social Value Orientation (SVO) and dichotomized averaged tokens allocated to the receiver 
in the Ultimatum Game (UG).
Effect Partial r Power
Total effect .36 .97
SVO on ICE-PRG .35 .96
ICE-PRG on allocation behaviour in UG .27 .79
Direct effect .27 .79
Indirect effect .76
Note. Alpha for all power calculations set to .05. N = 102.
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3.1.3 Discussion
The findings of Study 1 show that the more prosocial an individual is, the more 
cooperative emotions (pride about being fair, regret and guilt about being unfair) and the less 
competitive emotions (pride about being unfair, regret and guilt about being fair) s/he 
anticipates experiencing. With regard to allocation behaviour, prosocials were more generous 
than proselfs. Both of these results are consistent with the SVO literature discussed earlier. 
There was also evidence that anticipated emotions at least partly mediated the relation 
between SVO and allocation behaviour in Study 1. The significant indirect effects observed 
in the mediation analyses suggest that differences in anticipated emotion contribute to the 
explanation of the relation between SVO and allocation behaviour. This shows that 
anticipated emotions give an insight into the psychological processes involved in the 
differences in preferences for divisions between resources as measured by SVO. It would 
seem that SVO predicts allocation behaviour because differences in SVO are associated with 
differences in anticipated emotion, which in turn are strongly predictive of allocation 
behaviour. This shows that it is not simply a generalised preference for equal versus unequal 
allocations that distinguishes proselfs from prosocials. Instead, individuals with a preference 
for equal allocations think that they would anticipate more cooperative emotions (pride about 
being fair) compared to competitive emotions (regret and guilt about being unfair) if they 
were to make equal allocations. However, people with a preference for unequal allocations 
favouring the allocator think that they would anticipate more competitive emotions as 
compared to cooperative emotions if they were to make unequal allocations. 
However, it is worth noting that the sample used in the present study consisted mainly 
of participants who were medium or high in prosociality (whether this was assessed by SVO 
or by the ICE measure). Thus, in a follow-up study, one of my aims was to recruit a sample 
of participants that was likely to include more individuals with SVO and ICE scores on the 
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proself/competitive side of the midpoint. Van Lange, Schippers, and Balliet (2011) found that 
psychology students were more likely to be prosocial (57% prosocial) than business students 
(36% prosocial), presumably reflecting the nature of the subject they are studying. Among 
business or economics students, there were more individualists (47%) and competitors (17%), 
as compared to psychology students, where there was a lower percentage of both 
individualists (37%) and competitors (6%) (Van Lange et al., 2011). Thus, business students 
were recruited for Study 2. As well as allowing me to test whether the findings observed in 
Study 1 are replicable, this also enabled me to explore whether there are any differences 
between psychology and business students in SVO, anticipated emotions and allocation 
behaviour. 
3.2 Study 2
3.2.1 Method
3.2.1.1 Design and participants
In Study 2, participants were 124 business students (74 female, 49 male, 1 
undisclosed; Mage= 21.87, SD = 2.95) recruited from Cardiff University’s Business School. 
Participants were rewarded £3 worth of Amazon vouchers for their participation and were 
automatically entered into a lottery worth up to a maximum of a further £30 in Amazon 
vouchers. Two pairs of participants were randomly chosen as the lottery winners. The nature 
of the lottery and the manner in which the distributions were determined were identical to the 
procedure used in Study 1. Study 2 was a self-administered questionnaire that was presented 
through the Qualtrics platform. 
3.2.1.2 Materials
With the exception noted below, all materials used in Study 2 were similar to those 
used in Study 1. However, in Study 2 I added the short form of the Need for Affect (NFA) 
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measure (Appel, Gnambs, & Maio, 2012) to the battery of measures that were completed. 
This was added as a filler task to achieve greater temporal separation between the three sets 
of measures that all involved the allocation of resources: the SVO-SM, the ICE measure and 
the economic games. The NFA measures the tendency of the individual to avoid or approach 
emotion-inducing situations/activities and consists of 10 items. These are answered on a 7-
point Likert scale running from -3 (strongly disagree) to 3 (strongly agree). Because this 
measure was intended to serve only as a filler task, it was not included in any of the analyses 
reported below and will not be discussed further. 
3.2.1.3 Procedure
The procedure for Study 2 differed slightly from that used in Study 1. After giving 
consent, participants completed the SVO-SM (Murphy et al., 2011). Next, they were 
presented with the short form of the Need for Affect measure (Appel, Gnambs, & Maio, 
2012). Then, participants completed the DG and UG versions of the ICE measure (in a 
counterbalanced order) and made allocations in both the DG and UG (again, in a 
counterbalanced order). After that, participants completed a similar attention check that was 
presented in Study 1. Participants were then required to state the minimum offer that they 
would accept in the UG if they were in the role of the recipient. Before the debrief, 
participants were asked if they had taken their participation in the study seriously. Lastly, 
participants were thanked, debriefed and received their reward. 
3.2.2 Results
3.2.2.1 Data treatment. 
For Study 2, data from 93 participants were retained for analysis (59 female, 33 male; 
Mage= 21.80, SD = 3.13). This is because data from participants who failed the attention 
check (N = 13), or whose response time was longer than 2.5 times the median response time 
(Mdn = 20.33; N = 16) or shorter than 2.5 times the median response time (N = 2) were 
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excluded from the analyses. The distribution of the participants’ SVO scores is shown in 
Figure 3.6. There it can be seen that there was a greater spread of scores than was the case in 
Study 1, with fewer participants clustered at the prosocial end of the scale. 
For exploratory purposes, I examined the correlations between participants’ NFA 
scores, SVO scores and allocation behaviour in both the UG and DG. The NFA score was 
calculated by subtracting the emotion avoidance score (the aggregated score of the items 
related to avoiding emotion-inducing situations) from the emotion approach score (the 
aggregated score of the items related to approaching emotion-inducing situations) (Appel et 
al., 2012). The Spearman correlation between the NFA score and SVO score was not 
significant, rs(93) = .094, p = .368. Similarly, the Spearman correlations between NFA and 
allocation behaviour in both the UG (rs(93) = .025, p = .811) and the DG (rs(93) = .040, p = 
.705) were not significant. The Spearman correlations between NFA and anticipated 
emotions in both the UG (rs(92) = .093, p = .378) and the DG (rs(93) = .011, p = .919) were 
also not significant. Due to the non-significant correlations between NFA and SVO, 
allocation behaviour and also anticipated emotions, further analyses using the NFA measure 
were not pursued.
The anticipated emotion items in the fair and unfair allocation behaviour conditions 
the DG version were combined to create an anticipated pride scale (pleased and proud; fair, a
= .93; unfair, a = .94), an anticipated regret scale (regretful and disappointed; fair, a = .93; 
unfair, a = .91), and an anticipated guilt scale (guilty and ashamed; fair, a = .93; unfair, a = 
.96). Following a similar procedure, the anticipated emotions items in the UG version were 
clustered in the same way to make an anticipated pride scale (pleased and proud; fair, a = 
.93; unfair, a = .80), an anticipated regret scale (regretful and disappointed; fair, a = .93; 
unfair, a = .95), and an anticipated guilt scale (guilty and ashamed; fair, a = .95; unfair, a = 
.94). 
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These anticipated emotion scores were integrated in the same way as in Study 1: I
formed ICE-pride, ICE-regret, ICE-guilt scores by calculating a difference score between 
responses to the fair and unfair items and then averaged the three subscales into a single ICE-
PRG score. This was done separately for the DG and UG versions. Again, a positive score 
reflects the anticipation of more cooperative emotions, zero reflects the fact that there is no 
difference in the anticipation of emotions when making fair or unfair allocations, and a 
negative score represents the anticipation of more competitive emotions. The distributions of 
scores on each ICE-PRG measure (one for the DG, one for the UG) are shown in Figures 3.7 
and 3.8. 
Figure 3.6. Distribution of participants’ Social Value Orientation (SVO) Angle (Study 2).
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Figure 3.7. Distribution of ICE-PRG scores relating to the Dictator Game (Study 2).
Figure 3.8. Distribution of ICE-PRG scores relating to the Ultimatum Game (Study 2).
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3.2.2.2 SVO, Allocation Behaviour and Anticipated Emotions
The means, standard deviations of the constructs of interest and the correlations 
between them are presented in Table 3.4. Similar to Study 1, all correlations were positive 
and highly significant. Again, I examined whether anticipated emotions mediated the relation 
between SVO and allocation behaviour. Using the PROCESS macro in SPSS, I ran two 
mediation analyses with SVO as the predictor, ICE-PRG as a mediator and the dichotomized 
average number of tokens allocated to the receiver in the DG and UG, respectively, as the 
outcome variable. The outcome variable was dichotomized because the average numbers of 
tokens allocated to the receiver in both the DG and the UG were not normally distributed 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov: DDG(93) = 2.12, p < .001 and DUG(93) = 3.06, p < .001). Therefore, 
offers ³ 15 were classified as fair and offers £ 14 were classified as unfair.
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Table 3.4. Correlations between social value orientation, cooperation and competitive 
emotions and tokens allocated in the Dictator and Ultimatum Game (Study 2)
SVO Angle DG ICE PRG UG ICE PRG DG tokens 
allocated to 
receiver
UG tokens 
allocated to 
receiver
SVO 
Angle -
DG-
ICE-
PRG
.359*** -
UG-
ICE-
PRG
.283*** .725*** -
DG 
tokens 
allocat
ed to 
receive
r
.387*** .445*** .325*** -
UG 
tokens 
allocat
ed to 
receive
r
.364*** .385*** .346*** .485*** -
M 26.22 .53 .73 11.52 13.59
SD 13.43 .98 1.01 4.58 3.62
Note. The sample size for SVO Angle, UG ICE PRG, tokens allocated to the receiver in both 
DG and UG are all n = 93. However, the sample size for DG ICE PRG is n = 92. 
*** p < .001 (2-tailed). 
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The mediation analyses for both games showed that the total effect of SVO on tokens 
allocated in both the DG (see Figure 3.9) and the UG (see Figure 3.10) was positive and 
significant. Consistent with the correlation analyses reported above, SVO was a positive and 
significant predictor of ICE-PRG in both games, bDG = .02, 95% CI [.010, .338] and bUG = 
.02, 95% CI [.007, .031], and ICE-PRG was a positive and significant predictor of allocations 
in both games, bDG = .93, 95% CI [.002, .337] and bUG = 1.05, 95% CI [.343, 1.758]. More 
importantly, the indirect effect of SVO on allocation behaviour through ICE-PRG was 
significant in both games, bDG = .02, 95% CI [.007, .044] (see Figure 3.9) and bUG = .02, 95% 
CI [.007, .044] (see Figure 3.10). However, the direct effect of SVO on allocation remained 
significant, bDG = .03, 95% CI [.003, .065] and bUG = .04, 95% CI [.012, .071], indicating that 
ICE-PRG partially (rather than fully) mediated the effect of SVO and allocation behaviour.
Figure 3.9. Indirect effect of Social Value Orientation (SVO) on dichotomized averaged 
tokens allocated to the receiver in the Dictator Game (DG) through ICE PRG. * p < .05, ** p 
< .01, *** p < .001 (Study 2).
Figure 3.10. Indirect effect of Social Value Orientation (SVO) on dichotomized averaged 
tokens allocated to the receiver in the Ultimatum Game (UG) through ICE PRG. ** p < .01, 
*** p < .001 (Study 2).
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3.2.2.3 Psychology vs. Business Students
Using t-tests, I compared whether the psychology and business students differed in 
their SVO. The results showed that, as expected, psychology students (M = 32.94, SD = 7.47) 
were significantly more prosocial than their business student counterparts were (M = 26.22, 
SD = 13.43), t(135.93) = 4.33, p < .001. 
Next, I conducted t-tests examining differences between the two groups with respect 
to their anticipated emotions in the DG (DG-ICE-PRG) and the UG (UG-ICE-PRG). The 
results showed that for the DG-ICE-PRG measure psychology students (M = .97, SD = 1.04) 
had significantly higher scores compared to business students (M = .53, SD = .98), t(208) = 
3.17, p < .001. The same was true for the UG: psychology students (M = 1.02, SD = .98) had 
significantly higher ICE scores than business students did (M = .73, SD = 1.01), t(209) = 
2.12, p < .001. 
However, in terms of allocation behaviour, a Mann-Whitney test indicated that 
although psychology students (M = 11.74, SD = 4.73, Mdn = 15.00) tended to make higher 
allocations in the DG than business students did (M = 11.52, SD = 4.58, Mdn = 14.00) this 
difference was not significant, U = 5057.00, p = .297. Turning to allocations made in the UG, 
psychology students (M = 13.52, SD = 3.10, Mdn = 15.00) again did not differ from their 
business student counterparts (M = 13.59, SD = 3.62, Mdn = 15.00), U = 5263.50, p = .563. 
3.2.3 Discussion 
The relationship between SVO and anticipated emotions was similar to that observed 
in Study 1, as was the relationship between SVO and the allocation behaviour. More 
importantly for present purposes, anticipated emotions partially mediated the relationship 
between SVO and allocation behaviour. Because participants in Study 2 had a greater range 
of SVO scores, these results demonstrate that the findings of Study 1 were not due to the fact 
that there was a restricted range of SVO and therefore show the robustness of these findings. 
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This suggests that differences in anticipated emotions can account (at least partly) for 
individual differences in preferences for divisions of outcomes. 
This study also explored the differences in SVO, anticipated emotions and allocation 
behaviour between psychology and business students. Results showed that these two groups 
differed in their SVO, in line with what was found by Van Lange and colleagues (2011). 
More importantly, results showed that business and psychology students differed in their 
anticipated cooperative and competitive emotions. This finding particularly builds on the 
research of Van Lange and colleagues (2011) as it provides further insight into the 
differences between the two groups of students. The fact that students in different disciplines 
have different preferences for outcomes can perhaps be explained by the fact that these 
students anticipate experiencing more or less cooperative or competitive emotions. However, 
the results showed that psychology and business students did not differ in their allocation 
behaviour when they were asked to divide resources between self and an anonymous person. 
This may reflect differences in what was being measured. In the SVO and ICE measures, I 
assessed individual differences in preferred outcomes (SVO) and the emotions participants 
anticipated experiencing if they were to make certain specified allocations. However, 
allocation behaviour as measured in the DG and UG is concrete rather than hypothetical. 
Thus, a given individual might prefer competitive outcomes and might anticipate competitive 
emotions (pride about being unfair, regret and guilt about being fair), but when asked to make 
actual allocations, this individual might allocate more to the receiver because real outcomes 
are (potentially) at stake. Given that the tokens in each game were converted to real money if 
they were chosen as the lucky winners, individuals may be influenced by the prospect of real 
outcomes and as a result may play the games in a “strategically fairer” manner. 
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3.3 General Discussion
In line with my first hypothesis, these studies showed that SVO is associated with the 
cooperative and competitive emotions that individuals anticipate experiencing about fair and 
unfair resource allocations. In relation to my second hypothesis, these studies also showed 
that anticipated cooperative and competitive emotions partially mediated the relationship 
between SVO and allocation behaviour. More specifically, the more prosocial an individual 
is, the more likely s/he is to anticipate cooperative emotions and the less likely s/he is to 
anticipate competitive emotions when making resource allocation decisions. This then 
appears to lead such individuals to make more equal resource allocation decisions. On the 
other hand, the less prosocial an individual is, the less likely s/he is to anticipate cooperative 
emotions and the more likely s/he is to anticipate competitive emotions when making 
resource allocation decisions, which appears to lead such individuals to make less equal 
resource allocation decisions. Thus, my provisional conclusion is that anticipated emotions 
function as the (or at least a) psychological link between individual differences in the 
preference for certain resource allocation outcomes and how people actually make resource 
allocation decisions between self and another person. 
The current findings extend what we know about SVO by pointing to a factor that 
drives individuals to have different outcome preferences (e.g., equal or unequal divisions of 
resources). Past researchers have linked SVO and emotions (as discussed in the introduction) 
such as empathy, sympathy and concern towards the others (Eggum et al., 2011; Van Kleef & 
Van Lange, 2008). This is further supported by the current studies, because the current 
findings are interpreted as showing that it is the anticipation of cooperative and competitive 
emotions that – at least in part – is responsible for the observed differences in allocation 
behaviour. The findings suggest that individuals with a prosocial social value orientation 
expect to experience cooperative emotions when making such decisions; and that individuals 
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with a proself social value orientation expect to experience competitive emotions when 
making such decisions. The apparent role of anticipated emotions in guiding behaviour in 
these studies is consistent with the emotion-as-feedback perspective, which states that 
anticipated emotions guide behaviour (DeWall et al., 2016). 
The current studies have their limitations. Firstly, across both studies, participants’ 
SVO were not equally distributed. Participants’ SVO scores showed that they were more 
likely to be prosocial than proself. Although there was a more diverse sample in terms of 
participants’ SVO in Study 2 than in Study 1, there were relatively few participants who 
would be classified as proself (N = 28 out of 93 participants) on the basis of the criteria 
provided by Murphy et al. (2011). However, in the current studies I managed the uneven 
distribution of prosocials and proselfs by treating SVO as a continuous predictor and 
therefore did not rely on a categorical distinction in the correlational and mediation analyses. 
Future research should aim to recruit equal numbers of prosocials and proselfs in order to be 
able to draw more robust conclusions. 
Secondly, it could be argued that the samples recruited for both studies consisted of 
participants from western, educated, industrialized, rich and/or democratic (WEIRD) 
countries, which is not representative of the world’s population (Henrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010). According to Henrich and colleagues (2010), as of 2008, 97% published 
articles in top Psychology journals consist mainly of participants from WEIRD countries, 
which only covers about 12% of the world’s population. Taking the Henrich et al. argument 
seriously, because the current studies recruited students from a British university, they should 
be replicated using participants from a non-western cultural background and environment. 
This is addressed in Chapter 4 of my thesis, where I replicated the current studies recruiting 
Malaysian participants. Furthermore, because past research has shown that individuals may 
exhibit ingroup favouritism (Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2014; Ben-Ner et al., 2009), and with 
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Malaysia having a multi-ethnic population, I took the opportunity to manipulate the 
receiver’s identity (e.g. ingroup vs. outgroup) in the studies reported in Chapter 4. This may 
provide additional insight into the role of anticipated emotions on the relationship between 
receiver’s identities on allocation behaviour, which will be discussed further in Chapter 4. 
Another limitation of the current studies is that they were correlational in nature, 
whereby all three constructs were measured rather than manipulated. Individuals’ SVO was 
measured using the SVO Slider measure, anticipated emotions were measured using the ICE 
measure, and individuals’ allocation behaviour was measured using the economic games (DG 
and UG). Although the studies were correlational, reversing the mediation model (such that 
the effect of ICE on allocation is mediated by SVO, or the effect of SVO on ICE is mediated 
by allocation behaviour) would be logically implausible. Evidence from past literature 
showed that SVO is a stable individual difference in preferences for outcomes, and that this 
individual difference results in different allocation behaviour. It would therefore be unlikely 
that the model could be reversed, such that allocation behaviour predicts either SVO or ICE. 
Nevertheless, according to Spencer, Zanna and Fong (2005), if a mediation model indicates a 
significant indirect effect on the relationship between the IV and the DV, the mediator should 
be manipulated experimentally to establish that the mediation model is not only significant in 
correlational terms but also represents a causal chain. Establishing a causal chain between the 
constructs in the mediation model is deemed to be superior to a purely correlational 
mediation model. Because there were no manipulations of these constructs in the current 
studies, causal inferences from these correlational data are therefore difficult to make with 
any real confidence. In order to address this limitation, in the studies reported in Chapter 5 I 
experimentally manipulated anticipated emotions in order to investigate whether this would 
influence allocation behaviour. 
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Another possible limitation to the current studies is the order in which the measures 
were completed. In Study 1, SVO was measured at the end of the survey. This could be 
regarded as problematic because it means that the key predictor variable in the mediation 
model was measured after both the DV and the mediator. However, in Study 2, SVO was 
measured near the beginning of the survey. When we compare Study 1 and Study 2 with 
respect to the correlations between SVO and anticipated emotions, and between SVO and 
allocation behaviour, it can be seen that these are similar in magnitude. This suggests that the 
order in which the measures were completed did not affect the findings. Also, in Chapter 2 
there was evidence that SVO is a stable social preference when it was measured at two 
different time-points. This is consistent with the existing literature on SVO (Messick & 
McClintock, 1968; Murphy et al., 2011). In light of this, it is argued that the order in which 
the measures were completed does not pose problems for the main finding of the current 
studies.
In conclusion, the overall aim of these studies was to investigate whether the relation 
between SVO and allocation behaviour can be accounted for by differences in anticipated 
emotions. The results of these two studies were supportive of the proposition that anticipated 
emotions help to explain differences in allocation behaviour between prosocials and proselfs. 
In particular, the pattern of findings showed that participants scoring high in prosociality are 
likely to anticipate experiencing more cooperative emotions than competitive emotions and 
suggests that it is this that leads them to divide resources between self and other in a fair way. 
In subsequent chapters, I will address some of the issues identified in this discussion. Thus, in 
Chapter 4, I will report studies in which I replicate the current studies in a different cultural 
context and examine whether anticipated emotion mediates the relationship between SVO 
and allocation behaviour when the group membership (ingroup versus outgroup) of the 
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receiver is known. In Chapter 5, I will report studies in which I examine the consequences for 
allocation behaviour of manipulating anticipated emotions.
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4 Chapter 4: Social Value Orientation and Anticipated Emotions in Resource 
Allocation Decisions: The Malaysian Context
Individual dispositional preferences and anticipation of future emotions have 
consequences for decision making (Mellers & McGraw, 2001; Van Der Schalk et al., 2012). 
For instance, allocators who have a dispositional preference to be fair will anticipate more 
cooperative emotions and fewer competitive emotions when allocating resources, and this 
leads to fairer allocations towards their opponents (as seen in the findings of the studies 
reported in Chapter 3). Although an individual’s dispositional preference may be to behave 
cooperatively as a way to feel positive about being fair and/or avoid feeling negative 
emotions about behaving unfair, does his/her allocation behaviour change when the 
opponent’s social identity is revealed? In this study, I aim to investigate whether the social 
identity of the opponent changes allocation behaviour and how this is moderated by 
individual differences in terms of social value orientation (SVO) and anticipated emotions.
Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) argues that individuals derive part of 
their identity from the groups they belong to and that this contributes to their personal self-
esteem. Hence, individuals are motivated to find attributes of their groups that positively 
distinguish them from other groups. In an intergroup setting, social identity becomes salient 
and therefore individuals are more inclined to search for positive ingroup differentiation. 
Some studies have used economic games to study the difference in allocation behaviour 
towards ingroup and outgroup members. For example, to measure altruistic behaviours 
researchers have used the Dictator Game (DG) whereby an allocator is endowed a particular 
amount of monetary units (MUs) and then needs to make a decision about how to divide this 
resource with another person who is either from their ingroup or from an outgroup (Ben-Ner 
et al., 2009). No matter how many MUs the allocator allocates to the receiver, the receiver 
has to accept the allocation. Thus, the allocator assumes the role of a dictator. Ben-Ner and 
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colleagues (2009) found that allocators gave more MUs to ingroup members than to outgroup 
members. This suggests ingroup favouritism, a tendency to favour ingroup members over 
outgroup members, and is consistent with the social identity theory argument that group 
members will search for ways to distinguish the ingroup from an outgroup in ways that 
reflect well on the ingroup.
Individual differences in allocation preferences such as social value orientation (SVO) 
are also known to affect allocation behaviour (see previous chapters). SVO is commonly 
categorized into three orientations; prosocial, individualistic and competitive (Van Lange et 
al., 1997). Prosocials prefer to minimize the difference in resource allocation between 
themselves and others (inequality averse prosocials) or to maximize both their own and 
others’ outcomes (joint gain maximizer prosocials). Individualists have a preference for 
maximizing their own payoff. Competitive individuals prefer to maximize the difference 
between their own and others’ outcomes by having a higher payoff than the other person. In 
past research, individualists and competitors are usually combined in a single category as 
‘proself’ (Haesevoets, Folmer, & Van Hiel, 2015), a term that I will adopt here. Research has 
shown that prosocials are more cooperative than proselfs (De Cremer & Van Lange, 2001). 
This was assessed using both the public goods dilemma and the give-some dilemma. In the 
public goods dilemma, participants who were in a team of four were given 30 points each and 
were tasked to contribute any amount they wished to a common pool. The total amount 
contributed by the participants and other team members would be doubled and then divided 
equally among the team members. The catch in this game was that team members who did 
not contribute to the common pool would still benefit from the common pool (i.e., free 
riding). Thus, non-contribution would be the most attractive option. However, this would 
result in a lower outcome than if all the team players contribute. Findings showed that 
participants who are prosocial cooperated more than proselfs due to reported higher social 
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responsibility (De Cremer & Van Lange, 2001). In a modified give-some dilemma, 
participants were given four blue chips and the other player (an unknown person) was given 
four yellow chips. Each chip that the participant decides to keep was worth 25 points and 
each chip given to the other player was worth double (50 points). As for the other player, 
each chip s/he keeps is worth 25 points and each chip given to the participant was worth 50 
points. Participants were told the amount of chips given by the other player, which was either 
1 chip (low cooperation) or 3 chips (high cooperation). Upon receiving this information, 
participants were asked to decide how many chips they intended to give to the other person. 
A higher amount of chips given to the partner indicates greater cooperation, and it was found 
that prosocials were more cooperative than proselfs. Participants also cooperated more when 
the other player showed high cooperation (De Cremer & Van Lange, 2001). In both these 
dilemmas there is evidence that prosocials are more cooperative than proselfs. 
Past literature has shown that individuals are affected by the consequences of decision 
making in terms of the emotions that they anticipate experiencing (Lerner et al., 2015). For 
example, anticipated pride about being fair and anticipated regret about being unfair elicits 
cooperative resource allocation behaviour (Van Der Schalk et al., 2012). Similarly, an 
individual may behave in a more desirable way (perhaps more morally) in order to avoid 
feeling disappointment (Gill & Prowse, 2012; Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, Manstead, & Van Der 
Pligt, 2000). In a study investigating divorce negotiation, guilt was reported to enhance 
cooperative behaviours (Wietzker, Buysse, Loeys, & Brondeel, 2012). Feeling shameful 
when one fails to act morally was also found to motivate prosocial behaviour (De Hooge, 
Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008). In the current study, I aim to measure anticipated 
emotions about fair and unfair decisions by focusing on these decision-related emotions.
The studies reported in Chapter 3 investigated the relationship between the three 
constructs: SVO, anticipated emotions and allocation behaviour. Specifically, the studies in 
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Chapter 3 examined the relation between these constructs in the context of both the DG and 
the Ultimatum Game (UG). Results from Chapter 3 showed that anticipated cooperative and 
competitive emotions robustly mediated the relationship between SVO and allocation 
behaviour. In particular, prosocials anticipated more cooperative emotions and less 
competitive emotions, which then appeared to lead them to behave more fairly when 
allocating resources. The mediation analyses reported in Chapter 3 relied on the measurement 
of individual differences in SVO and in anticipated emotions, which meant that these studies 
were purely correlational in nature. To establish causal evidence that differences in 
preferences for divisions of resources outcomes can be explained by the extent to which 
individuals anticipate cooperative and competitive emotions, it would be helpful to include an 
experimental manipulation of these preferences. Given that individuals tend to prefer more 
equal outcomes between themselves and a member of their own group than between 
themselves and a member of an outgroup, it could be hypothesized that having an ingroup or 
an outgroup receiver should elicit different anticipated emotions. Specifically, it is 
hypothesized that ingroup receivers are more likely to elicit cooperative emotions whereas 
outgroup receivers are more likely to elicit competitive emotions. 
The studies reported in the current chapter are quite similar to those reported in 
Chapter 3, the exception being that the ethnic identity of the opponent in the DG was (subtly) 
made known to the participants playing the game. To manipulate group membership, I 
utilised the fact that Malaysia is a multi-ethnic population. Malaysia’s population consists of 
three main ethnic groups, Bumiputra [69.1%], Chinese [23%] and Indians [6.9%], and others 
[1%] (Department of Statistics, 2018). Due to colonial history, Malays and other indigenous 
groups are labelled ‘bumiputra’ (Khattab, 2016; Siddique & Suryadinata, 1981). ‘Bumiputra’
means ‘sons of the soil’ in the Malay language. This label was given to distinguish Malays 
and other indigenous groups from Chinese and Indians (non-bumiputra). Bumiputras have 
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bumiputra privileges, which means they receive more educational and economic assistance 
from the Malaysian government (Pietsch & Clark, 2014). This policy was implemented by 
the Malaysian government in 1970 through the New Economic Policy (NEP) (G. K. Brown, 
2007; Jomo & Sundaram, 2004), to help the bumiputras who, at the time, were not doing so 
well in these areas compared to the non-bumiputras. This policy was also implemented to 
help the ethnic groups reach national harmony, particularly in the economic and education 
field (Mokhtar, Chan, & Singh, 2017; Montesino, 2012). However, over the years, this policy 
has raised issues of inequality between the bumiputras and non-bumiputras due to the amount 
of help the bumiputras receive from the government (Tyson, Jeram, Sivapragasam, & Azlan, 
2017). This in turn has also contributed to segregation between the ethnic groups within the 
society (Cheong, Hill, & Leong, 2016; Montesino, 2012; Tyson et al., 2017). Because of the 
distinction between ethnic groups in Malaysia, it is a relevant context in which to investigate 
differences in allocation towards ingroup and outgroup members. For the present studies, I 
recruited participants from the three main ethnic groups: Malay, Chinese and Indians. Each of 
these ethnic groups is unique and distinct from each other in terms of tradition, culture and 
religion. The Malays are viewed as the majority group (due to a larger population) and 
Chinese and Indians are viewed as minority groups (due to their smaller populations).
The first aim of the research reported below was to investigate whether there are any 
differences in allocators’ anticipated emotions towards ingroup and outgroup receivers. I 
predicted that participants would anticipate more cooperative emotions and less competitive 
emotions when making allocations to ingroup members then when allocating to outgroup 
members. The second aim was to investigate the difference in allocators’ allocation
behaviour towards ingroup and outgroup receivers. I predicted that participants would 
allocate more tokens to ingroup members then to outgroup members. A third aim was to 
examine whether any effect of receivers’ group membership on allocation behaviour would 
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be mediated by anticipated emotions. I predicted that the effect of receiver’s group 
membership/social identity on allocator’s allocation behaviour would be mediated by 
anticipated cooperative and competitive emotions. In addition, I explored whether there were 
differences in allocation behaviour between members of the majority group (Malay) and 
members of the minority groups (Chinese and Indian). Finally, I also aim to replicate the 
findings reported in Chapter 3, whereby the effect of SVO on allocation behaviour would be 
mediated by anticipated cooperative and competitive emotions.
4.1 Study 1
4.1.1 Method
4.1.1.1 Design and participants
The study had a 3 (Allocator group: Chinese, Indian and Malay; quasi-experimental 
between-subjects factor) x 3 (Receiver group: Chinese, Indian and Malay; within-subjects 
factor) mixed design. I recruited 123 Malaysians (97 females, 25 males, 1 undisclosed, Mage = 
25.23, SD = 2.94) from the three major ethnic groups in Malaysia, Chinese (N = 43), Indians 
(N = 38) and Malays (N = 42), all of whom were above 18 years old. Recruitment was done 
through social media and snowballing. Each participant was given a RM15 (approximately 
£3) gift voucher for their time and was also given a chance to be entered into a lottery worth 
up to RM60 (approximately £11) in gift vouchers. The questionnaire was administered online 
using a survey site (Qualtrics).
4.1.1.2 Materials
Index of Cooperative and Competitive Emotion (ICE) Measure. To measure 
anticipated cooperative and competitive emotions, the ICE measure that was developed in 
Chapter 2 was used in an adapted form. The scenarios were adapted in such a way that tokens 
were allocated to others who belonged to the three ethnic groups (Chinese, Indian and 
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Malay). For each ethnic group, ethnic group-specific names were used (Chinese: Siew Ling 
or Sui Mei [female] & Chi Yung or Jian Hong [male], Indian: Shantini or Lakshimi [female] 
& Viknesh or Kumar [male], and Malay: Nurul or Aini [female] & Ali or Samad [male]). 
Each name that was used was presented equally but in a random order representing each 
ethnic group. The proposed divisions in the scenarios represented equal (12:12 and 21:21 
[Chinese], 9:9 and 24:24 [Indian], 15:15 and 18:18 [Malay]) and unequal (16:8 and 28:14 
[Chinese], 12:6 and 32:16 [Indian], 20:10 and 24:12 [Malay]) allocations. Participants were 
told that the tokens allocated would be accepted by the receiver regardless of the amount of 
the distribution. This was to ensure that the scenarios reflected allocations in a DG. For 
example, one item asked participants to imagine that there were 36 tokens at stake, and the 
participant took 24 tokens for him/herself and allocated 12 tokens to the other person. 
Participants were asked to rate how they would feel about this division of tokens, using a 
scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much) to indicate the extent to which they would feel each of 
six emotions: pleased, proud, regretful, disappointed, guilty, and ashamed. Definitions of 
each emotion were given in English and in the Malay language (the official language of 
Malaysia) to make sure participants fully understood what these emotions mean (see 
Appendix C). The English definitions were taken from the Oxford online dictionary ("proud, 
pleased, regret, disappointment, guilt, ashamed," 2018) and the Malay definitions were taken 
from the Dewan Pustaka and Bahasa online dictionary ("bangga, gembira, menyesal, kecewa, 
bersalah, malu," 2018). There were two versions of these 12 scenarios, one with female 
opponents and the other with male opponents. In the 12 scenarios, each of the randomly 
assigned names from each ethnic group was presented four times. Participants were always 
given same-gender scenarios. An example of the scenarios used for the ICE measure is 
shown in Appendix D. 
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Social Value Orientation. Similar to studies reported in previous chapters, I assessed 
participants’ SVO using the SVO Slider Measure (SVO-SM) (Murphy et al., 2011). This
measure requires participants to choose the most preferred allocation between themselves and 
the recipient (an anonymous other). The SVO-SM has 15 items of which 6 primary items 
distinguish participants into four groups (altruist, prosocial, individualists and competitors) 
and the other 9 secondary items break the prosocial motivation down into joint gain 
maximization and inequality averse motivation. For this study, only the nine primary items 
were used in order to reduce the time commitment for participants. Each item consists of nine 
allocation options, whereby each option gives a certain amount of points to the allocator and 
a certain amount of points to the receiver. The items are created in such a way that the 
options differ in pay-offs for the allocator, the receiver, the joint outcome, and the difference 
between allocator and receiver. These scores are then used to calculate the degree of 
prosociality, with larger ‘angles’ reflecting greater prosociality. 
Allocation behaviour. Each participant played the role of allocator in a DG and was 
given a total of 30 tokens to divide between him/herself and an opponent who (by virtue of 
the same names presented to the participant in the ICE measure) belonged to one of the three 
ethnic groups. The participants were told that the tokens had monetary value, in the sense that 
the points gained would be paid out in real money if they won a lottery. On completing the 
survey, participants were automatically entered into the lottery in which they could win a gift 
voucher worth up to a maximum of RM30 (approximately £5).6
Ingroup Identity Measure (IIM). The IIM (Leach et al., 2008) assessed ingroup 
identification. This 14-item measure consists of two second-order factors: self-definition 
6 Two pairs of participants were randomly picked for the lottery. They were paid out 
RM60 (approximately £11) that was the maximum possible winnings of the allocation in gift 
vouchers because participants were not actually paired with another participant.
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(which in turn consists of individual self-stereotyping and in-group homogeneity) and self-
investment (which in turn consists of satisfaction, solidarity and centrality). Example items 
are “I feel a bond with [ingroup]” (representing solidarity) and “I have a lot in common with 
the average [ingroup]” (representing individual self-stereotyping). Respondents were asked to 
rate the extent to which they agreed with each item on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) 
to 5 (strongly disagree). The IIM had three different versions, one for each ethnic group. 
Qualtrics was programmed to present the version referring to the participant’s own ethnic 
group. 
Attention check. The attention check presented participants with a block of text 
related to emotions and they were given three options to choose from. However, at the end of 
that text, they were asked not to click on any of the options given and were asked to move on 
to the next question. Participants failed the attention check if they clicked on one of the 
options given. 
4.1.1.3 Procedure
Participants first completed a consent form. Next, they completed demographic items 
(ethnic group, age, gender, fluency in English, and occupation). Participants were then asked 
to complete the SVO-SM and the IIM. The items in both the SVO-SM and IIM were 
presented in a randomized order. Next, participants were shown the definitions of the 
emotions that they would be presented within the next scale, the ICE measure. They then 
reported their anticipated emotions for the 12 different allocation scenarios in the ICE 
measure. These scenarios were presented in a randomized order. Next, the attention check 
was presented to the participants. They were then asked to play the DG three times (once for 
each ethnicity: Chinese, Indian and Malay) to measure their allocation behaviour. The order 
of the opponents they played against was randomized. After that, participants were asked 
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whether they had taken their participation in the study seriously. Finally, participants were 
debriefed.
4.1.2 Results
4.1.2.1 Data treatment
Out of the 123 Malaysians recruited, data from 105 individuals (Mage = 25.33, SD = 
2.86) were retained for analysis. There were 22 males, 82 females and 1 participant with 
undisclosed gender. The participants included 35 Chinese, 33 Indians and 37 Malays. Data 
from participants who failed the attention check (N = 7), participants who admitted that they 
were not serious in answering the questionnaire (N = 3), and from those who took longer than 
2.5 times the median response time (Mdn = 19.35, N = 8) were dropped. 
4.1.2.2 Anticipated emotions towards ingroup and outgroup receivers
A t-test was done to address the hypothesis, that participants (allocators) would 
anticipate more cooperative and less competitive emotions when making allocations to 
ingroup members compared to when making allocations to outgroup members. Results 
showed that participants did not differ in their anticipated cooperative and competitive 
emotions towards ingroup (M = 1.14, SD = 1.32) and outgroup (M = 1.18, SD = 1.31) 
members, t(102) = -.72, p = .471. 
It was further explored whether participants from each ethnic group differed in their 
anticipated cooperative and competitive emotions towards receivers from different ethnic 
groups by conducting a 3 (Allocator group: Chinese, Indian and Malay; quasi-experimental 
between-subjects factor) x 3 (Receiver group: Chinese, Indian and Malay; within-subjects 
factor) mixed ANOVA. There were no significant main effects for receivers’ ethnic group, 
F(2, 202) = 2.14, p = .121, or for allocators’ ethnic group, F(2, 101) = 1.82, p = .168 on 
anticipated emotions. There was also no significant interaction between receivers’ and 
allocators’ ethnic group, F(4, 202) = .59, p = .672. This shows that Chinese, Indians and 
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Malays did not differ in their anticipated cooperative and competitive emotions towards the 
three ethnic groups. 
I then explored the difference between the majority group (Malays) and the minority 
group (Chinese and Indians) in their anticipated cooperative and competitive emotions 
towards ingroup and outgroup members, using a 2 (majority vs. minority allocator, between-
subjects) x 2 (ingroup vs. outgroup receiver, within-subjects) mixed ANOVA. There was no 
significant main effect for receivers’ group membership, F(1, 101) = 1.01, p = .318, but there 
was a near significant main effect of allocators’ group membership, F(1, 101) = 3.91, p = 
.051, on anticipated emotions towards others, whereby minority group participants 
anticipated more cooperative and less competitive emotions (M = 1.34, SD = 1.34) than 
participants of the majority group (M = .85, SD = 1.13). However, there was no significant 
interaction between allocators’ and receivers’ group membership, F(1, 101) = 1.20, p = .276. 
The absence of a significant interaction shows that there were no differences between the 
majority and minority group allocators in their anticipated cooperative and competitive 
emotions towards ingroup and outgroup receivers.
4.1.2.3 Allocation behaviour 
When comparing participants’ allocation behaviour toward ingroup and outgroup 
receivers, a Wilcoxon Signed Rank test showed that participants did not differ in their 
allocation behaviour towards ingroup (M = 13.79, SD = 3.44, Mdn = 15.00) and outgroup 
Chapter 4104
receivers (M = 13.86, SD = 2.99, Mdn = 15.00), Z = -.24, p = .810.7,8 When exploring further 
whether each ethnic group differed in their allocation to ingroup and outgroup receivers, 
7 For each ethnic group, there were two different outgroup members: For Chinese 
participants the outgroup included the Malay receiver and the Indian receiver; for Indians the 
outgroup included the Malay and the Chinese receiver; and for Malays the outgroup included 
the Chinese and Indian receivers. The two outgroups were combined into a single outgroup 
category because a Wilcoxon signed rank test showed that Chinese, Indians and Malays did
not differ in their allocation behaviour towards the two outgroups, ZChinese = -1.34, p = .180, 
ZIndian = -1.17, p = .244, and ZMalay = -.61, p = .539.
8 Using the G*Power software (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009; Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), I conducted a post-hoc power analysis on the difference 
between participants’ allocation behaviour towards ingroup and outgroup members. This
showed that, given the sample size (N = 103), the power obtained for finding a difference in 
participants’ allocation towards ingroup and outgroup members was very low (1 – b = .08) 
and close to zero. Moreover, a sensitivity test (using the G*Power software) showed that the 
current study had sufficient power (1 – b = .80) to find a small effect of Cohen dz = .025 
(Cohen, 1969, p. 38). In other words, it seems to be the case that the low power that was 
achieved reflects that there was no difference in participants’ allocation behaviour towards 
ingroup and outgroup members, rather than having insufficient sample size to uncover this. 
For study 2, I aimed to recruit at least as many participants per condition because the power 
analysis suggested that this was sufficient to find a small effect size. 
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there was no significant difference in allocations to ingroup and outgroup for any of the
ethnic groups, ZMalay = -.614, p = .539, ZChinese = .000, p = 1.0, and ZIndian = 1.490, p = .136.9
For exploratory purposes, we examined whether the ethnic groups differed in their 
overall allocation behaviour. A Kruskal Wallis test comparing Malay (M = 13.31, SD = 3.02, 
Mdn = 15.00), Chinese (M = 13.75, SD = 3.54, Mdn = 15.00) and Indian (M = 14.51, SD = 
1.95, Mdn = 15.00) allocators, showed that their allocation behaviour towards others 
(irrespective of the receivers’ ethnicity) marginally differed from what would be expected by 
chance, c2(2) = 5.38, p = .068. When participants were grouped according to their majority 
and minority group status in the Malaysian society, a Mann Whitney U test showed that 
majority group allocators (M = 13.31, SD = 3.02, Mdn = 15.00) allocated significantly less to 
others (irrespective of the receivers’ ethnicity) than minority group allocators (M = 14.11, SD
= 2.90, Mdn = 15.00), U = 947.50, Z = -2.317, p = .020.
4.1.2.4 Anticipated emotions as a mediator 
Because there were no significant effects of receivers’ group membership on 
allocators’ anticipated emotions or allocation behaviour, the predicted mediation of the 
impact of group membership on allocation behaviour by anticipated emotions could not be 
tested. However, because there was a significant difference in allocation behaviour between 
the majority and minority group, a mediation analysis was conducted to test whether the 
9 The correlations between the IIM scores for each ethnic group and allocation 
behaviour towards ingroup (rMalay(37) = -.021, p = .903; rChinese(35) = -.089, p = .613; 
rIndian(31) = .001, p = .995) and outgroup members (rMalay(37) = -.016, p = .927; rChinese(35) = 
-.219, p = .206; rIndian(31) = -.152, p = .415) were not significant. The absence of significant 
correlations between the IIM and allocation behaviour shows that strength of ingroup 
identification did not play a role in shaping allocation behaviour. This is consistent with the 
fact that the manipulation of group identity did not influence allocation behaviour.
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effect of allocators’ group membership (majority versus minority) on allocation behaviour 
was mediated by anticipated cooperative and competitive emotions. This is reported below.
Using the PROCESS macro in SPSS, I ran a mediation analysis with allocators’ group 
membership as the predictor (whereby the majority group was coded 1 and the minority 
group was coded 2), anticipated cooperative and competitive emotions (using ICE-PRG) as 
the mediator, and the dichotomized10 averaged tokens allocated to the receiver (irrespective 
of receiver’s ethnicity) in DG, as the outcome variable (see Figure 4.1). The mediation 
analysis showed that the total effect of allocators’ group membership on tokens allocated in 
DG was significant and positive, b = 1.04, 95% CI [.162, 1.919]. Although allocators’ group 
membership did not predict ICE-PRG, b = .50, 95% CI [-.023, 1.014], ICE-PRG was a 
significant and positive predictor of allocations in the DG, b = .70, 95% CI [.242, 1.164]. 
More importantly, the indirect effect of SVO on allocation behaviour through ICE-PRG was 
significant, b = .35, 95% CI [.022, .902]. The direct effect of group membership on allocation 
was no longer significant when controlling for anticipated emotions, b = .87, 95% CI [-.063, 
1.794]. Despite the fact that there was no direct effect of allocators’ group membership on 
anticipated cooperative and competitive emotions, the significant indirect effect demonstrates 
that at least to some extent the difference between majority and minority groups in allocation 
behaviour can be attributed to differences in anticipated emotions. 
10 Exploration of the allocation data showed that the average number of tokens 
allocated to the receiver in each DG was not normally distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov: 
D(103) = 3.69, p < .001). I therefore decided to dichotomize allocation scores, with offers ³
15 deemed to be fair and offers £ 14 deemed to be unfair.
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Figure 4.1. Indirect effect of allocators group membership (majority vs. minority) on 
dichotomized averaged tokens allocated to the receiver (regardless of ethnicity) in the 
Dictator Game through ICE PRG. * p < .05, ** p < .01 (Study 1).
Using the PROCESS macro in SPSS, a mediation analysis was carried out to test 
whether the pattern of findings observed in the studies reported in Chapter 3, whereby 
anticipated cooperative and competitive emotions mediated the relation between SVO and 
allocation behaviour, would be replicated in this study. In this mediation model, SVO was the 
predictor, anticipated cooperative and competitive emotions (using ICE-PRG) was the 
mediator, and the dichotomized averaged tokens allocated to the receiver (regardless of
receivers’ ethnicity) in the DG was the outcome variable (see Figure 4.2). This mediation 
analyses showed that the total effect of SVO on tokens allocated in DG was significant and 
positive, b = .05, 95% CI [.011, .086]. SVO was also a significant predictor of ICE-PRG, b = 
.04, 95% CI [.019, .059], and ICE-PRG was a significant and positive predictor of allocation 
behaviour, b = .63, 95% CI [.167, 1.103]. Moreover, the indirect effect of SVO on allocation 
behaviour through ICE-PRG was significant, b = .02, 95% CI [.009, .050], while the direct 
effect of SVO on allocation was no longer significant, b = .03, 95% CI [-.012, .067], thereby 
replicating the results reported in Chapter 3.
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Figure 4.2. Indirect effect of Social Value Orientation on dichotomized averaged tokens 
allocated to the receiver (regardless of ethnicity) in the Dictator Game through ICE PRG. * p 
< .05, *** p < .001 (Study 1).
4.1.3 Discussion
The finding that differences in anticipated cooperative and competitive emotions 
mediated the effect of SVO on allocation behaviour replicated the pattern observed in
Chapter 3. This echoes the argument made in Chapter 3 that prosocials anticipate more 
cooperative emotions (pride about being fair, regret and guilt about being unfair) than 
competitive emotions (pride about being unfair, regret and guilt about being fair), and that it 
is these anticipated cooperative and competitive emotions that are responsible for individual 
differences in allocation behaviour. More importantly, the pattern of mediation is replicated 
in a population with a different cultural background. This will be discussed further in the 
general discussion of this chapter.
However, the results of the present study did not support the prediction concerning 
differences in anticipated emotions and allocation behaviour when allocating resources to 
ingroup and outgroup others. Surprisingly, the results showed that there were no differences 
in allocations to ingroup and outgroup receivers. This stands in contrast to the ingroup 
favouritism in allocation behaviour observed by other researchers (Ben-Ner et al., 2009; 
Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994; Liebe & 
Tutic, 2010). A potential reason for the absence of this effect in the current study is that 
participants were asked to play three DGs consecutively with members of the three different 
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ethnic groups, in a within-subjects design. This may have made them aware of the fact that 
the ethnicity of the other to whom they were making allocations was being varied. In turn, 
this may have affected the way the tokens were distributed because participants might have 
wanted to be seen to allocate tokens in an unbiased way, for socially desirability reasons. In 
other words, impression management concerns may have restrained participants from 
allocating the resources unequally between the members of the different ethnic groups. 
Because there were no differences in allocation behaviour towards ingroup and outgroup, the 
idea of experimentally manipulating preferred ways of dividing the resources was 
unsuccessful. 
Despite this lack of effect, the results showed that when participants were re-classified 
into majority and minority groups, the minority group was more likely than their majority 
group counterparts to make fair allocations to other receivers (regardless of the receivers’ 
ethnicity). Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) offers a possible explanation for the 
fact that members of minority groups were more generous than were members of the majority 
group. Social identity theory posits that people seek to make comparisons between their own 
group and other groups in such a way that their own group is positively distinctive. Because 
the majority group is more privileged compared to minority groups in the context of 
Malaysian society, comparing ingroup with the majority group would normally be 
unfavourable for a minority group if the comparison is being made on the dimension of 
resources. Thus, in order for the minority group to make a more favourable comparison, they 
might seek to compare ingroup with the majority outgroup on an alternative dimension. This 
is known as the social creativity strategy (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Thus, it could be argued 
that members of the minority groups behaved more generously in the current study as a way 
to positively distinguish themselves from the majority group in terms of morality rather than 
resources. 
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It could also be argued that social dominance theory can account for the difference 
between majority and minority groups in allocation behaviour (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, 
& Malle, 1994). Social dominance theory postulates that forming group-based hierarchies is a 
universal human tendency and that hierarchical social order is maintained through individual 
and institutional discrimination (e.g., through hierarchy-legitimizing myths) (Pratto et al., 
1994). The theory also identifies an individual difference variable that describes preferences 
for hierarchical relationships between groups, which is social dominance orientation (SDO; 
Pratto et al., 1994). Social dominance theory posits that in order for higher status groups to 
maintain their position, they promote societal roles and practices that enhance inequality. At 
the same time, lower status groups strive for equality and being on par with the higher status 
group. In the Malaysian context, the majority (bumiputras) group have a higher status than 
the two minority groups (Chinese and Indians) because the bumiputras receive special 
privileges that the minority groups do not (Pietsch & Clark, 2014). In light of social 
dominance theory, the differences in status of the bumiputras and non-bumiputras in 
Malaysia might explain why the majority group was generally less fair. Thus, it could be 
argued that the bumiputras acted less fairly in order to maintain status differences within 
Malaysian society, whereas non-bumiputras acted more fairly in order to promote equality 
between groups. 
Because this effect of majority/minority status on allocation behaviour was found in 
an exploratory analysis, I sought to replicate the effect in a follow-up study. I also took the 
opportunity to include a measure of SDO. If it is true that differences in allocation behaviour 
between majority and minority groups stem from differences in SDO, then there should be a 
negative relationship between SDO scores and allocation behaviour, such that individuals 
with a high score, who seek to maintain or even increase the differences in social status of 
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different groups, should allocate less to others, perhaps especially when those others are 
members of lower status (minority) groups.
Another change that was made in Study 2 was to switch the design of the study from a 
within-subjects to a between-subjects manipulation of receiver’s social identity. This was 
done to avoid participants acting in a socially desirable way. By switching to a between-
subjects design, the manipulation of the opponent’s social group identity should have been 
less transparent than it was in the within-subjects design used in Study 1. I also sought to 
recruit a bigger sample in order to rule out the possibility that the lack of evidence for 
differences in allocations to ingroup and outgroup members in Study 1 was due to lack of 
power. 
4.2 Study 2
The main aim of Study 2 was to re-examine the prediction that there would be a 
difference in allocation behaviour towards ingroup and outgroup members. It was felt that a 
better way to test this prediction would be to change the design from within-subjects to 
between-subjects. With this change, I hypothesised that there would be a difference in 
participants’ allocation behaviour towards ingroup and outgroup members. Specifically, 
participants would allocate more tokens to ingroup members than to outgroup members.
A further aim of this study was to explore the SDO explanation for the difference in 
allocation behaviour of minority and majority group allocators towards others (regardless of 
the receivers’ ethnicity) that was found in Study 1. A measure of SDO was therefore added to 
investigate the extent to which preferences for group-based hierarchies could account for this 
effect. According to Social Dominance theory, higher status groups are generally higher in 
SDO and strive to maintain their position by enhancing the inequality (Pratto et al., 1994), 
while lower status groups are generally lower in SDO and strive for equality to bridge the gap 
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between higher status groups and themselves. In the current study, I predicted that in the 
Malaysian context, the minority group would have lower SDO and the majority group would
have high SDO. 
I also explored the combined effects of allocators’ group membership (majority vs. 
minority), receivers’ group membership (ingroup vs. outgroup) and SDO on allocation 
behaviour. I predicted that the majority group would be less generous to others than would 
the minority group, and that the strength of the effect of allocators group membership on 
allocation behaviour would depend on individuals’ level of SDO in such a way that majority 
members high in SDO would be even less fair, whereas minority members low in SDO 
would be even more fair. I also predicted that the participants would be more generous to 
their ingroup members than to their outgroup members, and that ingroup favouritism would 
be moderated by SDO in such a way that this would be more pronounced for participants 
high in SDO.
A further change from Study 1 is that instead of using the DG, I used the UG (Güth et 
al., 1982). As noted earlier in the thesis, the UG has a strategic component in the sense that 
the allocator needs to consider that the receiver might reject the offer and this could increase 
participants’ engagement with the game. In addition, the survey was translated into Malay to 
accommodate non-English speaking Malaysians. A professional translator translated the 
questionnaire from English to Malay. To ensure that the translated version reflected the 
English version, two bilingual (Malay and English) speakers checked the translated 
questionnaire. The survey was presented in both languages (English and Malay) in order to 
give participants a choice of completing the questionnaire in either English or Malay. 
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4.2.1 Method
4.2.1.1 Design and participants 
Study 2 had a 2 (Allocator group: Chinese and Malay; quasi-experimental factor) x 3 
(Receiver group: Chinese, Indian and Malay) between-subjects design. There were 565 
participants (435 females, 129 males, 1 other, Mage = 23, SD = 4.142) who were recruited for 
this study. Out of these, 243 were Chinese, 65 were Indians, 222 were Malay, 13 were from 
other ethnic groups and 22 were of mixed ethnicity. Participants were recruited from 
Malaysian universities through social media and mass emailing to groups of classes with the 
help of lecturers and administrative staff. As an incentive, all participants were entered into a 
lucky draw in which four pairs had a chance to win a voucher worth RM60 (approximately 
£12) each. The questionnaire was administered online using a survey site (Qualtrics).
4.2.1.2 Materials 
As Study 1, SVO, an attention check and the IIM were administered. The ICE 
measure was simplified by not varying the recipients’ social identity. This was to reduce the 
duration of the study and to make the manipulation of the receiver’s social identity less 
obvious. Also, the ICE measure was adapted from Study 1 by presenting six allocation 
scenarios that reflected the UG rules, such that participants were reminded that the receiver 
could reject the allocation presented in each scenario. These six allocation scenarios 
represented fair (15:15; 18:18; 21:21) and unfair (20:10; 24:12; 28:14) divisions of tokens.
Similar to Study 1, the definitions of the emotions in the ICE measure were given in two 
languages (English and Malay). However, the definitions were slightly modified after making 
use of a professional translation service (see Appendix E), and were checked by two other 
bilingual speakers. These definitions were presented on the same screen below each item of 
the ICE measure. This was to ensure participants were able to refer to the definitions of the 
emotions when deciding how to answer each item. As noted above, the entire questionnaire 
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was presented in both Malay and English, with the question in Malay at the top and the 
English translation directly underneath. An example can be seen in Appendix E, showing that 
the Malay definitions of the emotions were given prior to the English definitions. 
In addition, the SDO measure (Pratto et al., 1994) was included. This consisted of 16 
items that measured individuals’ preferences for group-based dominance and inequality (e.g., 
“No one group should dominate in society;” “Some groups of people are just more worthy 
than others”). Participants are asked to rate each statement using a scale running from 1 
(strongly disagree/disapprove) to 7 (strongly agree/favour). 
Allocation behaviour. Study 2 measured allocation behaviour by using the UG (Güth 
et al., 1982). Each participant played the role of the allocator and was given a total of 30 
tokens, to be divided between him/herself and an opponent who by virtue of his or her name 
belonged to one of the three main Malaysian ethnic groups. The names used were the same as 
the ones used in Study 1. Participants were told that the receiver would be able to accept or 
reject the proposed allocation, and that if the recipient rejected the proposal, neither the 
allocator nor the recipient would receive any tokens. On the other hand, if the recipient 
accepted the proposal, the allocator and the recipient would receive what the allocator had 
proposed. Participants were told that the tokens had monetary value in the sense that the 
points gained would be doubled and would be paid out in real money if they won a lottery. 
After the survey was completed, participants were automatically entered into the lottery 
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where four pairs of winners could win a gift voucher worth up to a maximum of RM60 
(approximately £11).11
4.2.1.3 Procedure
Participants were first asked to complete a consent form. They were then asked to 
provide demographic information (ethnicity, age, gender, fluency in English and Malay, and 
occupation). Participants first completed the IIM. Participants then completed the SVO SM 
and the same attention check used in Study 1 was presented. Next, participants are asked to 
complete the SDO measure. The definitions of the anticipated emotions that would be in the 
next scale, the ICE measure, were displayed. After participants have completed the ICE 
measure, they then played the UG once with an opponent whose name was randomly chosen 
from the three ethnic groups. Thus, a participant could be randomly assigned either a Malay 
receiver (e.g., Nurul or Aini [female]; Ali or Samad [male]), a Chinese receiver (e.g., Siew 
Ling or Sui Mei [female]; Chi Yung or Jian Hong [male]), or an Indian receiver (e.g, Shantini 
or Lakshimi [female]; Viknesh or Kumar [male]) in the UG. The assigned receiver was 
always the same gender as the allocator. Participants were then asked whether they had taken 
their participation in the study seriously. Finally, participants were debriefed. 
4.2.2 Results
Out of 565 participants, data from 371 participants (Mage = 23.05, SD = 4.06) were 
retained for analysis. There were 81 males and 290 females in the final sample. I excluded 
participants who failed the attention check (N = 62) and whose response time was either 
11 In order to divide the gift voucher according to participants’ allocation in the 
Ultimatum Game (UG), I needed to retrieve the minimal offer that each participant would 
accept (see Chapter 3). However, this information was not collected in the study. Because of 
this, each winner was given the maximum amount that they could win which was RM60 
(approximately £11) in gift vouchers.
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shorter than 2.5 times the median response time (N = 37) or longer than 2.5 times the median 
response time (N = 29). Because participant ethnicity was a between-subjects factor, I 
excluded participants whose ethnicity was ‘other’ (N = 1) and also mixed ethnic individuals 
(N = 16). Because I did not recruit a sufficient number of Indian participants, data from 
participants who were of Indian ethnicity (N = 49) were also not included in the analyses. I 
included participants who identified themselves as Chinese (N = 197) or Malay (N = 174). 
Data included a slightly higher proportion of Chinese participants due to recruitment from 
private universities in Malaysia, where there are more non-Malays enrolled. This dates back 
to the implementation of the NEP (G. K. Brown, 2007; White, 2015).
A Mann-Whitney test was used to investigate whether participants differed in their 
allocations to their ingroup and outgroup members. Allocations to ingroup members (M = 
14.53, SD = 2.96, Mdn = 15.00) did not differ significantly from allocations to outgroup 
members (M = 14.46, SD = 2.84, Mdn = 15.00), U = 15414.50, Z = .19, p = .852.12
Next, I compared the allocation behaviours of the majority and minority groups 
toward others (irrespective of ethnicity) using a Mann Whitney Test. Results showed that 
majority (M = 14.38, SD = 3.07, Mdn = 15.00) and minority (M = 14.57, SD = 2.71 Mdn = 
15.00) groups did not differ in their allocations towards other receivers, U = 16490.50, Z = -
.76, p = .450. This is inconsistent with what was found in Study 1.
12 I then explored whether each allocators’ group membership (majority or minority) 
allocation behaviour differ towards their ingroup and outgroup members. Mann-Whitney
tests showed that the minority group did not differ in their allocation behaviour towards their 
ingroup (M = 14.55, SD = 2.99, Mdn = 15.00) and outgroup (M = 14.58, SD = 2.56, Mdn = 
15.00) members, U = 4286.50, Z = -.71, p = .476 and also the majority group did not differ in 
their allocation behaviour towards their ingroup (M = 14.50, SD = 2.96, Mdn = 15.00) and 
outgroup (M = 14.32, SD = 3.13, Mdn = 15.00) members, U = 3247.00, Z = -.38, p = .701. 
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A t-test was used to compare Chinese and Malay allocators’ SDO scores. As 
predicted, Malay allocators (M = 44.53, SD = 10.40) had significantly higher scores than 
Chinese allocators (M = 41.87, SD = 12.85), t(367) = -2.17, p = .031. 
Logistic regression was used to explore the combined effects of the three predictors 
allocators’ group membership (majority coded 1 vs. minority coded 2), receivers’ group 
membership (ingroup coded 1 vs. outgroup coded 2), and SDO score (centred) on the 
dichotomised dependent variable allocation behaviour (unfair coded 0 vs. fair coded 1).13 In 
Model 1, the predictor variables allocators’ group membership, receivers’ group membership 
and the centered SDO score were entered. In Model 2, the three two-way interaction terms 
between the predictors were added (allocators’ and receivers’ group membership, allocators’
group membership and SDO, and receivers’ group membership and SDO). In Model 3, a 
three-way interaction term between allocators’ group membership, receivers’ group 
membership and SDO was added. Model 1 had a model fit of Nagelkerke R2 = 5%, c2(3) = 
11.03, p = .012. There were no main effects of either allocators’ or receivers’ group 
membership on allocation behaviour, Ballocator = -.20, Exp(B) = .82, p = .482, and Breceiver = 
.19, Exp(B) = 1.21, p = .530. However, there was a significant main effect of SDO score on 
allocation behaviour, B = -.04, Exp(B) = .96, p = .003. Participants with higher SDO score 
were less likely to make fair allocations to the other person. Model 2 showed no significant 
from Model 1, Nagelkerke R2 = 5%, c2(3) = .47, p = .93. The two way interaction between 
allocators’ group membership and receivers’ group membership was not significant, B = -.40, 
Exp(B) = .67, p = .506, the interaction between allocators’ group membership and SDO score 
13 Exploration of the allocation data showed that the average tokens allocated towards 
others (regardless of the receivers’ ethnicity) in the UG was not normally distributed 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov: D(370) = 9.79, p < .001). I therefore dichotomized the allocation 
scores, whereby offers ³ 15 were deemed to be fair and offers £ 14 were deemed to be unfair.
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was not significant, B = -.01, Exp(B) = 1.00, p = .864, and the interaction between receivers’
group membership and SDO score was not significant, B = .00, Exp(B) = 1.00, p = .979. 
Model 3 showed no significant improvement from Model 2, Nagelkerke R2 = 5%, c2(1) = 
.17, p = .68. The three way interaction between allocators’ and receivers’ group membership 
and SDO score on allocation behaviour was not significant, B = -.02, Exp(B) = .98, p = .683. 
This reveals that there were no combined effects of allocators’ group membership, receivers’
group membership, and SDO. The only significant finding that emerged was a main effect of 
SDO that revealed that people who have a greater preference for group hierarchy in society 
were less likely to make fair allocations.
To explore whether the effect of allocators’ SDO on allocation behaviour towards 
others (regardless of the receivers’ ethnicity) was mediated by anticipated cooperative and 
competitive emotions, I used the PROCESS macro in SPSS (see Figure 4.3). The mediation 
analysis showed that the total effect of SDO on tokens allocated in UG was significant, b = -
.03, 95% CI [-.055, -.005]. SDO was a significant predictor of ICE-PRG, b = -.03, 95% CI [-
.043, -.024], and ICE-PRG was a significant predictor of allocations made towards others, b 
= .63, 95% CI [.374, .887]. Moreover, the indirect effect of SDO on allocation behaviour 
through ICE-PRG was significant, b = -.02, 95% CI [-.034, -.012]. The direct effect of SDO 
on allocation was not significant, b = -.01, 95% CI [-.035, .017], suggesting full mediation.
Figure 4.3. Indirect effect of Social Dominance Orientation on dichotomized averaged tokens 
allocated to the receiver (regardless of ethnicity) in the Ultimatum Game through ICE PRG. * 
p < .05, *** p < .001 (Study 2).
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Finally, I used the PROCESS macro in SPSS to explore whether the effect of 
allocators’ SVO on allocation behaviour towards others (regardless of the receivers’
ethnicity) was mediated by anticipated cooperative and competitive emotions (as found in 
Study 1 and Chapter 3; see Figure 4.4). The mediation analysis showed that the total effect of 
SVO on tokens allocated in UG was significant and positive, b = .07, 95% CI [.405, .094]. 
SVO was a significant predictor of ICE-PRG, b = .03, 95% CI [.022, .044], and ICE-PRG 
was a significant predictor of allocations made towards others, b = .52, 95% CI [.275, .773]. 
In addition, the indirect effect of SVO on allocation behaviour through ICE-PRG was 
significant, b = .02, 95% CI [.009, .029]. However, the direct effect of SVO on allocation 
remained significant, b = .05, 95% CI [.004, .023], suggesting partial mediation. 
Figure 4.4. Indirect effect of Social Value Orientation on dichotomized averaged tokens 
allocated to the receiver (regardless of ethnicity) in the Ultimatum Game through ICE PRG. * 
p < .05, *** p < .001 (Study 2).
4.2.3 Discussion
Contrary to what was predicted, I found no support for the prediction that there would 
be a significant difference in participants’ allocation behaviour towards ingroup and outgroup 
members in Study 2. This was despite the fact that the design was changed from within-
subjects in Study 1 to a between-subjects design in Study 2 with a view to eliminating (or at 
least reducing) social desirability effects. Furthermore, Study 2 had a larger sample in an 
effort to increase statistical power. The current research therefore failed to replicate previous 
studies in which researchers have shown ingroup favouritism in social dilemmas assessing 
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cooperation (Balliet et al., 2014; Ben-Ner et al., 2009). This may reflect something about the 
specific cultural context in which the studies were conducted, a point that I will get back to 
again later in this discussion.
Study 2 sought to replicate the difference in allocation behaviour between majority 
and minority allocators that was found in Study 1. I also explored whether SDO played a role 
as a moderator of the relationship between majority or minority group membership and 
allocation behaviour. As noted above, in the Malaysian context, minority groups are not 
given the same privileges as the majority group. It therefore seems plausible that minority 
group members might seek to promote equality, whereas majority group members might be 
motivated to maintain status differences. Thus, it was predicted that the minority group would 
be fairer compared to the majority group. However, the findings of Study 2 showed no 
differences between majority and minority allocation behaviour towards others (regardless of 
ethnicity). 
Despite this lack of a direct effect of group membership status on allocation 
behaviour, our findings did reveal that Malay participants scored generally higher on the 
measure of SDO than Chinese participants. Furthermore, there was a significant relation 
between SDO scores and allocation behaviour, such that those higher in SDO were less likely 
to be fair in allocating tokens to others. This provides at least some indirect evidence that 
SDO may be responsible for the differences between majority and minority members that 
was found in Study 1. Further analyses also showed that the effect of SDO on allocation 
behaviour towards others (regardless of the receivers’ group membership) was fully mediated 
by anticipated emotions. This not only suggests that SDO plays a role in influencing 
allocation behaviour but also shows that the influence of individual differences in preferences 
for a hierarchical social order on individual and institutional discrimination operates through 
their effect on cooperative and competitive emotions.
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However, there was no evidence of a moderating effect of SDO on allocation towards 
ingroup and outgroup receivers, nor was there evidence of a moderating effect of SDO on the 
relation between majority and minority group membership and allocation behaviour. A 
possible explanation for this is the use of the UG instead of the DG in Study 2. The UG is 
known to have strategic component, in the sense that allocators face a risk of their proposed 
allocation of resources being rejected by the receiver (Charness & Gneezy, 2008). This 
strategic component encourages allocators to offer more than the minimal amount to the 
receivers in order to avoid rejection (Scheres & Sanfey, 2006). However, participants did not 
appear to be more generous in their allocations in Study 2 than they were in Study 1, despite 
the incentive to offer more.
Another possible explanation for why Study 2 did not find any differences in 
allocation behaviour towards ingroup and outgroup members, and no differences in majority 
and minority group allocations may be that the participants were university students. 
Admittedly, research has shown that students are segregated based on religion and hold 
stereotypes about outgroup members (Mustapha, Azman, Karim, Ahmad, & Lubis, 2009; 
Tey, Awang, & Singaravelloo, 2009). However, in the same research, researchers found that 
undergraduate students were more tolerant about multi-ethnic interactions than secondary 
school students (Tey et al., 2009). They found that the perceptions of students at the 
University of Malaya regarding inter-ethnic relations improved between 2002 and 2008, 
although ethnocentrism still exists among these students (Tey et al., 2009). In addition, 
researchers found that university students do not see “polarisation” or ethnic tension as a 
racial issue, but rather they believe it has become a norm in the Malaysian society (Mustapha 
et al., 2009). The same researchers argued that the pattern of ethnic tension among university 
students occurs as ethnic segregation is commonly seen, but because of their academic 
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background they are more tolerant and understanding towards other ethnic groups (Mustapha 
et al., 2009). 
4.3 General Discussion
The main aim of the studies reported in this chapter was to vary the group 
membership of the receiver in an economic game setting to see whether this manipulation 
would influence participants’ allocation behaviour. However, there was no evidence of this 
predicted effect in either study. As noted earlier, the absence of an effect on allocation 
behaviour may have been due to impression management and social desirability concerns 
(Study 1) and using a non-representative sample that may have more liberal social attitudes 
(Study 2). A further possibility is that the manipulation of group membership (through the 
use of ethnically marked names) may have been too subtle, although the strong link between 
the names used and the ethnicity of someone with one of these names makes this less 
plausible. Given the consistent lack of any empirical support for the predicted effect of group 
membership, yet another possibility is that the influence of group membership on allocation 
behaviour in economic games is simply absent in the Malaysian context, despite the fact that 
it has been found in other cultural contexts (Efferson, Lalive, & Fehr, 2008; Whitt & Wilson, 
2007). A final possibility is that by individualising the receiver (through giving him or her a 
proper name), the procedure used in the current studies may have inadvertently enhanced fair 
behaviour in most participants, because they may have been more reluctant to act unfairly 
towards a named individual than they would have been if the recipient had been anonymous 
(as recipients generally are in economic games).
A secondary objective of the research reported here was to investigate possible 
differences in allocations made by majority and minority groups. Interestingly, the results of 
Study 1 appeared to suggest that allocators belonging to the Malaysian minority groups were 
more generous towards others (regardless of the receiver’s ethnicity) than the majority group, 
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perhaps demonstrating a stronger preference for equality in social relations (Pratto et al., 
1994). However, this pattern of findings was not replicated in Study 2. Although this may 
have been due to some procedural differences between Studies 1 and 2, it is possible that the 
Study 1 result was a chance finding. On the other hand, in line with our reasoning that 
minority members would have a stronger preference for equality, Study 2 did reveal that 
minority group members had lower SDO scores than majority group members. In addition, 
there was a negative relation between SDO and allocation behaviour that was consistent with 
our predictions. However, there was no significant interaction between SDO and group 
membership of the receiver on allocation behaviour, and also no interaction between SDO 
and group status of allocators on allocation behaviour. Taken together, the current studies 
provide some suggestive evidence that belonging to a majority or minority social group plays 
a role in resource allocation behaviour, but the precise nature of this relation is still an open 
question. 
Furthermore, the effect of group membership status on allocation behaviour in Study 
1 and the relation between SDO and allocation behaviour were fully mediated by anticipated 
emotions. As mentioned previously, the full mediation suggests that the influence of 
individual differences in preferences for a hierarchical social order on individual and 
institutional discrimination operates through their effect on cooperative and competitive 
emotions. This provides additional support for the general argument that anticipated emotions 
play a key role in the expression of preferences for different resource outcomes.
In the research reported in this chapter, I initially adopted a Social Identity theory 
(SIT) framework to make predictions about how resources would be allocated to ingroup and 
outgroup members in the context of the three main ethnic groups in Malaysia. An alternative 
basis for making these predictions would have been Realistic Conflict theory (RCT; LeVine 
& Campbell, 1972), which argues that intergroup hostility arises as a result of mutually 
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exclusive goals and competition for scarce resources. However, in the context of the current 
studies, competition between the ethnic groups was not emphasised or made salient. 
Specifically, participants were given a number of tokens and were simply asked to divide 
these between themselves and another person. The aim of manipulating the ethnicity of the 
recipient was to investigate whether this would influence participants’ allocation decisions. 
Because the experimental setup involved divisions between individuals, in principle there 
was no more competition between members of different ethnic groups than between members 
of the same ethnic group. Instead, the theoretical predictions depended on the general 
historical context of inter-ethnic relations in Malaysia carrying over to the specific context of 
the experiment. Given the absence of any competitive component in the experiments, it is 
perhaps no surprise that there was no evidence in support of RCT. However, in Study 1 of 
Chapter 4, participants from the minority group were found to allocate more tokens towards 
others (both ingroup and outgroup members) than the majority group. This suggested that 
Social Dominance Theory (SDT), which seeks to explain why and how social hierarchies are 
maintained, might be a more appropriate theory in the Malaysian context. It can be argued 
that a group-based hierarchy exists between the minority and majority groups in Malaysia, 
whereby the majority group is deemed to have a higher status in the society because they are 
given more privileges than members of minority groups. This suggested that the allocation 
behaviour observed in Study 1 may have reflected the kind of group-based hierarchy 
described by SDT. Thus, in Study 2 of this chapter I tested predictions derived from SDT.
Together with the studies reported in Chapter 3, the current studies robustly 
demonstrate that anticipated emotions at least partly mediate the relationship between 
individual differences in preferences for how resources should be allocated and how people 
actually allocate resources between themselves and another person. This not only replicates 
the main findings in Chapter 3, where SVO was shown to predict both anticipated 
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cooperative and competitive emotions and allocation behaviour, but also strengthens the main 
theoretical argument being advanced in this thesis, namely that differences in anticipated 
emotions provide a psychological explanation for the influence of SVO on allocation 
behaviour. Research has shown that most studies in the literature have tended to recruit 
samples from western populations, that is people who live in societies that can be 
characterised as WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, and Democratic), a fact 
that may result in findings that are not readily applicable to people living in the rest of the 
world (Henrich et al., 2010). Thus, one strength of the current studies is that by replicating 
the pattern of findings reported in Chapter 3 using a population from a non-Western country, 
in this case Malaysia, the current research shows the generalizability of the mediating role 
played by anticipated emotions in the relation between SVO and allocation behaviour. 
However, a note of caution may also be applicable here: Although the current findings 
suggest that this mediating role is generalizable, the findings may not generalise to Malaysian 
citizens who are less highly educated. 
A limitation of Study 2 is the fact that it did not investigate whether participants 
differed in their anticipated cooperative and competitive emotions in relation to ingroup and 
outgroup members. This was because the ICE measure used in Study 2 was not specifically 
customized to manipulate the social identity of the receivers in the scenarios. Dropping the 
manipulation of receiver’s social identity in the ICE measure used in Study 2 was done for 
pragmatic reasons - wanting to reduce the length of time needed to complete the study. 
Future studies should seek to collect data on the extent to which respondents anticipate 
cooperative and competitive emotions when allocating resources to an ingroup or outgroup 
member. This may also provide further insight into the role of anticipated emotions in 
mediating the effect of SDO on allocation behaviour found in Study 2. 
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In conclusion, although the central manipulation of receiver’s social identity did not 
influence allocation behaviour in the predicted way, there was some indication of variation in 
the allocation behaviour of majority and minority groups towards others in Study 1. 
However, this finding was not replicated in Study 2 and this is something that could be 
pursued in future research. The fact that SDO scores did predict allocation behaviour, and 
also differed significantly between members of the Malay majority group and the Chinese 
minority group suggests that the majority/minority status of allocators needs to be taken into 
account in research on allocation behaviour in a multicultural society. 
Although the main findings of the current studies were not in line with predictions, 
the finding that anticipated emotions played a significant role in mediating the relation 
between SVO and allocation behaviour is consistent with the notion that anticipated emotions 
play a role in resource allocation decision making. This was true even in a different cultural 
population. Furthermore, the finding that the negative effect that SDO has on allocations 
towards others is also mediated by anticipated emotions speaks to the generality of 
anticipated emotions as a psychological mechanism that can explain how prosocial, 
individualistic, and competitive dispositions are expressed. Stronger evidence that anticipated 
emotions play a causal role in shaping allocation behaviour will be provided in the next 
chapter (Chapter 5), where I report studies in which I experimentally manipulated anticipated 
emotions in a decision making context.
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5 Chapter 5: Emotion Regulation 
5.1 Introduction
“A man who is master of himself can end a sorrow as easily as he can invent a 
pleasure. I don’t want to be at the mercy of my emotions. I want to use them, to enjoy them 
and to dominate them.” (Wilde, 1974)
In the previous chapters I have established that prosocial individuals anticipate more 
cooperative and fewer competitive emotions, which leads to fairer allocations. What would 
happen to prosocials’ allocation behaviour when their intuitive cooperative emotions are 
reduced? A common saying is: "Don't make decisions when you are angry and don't make 
promises when you are happy." This implies that decisions that are made under the influence 
of people’s current feelings may, later on, be regretted. Dorian Gray, a character in The 
Picture of Dorian Gray (Wilde, 1974), states that he manages his emotions by putting a stop 
to feeling sorrow (due to his lover’s death) by indulging in pleasurable and amoral acts that 
would make him feel less sorrowful (more happy/pleasurable). By adjusting his actions, he 
replaces the current emotional response to a situation with a new emotional response. This is 
a form of emotion regulation. When relating it to allocation behaviour, if an individual 
anticipates pride about being fair and regret about being unfair, s/he would aim to feel 
positive and his/her action will therefore be influenced by the emotions anticipated. However, 
what happens to this person’s allocation behaviour if s/he is asked to regulate these emotions 
(i.e., detach him/herself from these emotions or focus on his/her anticipated emotions). In this 
chapter, I will be investigating whether regulating anticipated emotions can affect allocation 
behaviour. 
5.1.1 What is emotion regulation? When and why do we regulate our emotion?
Emotion regulation involves replacing the current emotional response towards a 
situation with a new emotional response (Gross, 1998, 2002). Knowledge of how to regulate 
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emotions requires the awareness of the most effective strategies to modify and nurture 
emotions in a specific situation (Côté, DeCelles, McCarthy, Van Kleef, & Hideg, 2011). 
According to Salovey and Mayer’s (1990) model, emotion regulation knowledge is a core 
facet of emotion intelligence and it is assumed by their model that emotions can be managed 
to achieve specific goals.
Research that has shown that emotion regulation knowledge facilitates both prosocial 
and deviant behaviour, depending on individual differences (Côté et al., 2011). In the current 
study, I focused on whether emotion regulation knowledge facilitates prosocial behaviour 
because this is more relevant to the current research. In their research, Côté and colleagues 
first asked their participants to complete a measure of emotion-regulation knowledge, called 
the Situational Test of Emotion Management (STEM; Maccann & Roberts, 2008). The 
STEM assesses whether participants are aware of different strategies for emotion regulation 
in different situations by showing that they know what to do when faced with emotional 
situations. The strategies included in the measure were amplification, maintenance or 
suppression of emotions in specific situations. Participants’ moral identity and prosocial 
behaviour were also assessed using a social-dilemma situation adapted from Brewer and 
Kramer (1986). They found that emotional regulation knowledge strengthens the relationship 
between moral identity and prosocial behaviour. More specifically, the more emotion 
regulation knowledge an individual has, the more positive is the association between moral 
identity and prosocial behaviour. The researchers argued that individual differences may 
motivate certain goals, but that these goals may not be achieved without knowing what to do 
in a certain emotional situation (Côté et al., 2011). In other words, emotion regulation 
knowledge contributes to knowledge of which strategies can be utilised to achieve certain 
goals. 
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Past researchers have distinguished between two types of emotion regulation 
strategies: antecedent-focused and response-focused strategies (Gross & John, 2003). 
Antecedent-focused strategies refer to regulation strategies that are employed before 
experiential, behavioural and physiological effects of the emotional process take place. 
Response-focused strategies refer to regulation strategies in direct response to the 
experiential, behavioural and physiological aspects of the emotional reaction. The process 
model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998) distinguishes five points where emotions may be 
regulated. At the first four of these points, antecedent-focused strategies can be employed: 1) 
selection of the situation, 2) modification of situation, 3) attention deployment, 4) cognitive 
change through reappraisal. At the fifth point, a response-focused strategy may be employed, 
where the experiential, behavioural and physiological responses are modulated (Gross, 1998, 
2015). 
According to traditional, hedonic accounts of emotion regulation, individuals are 
driven to decrease negative feelings and increase positive feelings (Larsen, 2000). Studies 
have shown that, with regulation, people are able to increase and decrease positive (Giuliani, 
McRae, & Gross, 2008; Quoidbach, Mikolajczak, & Gross, 2015) and negative emotions 
(Van’t Wout, Chang, & Sanfey, 2010). With regard to the use of emotion regulation in 
resource allocation situations, researchers have examined cognitive reappraisal and 
suppression strategies. For example, researchers have investigated whether cognitive 
reappraisal and suppression can reduce the negative feelings that arise from receiving an 
unfair offer in an Ultimatum Game and whether this influences the decision to either accept 
or reject the offer (Van’t Wout et al., 2010). These researchers asked their participants to 
reappraise the unfair offers (allocated by another person) by instructing them to adopt a 
neutral attitude. Participants who were in the suppression condition, on the other hand, were 
asked to inhibit any emotion-expressive behaviour. They found that participants who 
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reappraised the unfair offers were more likely to accept such offers, compared to participants 
who suppressed their emotions. The researchers argued that because reappraisal is an 
antecedent emotion regulation strategy, it would be easier to take a different perspective on 
the current situation before experiencing an emotional response. However, in the case of 
suppression, a response-focused strategy, it may be that the elicited emotions still affect the 
person’s behaviour. 
5.1.2 Current studies
The findings reported in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis revealed that anticipated 
emotions act as a mediator in the relationship between SVO and allocation behaviour. In 
particular, participants who are more prosocial were found to anticipate more cooperative 
than competitive emotions, which appeared to lead to fairer allocations to others. The studies 
reported in Chapters 3 and 4 relied on correlational data. However, in order to demonstrate 
the assumed causal relation between anticipated emotions to allocation behaviour, an 
experimental study is needed (Spencer et al., 2005). To achieve this, I decided to 
experimentally manipulate the proposed mediator (anticipated emotions) and examine the 
influence this would have on allocation behaviour. 
Past research has shown that when someone changes his or her behaviour to achieve 
the desired emotions and avoid undesirable emotions, this represents a form of emotion 
regulation (Van Der Schalk et al., 2012). More specifically, researchers found that when 
participants were asked to anticipate pride about being fair, they acted in a more fair way and 
that when they were asked to anticipate regret about being fair, the participants acted in a less 
fair way (Van Der Schalk et al., 2012). Also, because the distribution of ICE-PRG scores (in 
the previously reported empirical chapters) suggests that people vary in their anticipated 
emotions, in the current studies I manipulated the degree of emotion anticipated before 
making an allocation. Thus, the main aim of the research reported in this chapter was to 
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investigate the effects of emotion regulation on allocation behaviour. Studies in Chapter 3 
and 4 have shown that most participants are prosocial by disposition and they anticipate 
mostly cooperative emotions and less competitive emotions which lead to more fair 
allocation behaviour. Thus, assuming that most participants are prosocial by disposition, such 
that their natural tendency is to anticipate cooperative emotions, it was hypothesised that 
when participants are asked to down-regulate their emotions, they would allocate fewer 
tokens to the other person than they would in a control condition. By contrast, when 
participants are asked to up-regulate their emotions, they should allocate more to the other 
person than they would in the control condition.
The second aim of the current research was to investigate whether there is an 
interaction between SVO and emotion regulation on allocation behaviour. I hypothesised that 
emotion regulation strategies would moderate the relationship between SVO and allocation 
behaviour. In particular, when prosocials are asked to down-regulate their emotions, they 
should down-regulate their cooperative emotions, which should lead to more unfair 
allocations. Proselfs on the other hand, when asked to down-regulate their emotions, should 
down-regulate competitive emotions, and therefore be less likely to make unfair allocations. 
By contrast, when prosocials are instructed to up-regulate their emotions, they should up-
regulate cooperative emotions, which should lead to more fair allocations. When proselfs are 
asked to up-regulate their emotions, they should up-regulate competitive emotions, and this 
should lead to less fair allocations. Additionally, because each participant made allocations in 
three successive DGs, I explored whether these predicted effects of emotion regulation would 
increase across the three games.
In Study 1, I instructed participants to either up-regulate or down-regulate his/her 
emotions before making allocations in an economic game. In Study 2, I asked participants to 
down-regulate specific emotions before making allocations in an economic game. In both 
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studies, a control condition was also included. The economic game that was used to measure 
allocation behaviour was the Dictator Game (DG). This is because the DG is a purer measure 
of fairness in allocation behaviour and should be more reflective of the participant’s SVO. 
Both studies were approved by the Ethics Committee of Cardiff University’s School of 
Psychology. 
5.2 Study 1
5.2.1 Method
5.2.1.1 Design and participants
Participants were 203 students (181 female, 21 male and 1 undisclosed; Mage = 18.92, 
SD = .92) recruited from the School of Psychology, Cardiff University. In exchange for their 
participation, participants were given two course credits and were automatically included in a 
lottery worth up to a maximum of £30 in Amazon vouchers. The lottery of £30 reflected their 
allocation made in the DG. Further explanation of how these lotteries were conducted is 
given below. At an earlier time, participants’ SVO data were recorded.14 The questionnaire 
was administered online using Qualtrics.
5.2.1.2 Materials
Index of Cooperative and Competitive Emotions (ICE) Measure. This measure is 
the same as the one that was developed in Chapter 2. The ICE measure consisted of six 
allocation scenarios representing fair (15:15; 18:18; 21:21) and unfair (20:10; 24:12; 28:14) 
divisions of tokens. Participants were presented with these scenarios and were asked to 
imagine that they had made specific divisions between themselves and another anonymous 
person (the receiver). For example, in one item participants were asked to imagine that there 
14 SVO data from only 200 students were collected (Mage = 18.90, SD = 1.55) of 
whom 26 were males and 174 were females.
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were 30 tokens at stake and that the participant kept 15 tokens for him/herself and gave 15 
tokens to the receiver. Participants were told that the receiver had to accept the allocation 
regardless of what was offered to them and were asked to rate how they would feel about the 
allocation in each scenario, using a scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). The six emotions 
that were assessed were pleased, proud, regretful, guilty, ashamed and disappointed. 
Emotion regulation manipulation. There were three conditions in this study: an up-
regulating condition, a down-regulating condition and a control condition. In the up-
regulating and down-regulating conditions, participants were presented with a text stating 
that when they played the DG with an anonymous person (the receiver), they might find 
themselves thinking about how they would feel if they were to offer more or less to the 
receiver. Specifically, the instruction read: “When you play the game with the other person, 
you may find yourself thinking about how you would feel if you were to offer more or less to 
the other person”. In the up-regulating condition, the instruction asked participants to focus 
on these feelings and to be guided by them when they made their decisions. Specifically, the 
instruction read: “We would like you to focus on these feelings and to be guided by them 
when you make your decision”. However, in the down-regulating condition, the instruction 
specifically asked participants to put such thoughts out of their mind and try to play the game 
in a detached and dispassionate way. Specifically, the instruction read: “We would like you 
to put such thoughts out of your mind. Try to play the game in a detached and dispassionate 
way”. These instructions were presented to participants before each of the three DGs they 
played. In the control condition, no instruction was presented to participants and they simply 
played the DG three times. 
Social Value Orientation. Participants' SVO was assessed using the six primary 
items of the SVO Slider Measure (SVO-SM; Murphy et al., 2011). Each item has 9 allocation 
options whereby a number of points is awarded to the participant and an anonymous other, 
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and participants choose their most preferred allocation. For example, participants may choose 
an option representing 75 tokens allocated for themselves and 75 tokens for the receiver. 
From participants' choices, an SVO ‘angle’ can be computed. Larger angles reflect greater 
prosociality. Specifically, altruists would have an angle greater than 57.15°; prosocials would 
score angles between 22.45° and 57.15°; individualists would have angles between -12.4° 
and 22.45°; and competitive individuals would have an angle less than -12.04°. In the current 
research, I used SVO angle score as a continuous variable.
Allocation behaviour. The Dictator Game (DG; Kahneman et al., 1986) was used to 
measure allocation behaviour. Participants played the role of allocator and were given a total 
of 30 tokens to divide between themselves and an anonymous other (‘the receiver’). 
Participants were told that the tokens had real monetary value, whereby 1 token was 
equivalent to £1. At the end of the study, two participants would be randomly selected and 
paid out according to the allocations made in the economic games. One of the participants 
was randomly chosen as the allocator and the other participant would automatically be the 
receiver. Because there were three DGs, the allocation was based on a randomly chosen DG. 
Thus, if the participant allocated 20allocator:10recipient in the randomly chosen DG, then the 
lottery winners would be paid out accordingly.
5.2.1.3 Procedure
Participants’ SVO data was collected at a mass testing session at the start of the 
academic year. The actual study took place on average five months later. Participants 
received a unique ID that enabled retrieval of their SVO data while preserving anonymity. 
Participants first completed a consent form. They then completed a demographics 
questionnaire (measuring age, gender, fluency in English, study course and year of study). 
Next, participants completed the ICE measure. The six allocation scenarios in each set were 
presented in a randomized order. After this, participants were randomly assigned to one of 
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the three experimental conditions: down-regulating, up-regulating or control. They were then 
asked to allocate resources between themselves and an anonymous receiver in three separate 
DGs. After that, participants were asked whether they had taken their participation in the 
study seriously. Finally, participants were thanked, debriefed and rewarded with course 
credits for their participation. 
5.2.2 Results
5.2.2.1 Data treatment
Data from 170 participants (151 female, 19 male; Mage = 18.93, SD = 0.93) were 
retained for analysis. Data from participants who participated in the survey twice were 
detected through duplicated unique IDs (N = 21) and were excluded from analyses. Data from 
participants who admitted that they had not answered the questionnaire seriously (N = 2) and 
whose response times were longer than 2.5 times the median response time (Mdn = 8.23; N = 
10) were also excluded from analyses. There were 56 participants in each of the up-regulating 
and down-regulating conditions and 58 in the control condition. Of these, there were 111
participants who reported their unique ID and for whom their SVO scores could be retrieved. 
The majority of the participants scored relatively highly, showing that the sample was 
dispositionally prosocial (M = 32.33, SD = 10.10).
The ICE score (ICE-PRG) was calculated in the same way as was described in 
Chapter 2. Positive scores reflected more cooperative emotions (pride about being fair, regret 
and guilt about being unfair), zero reflected the fact that there was no difference in the 
anticipation of emotions when making equal or unequal allocations, and a negative score 
represented competitive emotions (regret and guilt about being fair and pride about being 
unfair). The distribution of the final ICE score (see Figure 5.1) shows that there were 
relatively few scores below the mid-point of the scale, with the majority of participants 
expressing more cooperative emotions than competitive emotions. Additionally, Figure 5.2 
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shows that the relation between SVO and ICE PRG. The scatterplot shows that participants 
who were higher in SVO reported higher anticipated cooperative emotions than competitive 
emotions.  
Figure 5.1. Distribution of ICE-PRG scores (Study 1).
Figure 5.2. Relation between Social Value Orientation and ICE PRG (Study 1).
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5.2.2.2 Allocation behaviour
Exploration of the allocation behaviour data showed that the average number of 
tokens allocated to the receiver across the three games was not normally distributed, 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov: D(170) = 2.71, p < .001. Thus, to compare allocation behaviour 
across the 3 conditions, a Kruskal Wallis Test was used (one for each game). Results showed 
that there was a significant effect of condition in Game 2 and Game 3 (see Table 5.1). 
Follow-up Mann-Whitney tests revealed that the number of tokens allocated to the receiver 
was the number of tokens allocated to the receiver was significantly different in the down-
regulating than in the control condition, for Game 2, UG2 = 1161.00, p = .01 and Game 3,UG3
= 978.50, p < .01 but not for Game 1, UG1 = 1337.50, p = .09 (p-value with Bonferonni 
correction). However, this number was not significantly different in the up-regulating 
condition than in the control condition for any of the three games, UG1 = 1546.50, p = .63,
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UG2 = 1439.00, p = .25, and UG3 = 1619.00, p = .98 (p-value with Bonferonni correction).15
Additionally, follow-up Mann Whitney tests showed that the number of tokens allocated to 
the receiver was significantly different in the up-regulating condition than in the down-
regulating condition for Game 2, UG2 = 904.00, p < .01 and Game 3, UG3 = 886.00, p < .01 
but not in Game 1, UG1 = 1213.50, p = .081 (p-value with Bonferonni correction). 
15 I ran two post-hoc power analyses using G* Power (Faul et al., 2009; Faul et al., 
2007) to see if the sample recruited in the current study had sufficient power to find the 
predicted effects: one for the comparison between the down-regulation and control condition, 
and one for the comparison between the up-regulation and control condition. Because the 
effect of the emotion regulation manipulation on allocation behaviour became more 
pronounced over the course of the three games, I only used data from G3 in the post-hoc 
power analyses. The significant difference between the down-regulation and control 
condition in allocations had a medium effect size of Cohen’s d = .69 (Cohen, 1969, p. 38). A 
post-hoc power analysis showed that the study had a high power of .94 to find this effect. 
However, the difference between the up-regulation and the control conditions had only a very 
small effect size, Cohen’s d = .03 (Cohen, 1969, p. 38) and the post-hoc power analysis 
revealed that the study had very low power to find this effect (1 – b = .03). This suggests that 
the study may have been underpowered, however a sensitivity test (using the G*Power 
software) showed that the current study had sufficient power (1- b = .80) to find a medium
effect of Cohen dz = .54 (Cohen, 1969, p. 38). Overall, the study had sufficient power to find 
a difference between the control and down-regulation conditions, but the low power achieved 
for the comparison between the up-regulation with the control conditions suggests that there 
simply may not have been a difference between these conditions. In Study 2, I aimed to 
recruit a comparable number of participants for each condition as there was satisfactory 
power for the difference between the control and the down-regulation conditions.
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I also investigated whether allocation behaviour differed significantly between games 
within each of the experimental conditions. Friedman’s ANOVA tests revealed a significant 
effect of game in the down-regulation condition (see Table 5.1). Post hoc analysis with 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests revealed a statistically significant reduction in allocation 
behaviour between Game 1 and Game 2, (Z = -3.28, p = .001) and between Game 1 and 
Game 3, (Z = -3.44, p = .001).
Table 5.1. Median allocations and test statistics in each game and condition (Study 1).
G1 G2 G3 Friedman’s ANOVA (c2)
Up-regulating (Median) 15 15 15 0.53
Down-regulating (Median) 10 10 9 17.89***
Control (Median) 15 14.5 15 3.3
Kruskal Wallis (c2) 5.44 16.85*** 21.43***
***p < .001
5.2.2.3 SVO and emotion regulation
A logistic regression was conducted to determine the joint effect of SVO and emotion 
regulation conditions on allocation behaviour in each of the three games. Allocation 
behaviour was dichotomized into fair (allocation of 15 or more tokens to the receiver) and 
unfair (allocation of 14 or fewer tokens to the receiver). Two dummy-coded variables were 
created that respectively contrasted the up-regulation and the down-regulation conditions 
with the control condition. SVO angle score was centred and entered into Model 1 together 
with both dummy-coded condition variables. In Model 2, the SVO-by-condition interaction 
terms were included. The results are presented in Table 5.2 for Games 1, 2 and 3. In all three 
games there was a significant main effect of SVO. The effect of down-regulation versus the 
control condition was significant in Game 2 and Game 3 and was trending towards 
significance in Game 1. This showed that participants in the down-regulation condition were 
less likely to make a fair offer than participants in the control condition. 
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The interaction terms were not significant (although some were marginal). Despite the 
fact that the interactions did not reach conventional thresholds for significance, the pattern of 
results seen in Figure 5.3 may suggests that the relation between SVO and allocation 
behaviour is moderated by emotion regulation. Figure 5.3 showed that in all three games, 
there were a significant relation between SVO and allocation behaviour in the control 
condition, in Game 1, B = .119, Exp(B) = 1.13, p = .025; Game 2, B = .149, Exp(B) = 1.16, p
= .019 and Game 3, B = .131, Exp(B) = 1.14, p = .018. However, there were no significant 
effects of SVO on allocation behaviour in the up-regulating condition for all three games, 
Game 1, B = .071, Exp(B) = 1.07, p = .147; Game 2, B = .017, Exp(B) = 1.02, p = .683, and 
Game 3, B = .006, Exp(B) = 1.01, p = .883 and in the down-regulating condition for Game 1, 
B = .059, Exp(B) = 1.06, p = .276; Game 2, B = .044, Exp(B) = 1.05, p = .420; and Game 3, B
= .038, Exp(B) = 1.04, p = .487 (see Figure 5.3).
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Table 5.2. Logistic regression of social value orientation and emotion regulation conditions 
on allocation behaviour in Game 1, 2, and 3 (Study 1).
Game 1 Game 2 Game 3
B Odds 
Ratio
p-
value
B Odds 
Ratio
p-
value
B Odds 
Ratio
p-
value
Model 1
SVO .09** 1.09** .003 .07** 1.07** .008 .06** 1.07** .010
Up-
regulating 
vs. 
control
.19 1.17 .725 .25 .54 .579 -.33 .72 .463
Down-
regulating 
vs. 
control
-.87† .42† .059 -1.08* .14* .021 -
1.55*
**
.21*** .001
Model 2
SVOxUp-
regulating
-.05 .95 .506 -.13† .88† .085 -.13† .88† .073
SVOxDo
wn-
regulating
-.06 .94 .425 -.11 .90 .212 -.09 .91 .239
Model 1 R2 = 16.00%, c2(3) = 
16.72, p < .001
R2 = 15.40%, c2(3) = 
16.00, p = .001
R2 = 17.00%, c2(3) = 
17.80, p < .001
Model 2 R2 = 16.70%, c2(2) = 
.785, p = .675
R2 = 18.80%, c2(2) = 
3.82, p = .148
R2 = 20.50%, c2(2) = 
4.04, p = .132
Notes: The R2 reported are Nagelkerke R2. Model 1 c2 tests Model 1 as a whole. Model 2 c2 
tests the improvement from Model 1 to Model 2.
* p £ .05, ** p £ .01, *** p £ .001, † p < .09
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a)
b)
c)
Figure 5.3. Moderating effect of emotion regulation conditions in Game 1(a), Game 2(b) and 
Game 3(c) on the SVO-allocation behaviour relationship (two-way interaction with 
categorical moderators) (Study 1). * p < .05
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5.2.3 Discussion
The main aim of this study was to provide causal evidence for the effect of the 
proposed mediator, anticipated emotions, on allocation behaviour (Spencer et al., 2005) by 
examining whether an emotion regulation manipulation has a significant effect on allocation 
behaviour. As seen in Table 5.1, there was a significant effect of emotion regulation on
allocation behaviour, but only for the down-regulation instruction. This shows that when 
participants were asked to down-regulate their emotions, this resulted in the decrease in 
tokens allocated across the three games. The findings showed that the majority of participants 
were prosocial and overwhelmingly anticipated cooperative rather than competitive 
emotions. Thus, the results suggest that when they were asked to down-regulate their 
emotions, they down-regulated cooperative emotions (pride about being fair, regret about 
being unfair) and this resulted in less fair allocation behaviour towards the other person. On 
the other hand, when they were asked to up-regulate their emotions, they should have up-
regulated cooperative emotions and this in turn should have led them to give more to others. 
However, the results did not reveal a significant main effect of up-regulating emotions on 
allocation behaviour, which suggests that a predominantly prosocial sample cannot be led to 
be fairer in their allocation behaviour. Because the nature of prosocials is to be generous, they 
would instinctively allocate fairly (50:50) to others. This suggests that a ceiling effect 
probably limited the effectiveness of the up-regulation condition. Despite the lack of a 
significant effect of the up-regulation instruction, the present study provides good 
experimental evidence that anticipated emotions have an impact on allocation behaviour.
A second aim of this study was to examine whether there was an interaction between 
SVO and emotion regulation strategies in shaping allocation behaviour. Although there were 
no significant interactions between SVO and the emotion regulation strategies on allocation 
behaviour, there was a consistent tendency for the strength of the relation between SVO and 
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allocation behaviour to vary across the three conditions. In the control condition there was a 
strong and positive relation between SVO and allocation behaviour across the three games 
(see Figure 5.3). This reflects the established relation between SVO and allocation behaviour: 
the more prosocial an individual is, the more s/he allocate towards others (Bogaert et al., 
2008; Messick & McClintock, 1968). However, SVO was not a significant predictor of 
allocation behaviour in either the up-regulating or the down-regulating conditions (see Figure 
5.3). The fact that the results in these conditions did not show a similar pattern as the one in 
the control condition provides evidence that the manipulation of anticipated emotions was 
effective. Asking participants to either up-regulate or down-regulate their emotions disrupted 
the normally stable influence of SVO preferences on allocation behaviour. 
Lastly, I explored whether the effect of the up-regulating and down-regulating 
instructions would become stronger across the three games. The results showed that the 
down-regulation manipulation had a significant main effect on allocation behaviour in Games 
2 and 3. This builds on the previous evidence that the manipulation had an effect on 
allocation behaviour, especially in the down-regulation condition, and suggests that repeating 
the instruction to discount one’s anticipated emotions has a greater impact on allocation 
decisions.
5.3 Study 2
The results of Study 1 demonstrate that down-regulation of anticipated cooperative 
emotions decreases fairness in DG allocations. However, the results do not tell us precisely 
which emotions participants were up-regulating or down-regulating. This is due to the 
generality of the instruction asking participants to up-regulate or down-regulate “anticipated 
emotions”, rather than specific anticipated emotions such as anticipated pride about being 
fair, regret and guilt about being unfair, or anticipated regret and guilt about being fair and 
pride about being unfair. In other words, the instructions used in Study 1 did not distinguish 
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between cooperative and competitive emotions. In Study 2, I therefore aimed to manipulate 
specific anticipated cooperative (pride about being fair and regret about being unfair) and 
competitive emotions (regret about being fair and pride about being unfair), in order to 
investigate their effect on allocation behaviour. This would allow me to disentangle the 
specific effects of the down-regulating cooperative and competitive emotions. 
Because Study 1 revealed a stronger effect of down-regulation than up-regulation on 
allocation behaviour, in Study 2 I decided to focus on the down-regulation of cooperative and 
competitive emotions. Study 2 included five down-regulation conditions: down-regulation of 
pride about being fair, down-regulation of regret about being unfair, down-regulation of 
regret about being fair, down-regulation of pride about being unfair, and a control condition 
in which no instructions about emotion regulation were given. Anticipated guilt was not 
included in the manipulation for pragmatic reasons. Because this would involve adding two 
further conditions, it would have resulted in a total of seven conditions. This would have 
stretched the participant resources available through the subject pool.
It was hypothesised that when individuals are asked to down-regulate cooperative 
emotions (pride about being fair and regret about being unfair) they will behave less fairly by 
allocating unequal tokens in a way that favours themselves. On the other hand, when 
individuals are asked to down-regulate competitive emotions (regret about being fair and 
pride about being unfair), it was hypothesized that they will behave more fair by giving equal 
or more tokens to others. 
5.3.1 Method
5.3.1.1 Design and participants
Participants were 240 students (206 female, 32 male and 2 undisclosed; Mage = 18.78, 
SD = .94) recruited from the School of Psychology, Cardiff University. In exchange for their 
participation, participants were given course credits. Additionally, participants were 
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automatically included in a lottery worth up to a maximum of £30 in Amazon vouchers. The 
lottery of £30 reflected their allocation made in the DG. The lottery was conducted in the 
same way as Study 1. At an earlier time, participants’ SVO data had been collected.16 Data 
were collected online using Qualtrics.
5.3.1.2 Materials
As in Study 1, the ICE measure was used to measure participants’ anticipated 
emotions, the SVO-SM (Murphy et al., 2011) was used to measure participants’ individual 
preferences regarding resource allocation, and the DG was used to measure participants’ 
allocation behaviour. The main difference with Study 1 concerned the emotion regulation 
instructions. In Study 2, there were 5 conditions: down-regulation of anticipated pride about 
being fair condition (DP-FC), down-regulation of anticipated regret about being unfair 
condition (DR-UFC), down-regulation of anticipated regret about being fair condition (DR-
FC), down-regulation of anticipated pride about being unfair condition (DP-UFC), and a 
control condition (no emotion regulation instruction). The DP-FC and DR-UFC conditions 
were both intended to down-regulate cooperative emotions while the DR-FC and DP-UFC 
were both intended to down-regulate competitive emotions. In each of the down-regulation 
conditions, participants were told that when they played the game with the receiver, they 
might find themselves thinking about how they would feel if they were to offer more or less 
to the receiver. Specifically, participants might think about how proud/pleased (or 
regret/disappointed, depending on condition) they would feel if they divided the resources 
equally (or unequally, depending on condition) between themselves and the receiver. 
Participants in all four down-regulation conditions were asked to put such thoughts out of 
their mind when playing the game and do not think about how proud and pleased (or regretful 
16 Out of 240 participants, the SVO data for 233 participants were retrieved. 
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and disappointed) they would feel. They were instructed to play the game in a detached and 
dispassionate way. The full instructions for each condition are shown in Appendix F.
5.3.1.3 Procedure
The procedure for Study 2 was similar to that of Study 1. The SVO measure was 
administered during a mass testing session at the start of the academic year. The actual study 
took place on average one month later and participants provided a unique ID code they had 
been given during the mass testing session, which enabled retrieval of their SVO data. First, 
participants completed a consent form. Next, participants completed a set of demographic 
questions (e.g., age, gender, self-reported fluency in English, university course and year of 
study). Participants then completed the ICE measure. Next, each participant was randomly 
assigned to one of the five conditions: DP-FC, DR-UFC, DR-FC, DP-UFC, or control. Then, 
they played three DGs consecutively with the instructions relevant to their condition (or no 
instruction in the case of the control condition) presented before each game. Next, 
participants were asked if they had taken their participation in the study seriously. Finally, 
participants were thanked, paid and debriefed.
5.3.2 Results
5.3.2.1 Data treatment
Data from 211 participants (183 female, 27 male and 1 undisclosed; Mage = 18.77, SD
= 0.91) were retained for analysis. Data from participants who did the survey twice were 
detected through duplicate IDs (N = 4) and were excluded from analyses. Data from 
participants who admitted that they had not answered the questionnaire seriously (N = 2) and 
whose response time was longer than 2.5 times the median response time (Mdn = 9.74; N = 
23) were also excluded from analyses. There were 43 participants in the DP-FC, 42 
participants in the DR-UFC, 38 participants in the DR-FC, 45 participants in the DP-UFC, 
and 43 in the control condition. SVO data were retrieved for 153 participants and majority 
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scored relatively high, showing that the sample was again dispositionally prosocial (M = 
33.34, SD = 8.05).
The ICE score (ICE-PRG) was calculated in the same way as in Study 1. The 
distribution of the ICE scores (see Figure 5.4) showed that there were relatively few scores 
below the zero-point of the scale and that the majority of participants had an ICE score 
greater than zero. This shows that the majority of participants anticipated more cooperative 
emotions than competitive emotions. Similarly to Study 1, Figure 5.5 shows that the relation 
between SVO and ICE PRG indicating that participants who were higher in SVO reported 
higher anticipated cooperative emotions than competitive emotions. 
Figure 5.4. Distribution of ICE-PRG scores (Study 2).
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Figure 5.5. Relation between Social Value Orientation and ICE PRG scores (Study 2).
5.3.2.2 Allocation behaviour
Exploration of the allocation data showed that the average number of tokens allocated 
to the receiver across the three games was not normally distributed, Kolmogorov-Smirnov: 
D(211) = 2.99, p < .001. To compare allocation behaviour across the five conditions for each 
of the games, I therefore used the Kruskal Wallis test. This showed that allocation behaviour 
in Game 1 and Game 3 differed significantly between the five conditions (see Table 5.3). In 
Game 2, the Kruskal Wallis test showed that allocation behaviour differed marginally 
significantly between conditions, c2(4) = 8.35, p = .08 (see Table 5.3). 
Additionally, to examine whether participants differed in their allocation across the 
games within each condition, Friedman’s ANOVA tests were carried out. These tests showed 
that participants differed in their allocations across the games in the DP-FC, DR-UFC and 
DP-UFC. However, this was not the case in the DR-FC and control condition (see Table 5.3).
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Table 5.3. Median allocations and test statistics in each game and condition (Study 2). 
Condition G1 G2 G3 Friedman’s Anova (c2)
Down Pride Fair 
(Median)
13 10 10 10.25**
Down Regret Unfair 
(Median)
15 13 15 8.97*
Down Pride Unfair 
(Median)
15 14 14 10.20**
Down Regret Fair 
(Median)
14 12 12 .22
Control (Median) 15 15 15 1.37
Kruskal Wallis (c2) 9.78* 8.35† 14.50**
*p < .05, **p < .01, † .05 < p < .08
To investigate the specific effects of down-regulation condition on allocation 
behaviour, I ran a Kruskal Wallis test examining allocation behaviour in the four down-
regulation conditions, excluding the control condition. This revealed that allocation 
behaviour in each game was not statistically different between the down-regulation 
conditions, Game 1: c2(3) = 5.37, p = .147; Game 2: c2(3) = .12, p = .990; Game 3: c2(3) = 
1.94, p = .586. This shows that although the instructions differed in the attempted 
manipulation of distinct emotions, participants did not exhibit any differences in their 
allocation behaviour towards the anonymous receiver as a result of these different 
instructions. 
Because participants did not differ significantly in their allocation behaviour across 
the four down-regulation conditions, these four conditions were grouped into a single down-
regulation condition by averaging the tokens allocated across all four conditions for each 
game. A Mann-Whitney test investigated the difference between this combined down-
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regulation condition and the control condition for each game. Allocation behaviour was 
significantly different in each of the games (see Table 5.4). 
Using a Friedman’s ANOVA, I then explored whether participants’ allocation 
behaviour differed across the three games within the combined down-regulation condition 
and the control condition. These analyses showed that participants’ allocation behaviour to 
the receiver significantly decreased across the games in the combined down-regulation 
condition but did not do so in the control conditions (see Table 5.4). Post hoc analysis with 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests using a Bonferroni correction revealed a statistically significant 
reduction in allocation behaviour between Game 1 and Game 2, Z = -4.07, p < .001, and 
Game 1 and Game 3, Z = -4.60, p < .001, but not between Game 2 and Game 3, Z = -.11, p = 
.911.
Table 5.4. Median allocations and test statistics in each game and condition (Study 2).
G1 G2 G3 Friedman’s 
ANOVA (c2)
Down-regulating 
(Median)
15 12 12.5 23.91***
Control 
(Median)
15 15 15 1.37
Mann Whitney U 2980.00* 2646.00** 2433.50***
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
5.3.3 Discussion
It was predicted that the effect of down-regulation on allocation behaviour would 
depend on the type of emotion that was being down-regulated (i.e., cooperative and 
competitive emotions). However, the results of this study show that participants did not differ 
in their allocation behaviour across the different down-regulation conditions. Findings 
revealed that participants acted less fairly when they were instructed to down-regulate their 
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emotions than when they were not given any instruction to down-regulate their emotions. 
Reflecting on the instructions that were given to the participants in the down-regulation 
conditions, it may be that the final sentence of each instruction, namely “Try to play the game 
in a detached and dispassionate way” (for the specific instructions, see Appendix F), led to 
participants setting aside their emotions when making allocations, regardless of which 
specific emotion they had been asked to down-regulate. As a result, no matter which 
emotions they had been specifically instructed to set aside, they may have simply ignored all 
emotions and made their allocations in the DG in a generally dispassionate way. 
The distributions of SVO and ICE scores showed that there were once again more 
prosocials than proselfs in the sample. Prosocials typically anticipate pride about being fair 
and regret about being unfair (Van Der Schalk et al., 2012). As a result, it may be the case 
that when participants were asked to down-regulate specific emotions, they did not follow the 
instruction about the specific emotion that they were asked to down-regulate and instead 
down-regulated the cooperative emotions about allocating resources that as prosocials they 
would have spontaneously experienced. 
5.4 General Discussion
Across two studies the current research shows that individuals shared resources less 
equally with another person when they were instructed to down-regulate the emotions they 
would normally have anticipated experiencing when making resource allocation decisions. 
Study 1 also included an up-regulation condition, but this did not lead to an increase in 
sharing. Given the high level of allocation in the control condition and the fact that the 
sample was largely prosocial, it is possible that the up-regulation condition was not 
successful in increasing fairness due to a ceiling effect. Study 2 aimed to further investigate 
whether down-regulation of cooperative emotions would have the opposite effect to that of 
down-regulation of competitive emotions. Unexpectedly, the sharing of resources was lower 
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in all down-regulation conditions, independent of the type of emotion that was regulated. It is 
possible that the instructions about the specific emotion that needed to be regulated were too 
subtle and that participants simply down-regulated the emotions that they spontaneously 
experienced. Given that the sample was largely prosocial this resulted in less fairness.
I also investigated whether emotion regulation moderated the influence of SVO on 
allocation behaviour. Although the interactions between conditions and SVO were not 
significant, there was some suggestive evidence that the effect of SVO on allocation 
behaviour that is typically observed was disrupted in the up-regulation and down-regulation 
conditions in Study 1. The simple slope of SVO in the control condition was positively and 
significantly related to the probability of making a fair offer. Although the simple slopes of 
SVO on allocation behaviour in the up-regulation and down-regulation conditions were not 
significant, the patterns showed that the manipulations disrupted allocation behaviour 
because they differed from the pattern observed in the control condition. This provides 
further evidence that anticipated emotions play a key role in the effect of SVO on allocation 
behaviour, supporting the provisional conclusion reached in Chapter 3.
In both studies there were more prosocial than proself individuals in the sample and 
therefore the majority of the participants would have anticipated more cooperative than 
competitive emotions. Thus, when asked to down-regulate their emotions, they would down-
regulate cooperative emotions (the emotions that prosocials would spontaneously anticipate) 
and therefore become less generous in their allocations. Following the same logic, a 
predominantly prosocial sample should have up-regulated their cooperative emotions in the 
up-regulation condition, but there was no significant increase in allocation behaviour in this 
condition. As previously noted, this may have been due to a ceiling effect whereby prosocials 
simply could become any more equal in their allocations or were already anticipating high 
levels of cooperative emotions. It may well be easier for prosocials to down-regulate the 
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cooperative emotions that they usually anticipate than it is for them to up-regulate these 
anticipated cooperative emotions when they are already at high levels. 
The expected effects of down-regulation and up-regulation for proself individuals are 
less straightforward. On one hand, it could be argued that competitive emotions are the 
emotions that proself individuals would spontaneously anticipate. In that case, down-
regulation and up-regulation should have the opposite effects to those that they have for 
prosocials: down-regulation should increase fairness, whereas up-regulation should further 
decrease the amount shared with another person. On the other hand, inspection of the ICE 
scores (Figures 5.2 and 5.5) reveals that proself individuals did not anticipate high levels of 
competitive emotions; rather, they simply did not differentiate the emotions they expected to 
feel when thinking about fair and unfair allocation decisions. Compared to prosocials, 
proselfs anticipated fewer cooperative emotions. In light of this, it could be predicted that in a 
more proself sample, down-regulation would have had a less marked effect (because there 
would be little anticipated emotion to down-regulate), whereas up-regulation might increase 
fairness in such a sample because their cooperative emotions are low to begin with. The 
findings of Study 1 provide suggestive evidence for the latter prediction. Future research 
should aim to recruit a higher number of proselfs to investigate whether emotions regulation 
strategies influence them differently.
Although we already knew from the research by Côté and colleagues (2011) that 
emotion regulation knowledge plays a role in moderating the effect of individual differences 
on allocation behaviour, the current studies extend this work by manipulating the degree of 
anticipated emotions and showing that it affects the relation of SVO on allocation behaviour. 
The significant effect of the down-regulating instruction on allocation behaviour found in this 
study is consistent with past research showing that thinking about anticipated emotions 
results in a change in allocation behaviour (Van Der Schalk et al., 2012). The current studies 
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build on these studies by directly manipulating the degree of anticipated cooperative and 
competitive emotions and showing that this affected allocation behaviour, at least when 
participants were instructed to down-regulate anticipated emotions. 
The current study, together with the studies reported in the previous chapters, suggest 
that when individuals are asked to make an allocation between themselves and another 
person, they think about the emotions they would expect to feel when making either a fair or 
unfair resource allocation decision. The results of these studies consistently show that 
prosocials anticipate more cooperative emotions than proself individuals. Thus, in order to 
feel positive (or avoid feeling negative) about an allocation, prosocial participants choose to 
behave fairly rather than unfairly. This reflects Gross's (1998) situational modification 
strategy of achieving the desired emotion after making a decision made by changing one’s 
behaviour. In the current studies, when participants down-regulated their anticipated 
emotions, their allocation to the other person became less fair. This specific down-regulating 
of anticipated emotions reflect Gross’s (1998) attention deployment strategy by not paying 
attention to their anticipated emotions when participants were asked to “detach” themselves 
from the emotions that they anticipate experiencing after being fair or unfair. Thus, it can be 
argued that by not paying attention to their anticipated emotions, participants were able to 
behave in a more dispassionate way when making their resource allocation decisions, leading 
them to make allocations that were less equal and more beneficial to themselves.
Several limitations to the current studies should be acknowledged. In both studies, the 
nature of the instructions may have played a role in generating the observed findings, not all 
of which were consistent with my predictions. In Study 1, the instruction used was quite 
general, with the result that I could not be sure which emotions were being regulated. This 
issue was addressed in Study 2, where a more specific down-regulation instruction was used. 
However, this greater specificity did not achieve the desired effect. Instead, rather than down-
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regulating specific emotions, participants appear to have generally detached themselves from 
the emotions they anticipated feeling in the decision making process. As noted above, this 
may have been due to the final sentence used in the instructions. This may have been 
responsible for the fact that all four of the down-regulating conditions in Study 2 produced 
similar results. 
Another possible limitation of the current studies relates to the use of the ICE measure 
to measure the emotions that participants thought they would feel if they were to behave one 
way or another (according to the prearranged allocations in the scenarios presented). 
However, the actual emotions that participants felt upon making a certain decision was not 
measured. Future research could assess the actual emotions that people experience upon 
making a certain decision. For example, actual emotions could be measured after participants 
have made an allocation in an economic game. This then could be compared to what they 
reported that they anticipated feeling according to the ICE measure. A further point is that the 
fact that participants’ anticipated emotions were measured using a set of prearranged 
allocations (the allocation scenarios included in the ICE measure), may have restricted 
participants’ ability to express what they actually anticipated in relation to their own choice 
of allocations. Thus, another suggestion for future research would be to measure participants’ 
anticipated emotions based on allocations that they are actively considering making in the 
economic game. These anticipated emotions before making an allocation could then be 
compared with the actual emotions experienced after making allocations in the economic 
game. 
Past research has shown that down-regulation of emotions has an effect on decision 
making (Côté et al., 2011; Van Der Schalk et al., 2012). It could be argued that when asking 
participants to down-regulate their emotions, this might have a paradoxical effect of making 
the emotions that are being down-regulated more salient, parallel to the rebound effect 
Chapter 5 157
observed by Wegner and colleagues (1987). Wegner et al. (1987) asked participants not to 
think of a white bear and found that after this thought suppression, thoughts about a white 
bear were more frequent than they were in a control condition. Although the current 
experiments lacked a manipulation check that would have enabled me to check whether there 
was a rebound effect, there is some evidence that this effect did not occur in the current 
research. This is because the effects of down-regulation became stronger over the course of 
the three consecutive allocations that participants made. 
Not having a measure of anticipated emotions as a manipulation check could be 
considered a limitation of this study. However, asking participants to report their anticipated 
emotions after instructing them to down-regulate their emotions may have had the undesired 
effect of participants focusing on their feelings. This would have undermined the intended 
effect of the manipulation. Previous research has showed that the instructions used in the 
study are successful in reducing emotions (Côté et al., 2011; Van Der Schalk et al., 2012). 
There is therefore independent evidence that this type of manipulation is effective. Also, 
participants’ allocation behaviour was lower in the down-regulation condition than in the 
control condition. This shows that the manipulation had the intended effect on allocation 
behaviour and thereby reduces the need for a manipulation check (Fayant, Sigall, Lemonnier, 
Retsin, & Alexopoulos, 2017; Sigall & Mills, 1998).
A final possible limitation is that neither of the current studies included an attention 
check. Future research should include an attention check in order to be sure participants pay 
attention to what they read on the screen. Thus, the only screening item that could be used in 
the current studies was the one asking participants if they had taken their participation 
seriously. 
All in all, the two studies reported in this chapter showed that a manipulation of 
anticipated emotion had a significant impact on participants’ allocation behaviour. In general, 
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down-regulation of anticipated emotions led to less fair allocations. Study 1 also yielded 
suggestive evidence that emotion regulation disrupted the normal effect of SVO on allocation 
behaviour. The current studies were therefore successful in providing experimental evidence 
that anticipated emotions play an important role in decision making.
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6 Chapter 6: General Discussion 
In this thesis I set out to understand the psychological processes that are responsible 
for individual differences in preferences for resource allocation outcomes in contexts where 
there is some tension between the motive to serve one’s own interests and the motive to 
consider the interests of another person. Because the greater tendency of prosocials 
(compared to proselfs) to allocate resources fairly is due to their greater sympathy and/or 
empathy for the other person (Eggum et al., 2011; Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008), I reasoned 
that anticipated emotions may represent a psychological mechanism that shapes individual 
differences in preferences for how to allocate resources between self and other. I therefore 
hypothesised that anticipated emotions would mediate the relationship between SVO and 
allocation behaviour. The findings from the research reported in this thesis show that 
anticipated emotions do help to account for the relationship between SVO and allocation 
behaviour. 
A second objective of the research reported in this thesis was to investigate the effects 
of group membership of the receiver in an economic game setting to see whether this 
manipulation would influence participants’ allocation behaviour. Additionally, this thesis set 
out to investigate whether the pattern of results found in studies conducted in a western 
culture would be replicated in studies conducted in a different cultural setting, namely 
Malaysia. Finally, in the research reported in Chapter 5, I investigated whether the pattern of 
the mediation that was consistently found in Chapters 3 and 4 reflected a causal influence of 
anticipated emotion on allocation behaviour. In the following section, I discuss the findings 
of each empirical chapter in light of the main research question. 
6.1 Summary of findings for each empirical chapter
Past SVO measures, such as the decomposed games used by Messick and McClintock 
(1968), the Triple Dominance measure (Van Lange et al., 1997), and the SVO-Slider measure 
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(Murphy et al., 2011), were developed to measure individuals’ preferences for different 
resource outcomes. Although these measures are successful in the sense that they show that 
preferences measured in these ways are predictive of actual allocation behaviour, they do not 
shed much light on the psychological mechanism underlying the individual differences in 
preferences. As argued above, because prosocials’ behaviour appears to be related to their 
greater sympathy/empathy (Eggum et al., 2011; Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008), I proposed 
that anticipated emotions might play a role in explaining these individual preferences. In 
Chapter 2, I described the development of the Index of Cooperative and Competitive 
Emotion (ICE) measure. This was intended to assess anticipated emotions that are relevant to 
resource allocation decisions and to extend our understanding of how individual differences 
in SVO influence behaviour. In the three studies reported in this chapter, the newly 
developed measure was shown to be reliable and valid. This justifies its use to address the 
main research question of my thesis. 
Using the newly developed ICE measure, the main research question was addressed in 
Chapter 3. In the two studies reported in this chapter I investigated my hypothesis that 
anticipated emotions would mediate the relationship between SVO and allocation behaviour. 
The findings of Study 1 provided good support for this prediction, however anticipated 
emotions only partially mediated the relation between SVO and allocation behaviour. It was 
also noted that the sample consisted mainly of prosocials. It could be that the mediating role 
of anticipated emotions is more evident among prosocials than among proselfs. Thus, in 
Study 2 I aimed to recruit a more “proself” sample (drawn from the population of business 
school students) to see whether there would also be evidence of mediation in this sample. It 
was the case that the sample was more varied with respect to SVO, although proselfs were 
still outnumbered by prosocials. As expected, there were significant differences in both SVO 
and anticipated emotions between the psychology student sample recruited in Study 1 and the 
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business school sample recruited in Study 2, although results did not show any differences in 
psychology and business school students’ allocation behaviour as did previous studies that 
have found differences (Van Lange et al., 2011). However, evidence of anticipated emotions 
as a partial mediator was once again found in Study 2. 
By measuring participants’ SVO and anticipated emotions using the ICE measure and 
asking participants to divide a set number of tokens with financial value between themselves 
and an anonymous other, the findings of these two studies show a reliable tendency for 
anticipated emotion to partially mediate the relationship between SVO and allocation 
behaviour. These studies provide the first evidence that the individual differences in 
preferences for resource allocation that are captured by measures of SVO can be explained at 
a more proximate level by differences in the emotions that prosocials and proselfs anticipate 
experiencing when making decisions about how to allocate resources between self and other. 
In an influential paper it was argued that most psychological research studies have 
been conducted in western cultures, using samples drawn from western populations (Henrich 
et al., 2010). This poses the risk that the findings of such research may not generalise to 
cultures that have different norms, values, and practices. To avoid depending exclusively on 
the results of studies using western samples, in the research reported in Chapter 4, I replicated 
the research conducted in Chapter 3 using an Asian sample, recruited in Malaysia. 
Additionally, due to the multi-ethnic and multicultural nature of Malaysia and its 
specific history that has led to a form of segregation among Malaysians (Cheong et al., 2016; 
Montesino, 2012; Tyson et al., 2017), I took the opportunity to investigate the effect of the 
receiver’s ingroup or outgroup identity on individual’s allocation behaviour, expecting to find 
evidence of a tendency to be more fair when making allocations to ingroup receivers. 
According to Social Identity Theory, individuals are motivated to achieve a positive 
distinction between their ingroup and their outgroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). To create this 
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positive distinctiveness, lower social status group members behave in a way that helps them 
to increase their social standing, for example by allocating resources fairly and thereby 
gaining the moral high ground. According to Social Dominance theory (Pratto et al., 1994), 
individuals differ in their preferences for status differences and group hierarchies in society. 
High status groups generally have greater preference for this and are motivated to maintain 
status differences between groups, whereas low status groups tend to have less preference for 
this and are motivated to promote equality. Thus, I also explored whether allocators from the 
majority group in Malaysia (Malays) differed in their allocation behaviour from those from 
minority groups (Chinese and Indians).
In these Malaysian studies, there was reliable evidence of a similar mediating role of 
anticipated emotions in the relation between SVO and allocation behaviour, despite the study 
being conducted in different cultural population. However, there was no evidence of 
differences in allocation behaviour towards ingroup and outgroup receivers. These findings 
are inconsistent with past literature showing ingroup favouritism in allocation behaviour 
(Balliet et al., 2014). There are several possible reasons for this inconsistency and these will 
be discussed below in the section on limitations. On the other hand, there was evidence of a 
difference in allocation behaviour on the part of majority and minority allocators in Study 1. 
These differences in allocation behaviour between majority and minority could reflect the 
preferences for maintaining existing status differences between groups that is described by 
social dominance theory, whereby majority group participants (Malays) have higher SDO 
and are less likely to demonstrate fairness to others than minority group participants 
(Chinese). However, the pattern that majority group participants demonstrated less fairness 
was not observed in Study 2. Nevertheless, individual differences in SDO did predict 
allocation behaviour, and anticipated emotions were found to play a mediating role in the 
relation between SDO and allocation behaviour. This shows the potential for anticipated 
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emotions to explain the influence of another individual difference measure that shapes 
decision making in resource allocation dilemmas and speaks to the generality of anticipated 
emotions as a proximal psychological explanation to explain dispositional preferences for 
outcomes of divisions.
The studies reported in chapters 3 and 4 relied mostly on correlational data. An 
experimental study was needed to establish the causal chain linking SVO to allocation 
behaviour via anticipated emotions (Spencer et al., 2005). Thus, in the two studies reported in 
Chapter 5, this causal chain was examined by manipulating the level of emotions anticipated 
when making resource allocation decisions. In two studies, it was found that instructing 
participants to down-regulate their emotions when making resource allocation decisions led 
them to allocate fewer tokens to the other person. The findings also showed that the down-
regulation condition had a stronger effect on participants’ allocation behaviour than did the 
up-regulating condition. The findings from this chapter complement other studies that have 
found that down-regulating emotions leads to an increase in antisocial behaviour (Van’t 
Wout et al., 2010).
The studies reported in Chapter 5 also examined whether emotion regulation 
moderates the influence of SVO on allocation behaviour. Although there was no significant 
interaction between SVO and emotion regulation condition, there was some suggestive 
evidence that the manipulation of anticipated emotion had an effect on the strength of the 
relation between SVO and allocation behaviour. The patterns in up-regulating and down-
regulating showed in Figure 5.3 in Chapter 5 suggest that the manipulation disrupted the 
normal relation between SVO and allocation behaviour as it differed from the pattern in the 
control condition.
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6.2 Theoretical Implications
Although it has long been established that SVO predicts resource allocation 
behaviour, previous studies have tended simply to accept this relation without examining the 
proximal causes of why prosocials and proselfs differ in the way they allocate resources 
between self and other. The studies reported in this thesis shed some light on why there is this 
difference: Prosocials and proselfs differ in their allocation behaviour because they anticipate 
that they will feel different kinds of emotion as a result of allocating resources in a way that 
is fair or in a way that favours the self over the other person. The results of the current studies 
show that prosocials anticipate more cooperative emotions (e.g., pride about being fair and 
regret and guilt about being unfair) and less competitive emotions (e.g., pride about being 
unfair and regret and guilt about being fair), and this pattern of anticipated emotion is linked 
to a more equal allocation of resources between themselves and the recipients. Proselfs, on 
the other hand, anticipate more competitive emotions (e.g., pride about being unfair and 
regret and guilt about being fair) and less cooperative emotions (e.g., pride about being fair 
and regret and guilt about being unfair), and this pattern of anticipated emotion is linked to a 
more unequal allocation of resources between them and the recipient. In all reported studies 
there was a consistent indirect effect of SVO on allocation behaviour via anticipated 
emotions and this (at least in part) answers the research question about what goes on in the 
minds of prosocials and proselfs when making these resource allocation decisions. Below I 
discuss the theoretical implications of these findings.
As noted above, research using SVO measures has shown that individuals who differ 
in SVO scores have different preferences for certain outcomes (Balliet et al., 2009; Murphy 
et al., 2011; Van Lange, Bekkers, et al., 2007). For example, prosocials tend to be 
cooperative people who prefer an equal outcome between themselves and other people. 
Proself individuals, on the other hand, are competitive/individualistic individuals who prefer 
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unequal outcomes favouring themselves. My newly developed ICE measure is a reliable and 
valid measure that captures an important psychological construct underpinning these 
preferences for different outcomes. By showing that scores on the ICE measure are 
significantly associated with SVO scores, and that ICE scores are also predictive of allocation 
behaviour in economic games, this research extends what we know about SVO. Put simply, 
the current research suggests that prosocials and proselfs appraise settings in which resources 
are to be divided between themselves and others differently, and that these differential 
appraisals lead them to anticipate different emotional experiences if they were to divide 
resources more or less equally. 
Between them, the studies reported in this thesis can be seen as establishing a causal 
chain linking stable individual differences in preferences for outcomes (SVO) with 
differences in resource allocation behaviour via differential anticipated emotions. The three 
key constructs that were investigated in this thesis are SVO, anticipated cooperative and 
competitive emotions and resource allocation behaviour. In the two studies reported in 
Chapter 3, I measured each of these constructs in a correlational design and demonstrated that 
SVO influenced allocation behaviour through the proposed mediator, anticipated cooperative 
and competitive emotions. This is a measurement-of-mediation design, drawing on a 
statistical analysis procedure originally introduced by Baron and Kenny (1986). It tests 
whether an independent or predictor variable influences a dependent or outcome variable 
through a mediating variable. However, Spencer, Zanna and Fong (2005) argued that the 
Baron and Kenny method, despite its widespread use, is often misapplied. Spencer et al. 
argued that in the measurement-of-mediation design, the relations between the predictor and 
outcome variable mediated by a third variable are often based on correlations. Like any 
correlational evidence, this leaves open the possibility that the causal relations assumed by 
the mediation model could be reversed or could be due to shared variance with an external, 
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unmeasured variable. This point applies in particular to the relation between the mediating 
variable, which is often intended to capture a psychological process, and the outcome 
variable, because the mediator is typically measured and not manipulated. To establish that 
the psychological process captured by the mediator genuinely has a causal impact on the 
outcome variable, the mediator should be manipulated (Spencer et al., 2005). In combination 
with evidence from the measurement-of-mediation design, this provides stronger support for 
the proposed mediation model.
Consistent with the argument of Spencer et al. (2005), in the studies reported in 
Chapter 5 I manipulated the proposed mediator (anticipated emotions). The findings of these 
two studies suggest that anticipated emotions indeed play an important role in decision 
making. When participants were instructed to down-regulate their emotions when 
contemplating resource allocation decisions, this led to differences in their allocation 
behaviour. The evidence from this manipulation-of-mediation approach therefore 
complements the evidence from the measurement-of-mediation approach used in the previous 
studies and helps to establish that there is a causal chain between the three constructs, such 
that SVO has its influence on allocation behaviour through its impact on anticipated emotions 
rather than the other way around.
Previous research has established that SVO is a stable preference (Messick & 
McClintock, 1968; Murphy et al., 2011). The current studies are consistent with this past 
work in showing that SVO is a stable individual difference. Measuring SVO using the slider 
measure at two different time-points showed substantial test-retest reliability. However, the 
present research shows that down-regulating or up-regulating anticipated emotions can 
override the influence of an individual’s SVO on his or her allocation behaviour. Thus, 
regardless of an individual’s SVO, manipulating anticipated emotions has an impact on 
allocation behaviour. This further strengthens the evidence for my main research prediction 
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by showing that anticipated emotions play an important role in resource allocation behaviour 
by overriding the influence of the supposedly stable trait of SVO. 
The current research also provides evidence that SDO is predictive of allocation 
behaviour, with persons who score highly in SDO being more likely to make unequal 
resource allocation decisions favouring themselves. These findings are consistent with social
dominance theory, which proposes that group-based social hierarchies are formed and 
maintained through processes of discrimination and prejudice (Pratto et al., 1994). Also 
consistent with social dominance theory is the finding that the SDO scores of members of the 
majority and minority groups in Malaysia differed, reflecting the social hierarchical status 
these groups have in Malaysia. Chinese participants, who are a minority group in that 
country, scored lower in SDO than did Malay participants, who form the majority group in 
Malaysia. Although I did not find a significant interaction between the majority/minority 
group membership of allocators and SDO scores on allocation behaviour, the fact that SDO 
scores differed significantly between Malays and Chinese and were also predictive of 
allocation behaviour was consistent with this reasoning. Taken together, the current studies 
provide some suggestive evidence that belonging to a majority or minority social group plays 
a role in resource allocation behaviour, but the precise nature of this relation is still an open 
question. Perhaps future research could pursue the question of why majority and minority 
members in Malaysia differ in their SDO scores but this does not reflect in their allocation 
behaviour. 
Although there is evidence that some emotions signals, such as laughter and screams, 
are recognised similarly across different cultures, there are other specific emotions that have 
different signals in different cultures (Sauter, Eisner, Ekman, & Scott, 2010). Furthermore, 
Russell (1994) proposed that although the valence and arousal dimensions of emotion are 
universally recognised, specific emotions are more culturally variable. Evidence of the 
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cultural variability of emotions raises the possibility that there might also be cultural 
variability in the influence of anticipated emotions. This issue was addressed in the current 
studies by recruiting participants from two different cultural backgrounds (the UK and 
Malaysia). There were similar patterns of results across these two cultures when investigating 
whether anticipated cooperative and competitive emotions mediated the relation between 
SVO and allocation behaviour. In the two different populations studied, the national 
languages differed, with the UK samples (mainly students of British nationality) speaking 
English and the Malaysian samples speaking Malay. This meant that the definitions of each 
anticipated emotions (in the context of resource allocation decisions) had to be translated 
carefully from English to Malay for the Malaysian participants. Despite the evidence that 
emotions have different connotations in different cultures and languages (Sauter et al., 2010; 
Wierzbicka, 1994), the current studies show a robust pattern of mediation of the relation 
between SVO and allocation behaviour by anticipated emotions. This suggests that the 
anticipated emotions that are assessed by the ICE measure have similar meanings and have a 
similar influence across the two cultures I investigated. These findings are consistent with 
research that found universal recognition of pride (Tracy & Robins, 2008), guilt (Furukawa, 
Tangney, & Higashibara, 2012) and regret (Gilovich, Wang, Regan, & Nishina, 2003).
6.3 Practical Implications
There are some noteworthy practical implications of the current findings. Firstly, the 
evidence that anticipated emotions play an important role in decision making about resource 
allocation, together with the evidence from the studies reported in Chapter 5 showing that 
down-regulating participants’ anticipated emotions influenced participants’ behaviour when 
allocating tokens, points to ways in which people could be encouraged to make more 
‘rational’ decisions (meaning decisions that serve their own interests). The manipulation used 
was a simple instruction to make a decision in a detached and dispassionate way and is 
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therefore short and easy to administer. The result (irrespective of participants’ SVO) was that 
they behaved in a less fair manner (i.e., distributing tokens more unequally between allocator 
and receiver, in a way that favoured the allocator) than in the control condition. This suggests 
that the ability to down-regulate emotions could be used to encourage individuals to make 
decisions in a way that serves their own interests. 
The effects of manipulating the anticipation of emotions may also have social benefits 
by increasing cooperation and encouraging individuals to allocate resources more equally 
through up-regulating cooperative emotions. Admittedly, in the present research the effects of 
the up-regulating condition were not significant. However, this finding (or lack thereof) 
needs to be considered in light of the fact that the current student samples tended to be 
prosocial in terms of their dispositional SVO. As a result, baseline levels of fairness and 
cooperative emotions may have been high to begin with and there simply may not have been 
any room to up-regulate these cooperative emotions further, leading to a ceiling effect in 
fairness. In addition, it may have been easier to get prosocial individuals, who normally 
anticipate cooperative emotions, to detach themselves from such emotions and to make less
equal resource allocation decisions, than it is to get proself individuals, who would normally 
anticipate competitive emotions, to detach themselves from these emotions and to make more 
equal resource allocation decisions as a result. In any case, future research should 
systematically examine the consequences of emotion regulation manipulations for decision 
making in social dilemmas. For example, perhaps it is easier to find effects of up-regulating 
cooperative emotions in contexts where people are generally less inclined to act fairly or pro-
socially, like volunteering time for a cause. It could also be interesting to investigate the 
effect of down-regulating competitive emotions in a setting where competitive emotions are 
more socially appropriate, like in sports. 
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The anticipated emotions that were the focus of the current research can be 
categorised into one of two groups: cooperative, other-regarding emotions (e.g., pride about 
being fair and regret and guilt about being unfair) and competitive, self-regarding emotions 
(e.g., regret and guilt about being fair and pride about being unfair). Thus the cooperative 
emotions studied here could be replaced by alternative other-regarding emotions, such as 
compassion. Research has shown that compassion towards others, such as caring about others 
who are suffering, predicts cooperative behaviour (Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010). 
This suggests that if the current research were to be replicated in a different context, for 
example a natural disaster setting in which there is an opportunity to offer aid to victims, 
helping behaviour would be more likely on the part of those who anticipate feeling 
compassion towards the victims. By the same token, competitive emotions could be replaced 
by alternative self-regarding emotional traits, such as high self-esteem. Research has found 
that individuals with high self-esteem are more likely to engage in non-cooperative behaviour 
(Kagan & Knight, 1979; Tjosvold, XueHuang, Johnson, & Johnson, 2008). However, there 
are conflicting findings concerning the influence of self-esteem on prosocial behaviour. For 
example, Lu and Argyle (1991) found that self-esteem can increase cooperation. Thus the 
relation between self-esteem and cooperative behaviour is not a simple one. Nevertheless, the 
specific emotions studied in the present thesis could perhaps be extended to include other 
relevant other-regarding and/or self-regarding emotions that might play a key role in shaping 
prosocial or proself behaviour in different social contexts. 
Although the studies reported in Chapter 4 were intended to replicate the findings 
reported in Chapter 3 on a sample with a different cultural background, they were also 
designed to investigate whether making a receiver’s social identity known to the allocator 
would influence the allocator’s behaviour. Given the history and background of community 
relations in Malaysia, it was predicted that Malaysian participants would exhibit ingroup 
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favouritism in their allocation behaviour. Had this been the case, the results would have had 
implications for strategies to improve inter-ethnic relations in Malaysia, for example by 
raising awareness of the role of anticipated emotions in making resource allocation decisions 
between ingroup and outgroup members. However, the results were unexpected, in that there 
was no evidence of ingroup favouritism. Here it can be argued that the way in which the 
receiver’s social identity was manipulated (by means of giving them an ethnically-marked 
first name) may have encouraged allocators to make more equal allocations than they would 
have done if the receiver’s social identity had been varied in a more anonymous way (e.g., by 
referring to him or her as ‘Person 12 from the Chinese group’ or ‘Person 3 from the Indian 
group’). Past research has found that allocators in the dictator game gave more to a named 
receiver as compared to an anonymous person (Charness & Gneezy, 2008). It was reasoned 
that individuals behave more favourably towards people with whom they perceived to have a 
close social distance, commonly defined in terms of race, religion, occupation or nationality
(Bohnet & Frey, 1999; Triandis, Hall, & Ewen, 1965). With the data collected in the present 
research, I cannot compare allocation behaviour to an anonymous person with that to a 
named person. Future studies could compare two types of manipulations of social identity 
(named outgroup receiver, as in the present studies, or an anonymous outgroup receiver, 
perhaps represented by an ethnically marked avatar). This would tell us whether knowing 
something about the personal identity of an outgroup receiver (i.e., their name) makes a 
difference in allocation behaviour. If it is found that participants are more equal in their 
allocation decisions when some individuating information about the receiver is made 
available, this would suggest a way in which ingroup favouritism in multi-ethnic societies 
such as Malaysia could be reduced. On a broader level, such research could help to increase 
donations to charitable sites, where messages revealing the name of an individual outgroup 
recipient of charitable donations might serve to enhance donations compared to messages in 
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which it is clear that the recipients would be outgroup members but in other respects they 
remain anonymous. 
6.4 Limitations and Future Research
6.4.1 Methodological Issues
The results of the current studies need to be interpreted with a degree of caution, 
because in most cases the participants were university students. Without conducting 
equivalent research on more varied populations, it remains unknown whether the findings 
would generalise to populations with different ages and educational backgrounds. Thus, 
future studies should seek to recruit participants from the general population. This may also 
be helpful in terms of recruiting a sample that is more varied in terms of SVO. 
Additionally, it could be argued that the use of a binary outcome variable may have 
impacted the magnitude of the correlation between SVO, anticipated emotions, and allocation 
behaviour. Across the studies, the correlations between SVO, anticipated emotions and 
allocation behaviour were calculated using non-parametric correlational analyses. In these 
correlations, continuous measures of SVO and anticipated emotions were compared with the 
actual (rather than dichotomised) allocation of tokens. Thus, the dichotomization of the 
outcome variable for the purposes of other analyses could not have influenced the observed 
correlations between allocation behaviour, on the one hand, and SVO or anticipated 
emotions, on the other hand. 
Another possible limitation is the fact that in all the studies reported in this thesis, 
there was a higher number of female than male participants. Although it is generally 
presumed that women are more prosocial then men (Löckenhoff et al., 2014) and although 
there is some evidence to support this in relation to SVO (Van Lange, 1999) and behaviour in 
the UG (Solnick, 2001), a more recent meta-analysis found no difference in the overall levels 
of cooperation between men and women (Balliet, Li, Macfarlan, & Van Vugt, 2011). In the
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current studies, the preponderance of women participants was such that I could not conduct 
comparative analyses between the two genders. Thus, future research should seek to recruit a 
more balanced number of females and males in order to be able to examine whether there are 
any differences in anticipated emotions in resource allocation contexts and in actual 
allocation behaviour.
A third limitation of the studies reported in this thesis is that they all used two 
economic games, namely the Dictator Game (DG) and the Ultimatum Game (UG). Although 
these games vary in one important respect, allowing me to establish that the mediating role of 
anticipated emotions could be found in both games despite this difference, it would of course 
be valuable to investigate whether the pattern of findings observed in this research would 
translate to other economic games. Because both the DG and UG are loss-framed, future 
studies could use similar loss-framed games, such as the public goods dilemma or the 
prisoners’ dilemma, to see whether anticipated emotions mediate the relation between SVO 
and decision making in those contexts. Given that these games are also loss-framed, it should 
be the case that prosocials would anticipate experiencing more cooperative emotions and less 
competitive emotions than would their proself counterparts, and that this would lead to more 
cooperative behaviour. Also, it would be more interesting as well to extend the current 
findings by doing these studies in economic game settings with a gain frame. For example in 
the common goods dilemma that has a gain frame, would participants anticipate similar 
emotions towards being fair or unfair in a take-some dilemma. With the current findings, 
future research should also look into the affect of anticipated emotions on the relation 
between SVO and different kinds of prosocial or coorperative behaviour other than resource 
allocation using economic games (e.g., such as donating to charities or volunteering time for 
a charitable cause).
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In the current thesis I have focused on the role of anticipated emotions in shaping 
participants’ allocation behaviour. However, it could be questioned whether these emotions 
are spontaneously anticipated when allocating tokens to the receiver in the UG and the DG, 
given that participants were explicitly asked about their anticipated emotions in most of the 
studies. Posing questions about anticipated emotions may have made them salient and 
therefore influential. In the emotion regulation studies (reported in Chapter 5), when 
comparing the down-regulation and control conditions, it is evident that the number of tokens 
allocated to the anonymous other decreased when participants were asked to down-regulate 
their emotions. This suggests that when participants are not specifically directed to consider 
their feelings (i.e., in the control condition), emotions do play a role in allocation behaviour. 
This interpretation is consistent with the results of Van Der Schalk and colleagues 
(2012), who found that the extent to which individuals anticipated pride about acting fairly 
(or unfairly) and the extent to which individuals anticipated regret about acting fairly (or 
unfairly) predicted the amount of tokens that individuals allocated to another person. These 
researchers argued that past emotional experiences led to the spontaneous anticipation of 
these emotions when faced with a similar situation and that the spontaneous anticipation of 
these emotions influenced their subsequent decision making (Van Der Schalk et al., 2012). 
Indeed, a meta-analysis of relevant research showed that anticipated emotions guide 
behaviour through such a feedback mechanism (DeWall et al., 2016). According to DeWall 
and colleagues (2016) anticipated emotions are “automatic affect”, which is based on past 
emotional experiences that are stored in memory and are activated without intention or 
awareness (Baumeister et al., 2007). 
Although the current emotion regulation studies do not directly establish that 
participants spontaneously anticipate emotions when making allocation decisions, other 
studies have yielded evidence relevant to this issue. For example, when children were asked 
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to state the emotions they anticipated if they were to act in an unfairly manner (e.g., copying 
a character who steals something or not helping another child who asked for help in building 
a sand castle), those children who reported that they would feel bad were more likely to make 
equal allocations in a separate allocation task using the dictator game (Gummerum, Hanoch, 
Keller, Parsons, & Hummel, 2010; Ongley & Malti, 2014). This suggests that children who 
anticipated feeling bad about their actions in the imagination task spontaneously anticipated 
feeling bad about not sharing allocations equally in the dictator game. Thus, these studies 
suggest that anticipated emotions are activated spontaneously (due to past experiences) and 
help individuals to modify their behaviour to achieve desired emotional outcomes (DeWall et 
al., 2016).
A concern that could be raised about the methodology used in the current studies is 
the possible role of social desirability. People may want to appear more prosocial and less 
proself and as a result attain more prosocial scores on the SVO measure and allocate more to 
the receiver in the economic games, not because of a genuine preference regarding outcomes 
but rather in order to appear and act in a socially desirable way. However, in most of the 
studies reported in this thesis, social desirability concerns are likely to have been minimised 
because data collection was anonymous and took place via self-administered online 
questionnaires. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that social desirability may have had an effect in the 
studies reported in Chapters 4 and 5. It is possible that differences in allocation to ingroup 
and outgroup members were not observed in Chapter 4 because of a general desire to avoid 
acting in an ingroup favouring way. However, the fact that the switch from a within-subjects 
(Study 1) to a between-subjects (Study 2) design did not affect the main findings suggests 
that this was not the case. Furthermore, it does not seem plausible to account for the findings 
reported in Chapter 5 in terms of social desirability. It is hard to see how social desirability 
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concerns would explain the impact of down-regulation instructions on allocation behaviour. 
Nevertheless, the role of social desirability cannot be ruled out entirely and future studies 
should consider including a social desirability measure such as the Marlowe-Crowne Social 
Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) or the Balanced Inventory of Desirable 
Responding (Paulhus, 1991).
6.4.2 Theoretical issues
Although I have argued that using the ICE measure extends our insight into why 
prosocials and proselfs make different resource allocation decisions, the fact that the 
mediation evidence was consistently partial rather than full suggests either that the ICE 
measure does not capture all the emotions that are relevant to explaining the differences 
between proselfs and prosocials, or that there are non-emotional factors that explain the 
influence of SVO on allocation behaviour. For example, factors like gender (Espinosa & 
Kováík, 2015), religion (Everett, Haque, & Rand, 2016) and social status (Kafashan, Sparks, 
Griskevicius, & Barclay, 2014), have been shown to play a role in prosocial behaviours and 
might therefore moderate the strength of the relation between SVO and anticipated emotions 
or between anticipated emotions and prosocial behaviour. With respect to alternative 
mediators of the relation between SVO and allocation behaviour in economic games, a 
candidate process might simply be the degree to which an allocator attends to him- or herself, 
as opposed to the recipient. Although such a difference in attention might be linked to 
differences in anticipated emotion, it could in principle be a purely cognitive process, with 
one type of person attending to his or her own interests, and another type of person attending 
to the interests of both parties. These factors could be taken into account in future studies in 
an effort to improve our understanding of the psychological processes that account for the 
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way in which the differences in preferences for resource outcomes that are captured by 
measures of SVO have an impact on behaviour in social dilemmas. 
Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty (2011) have argued that the term “partial 
mediation” should be avoided, because it is suggested that the indirect effect of a predictor on 
a dependent variable via a mediator, either in the absence of a significant direct relation 
between these variables prior to mediation analysis or in the presence of a significant relation 
between these variables after mediation analysis, is less impressive than a “full” mediation. In 
addition, these authors argued that if full mediation requires the relationship between the 
independent variable and the outcome variable to be non-significant when controlling for the 
mediator, then there are no further reasons to test and investigate additional mediators 
(Rucker et al., 2011). Instead, they proposed that the main focus should be on the magnitude 
of the indirect effect of the relation between the predictor and the outcome variable, and on 
examining different mediators and controlling for variables that could possibly affect the 
indirect effect (Rucker et al., 2011). Even though the findings presented in the current thesis 
do not meet the criteria for ‘full’ mediation, the studies reveal a consistent and robust pattern 
across a range of samples. It is therefore argued that anticipated emotions can account for a 
meaningful proportion of the variance in allocation behaviour that is explained by SVO. In 
addition, I have proposed that future research should take into account other variables that 
may affect (the strength of) the relation between SVO and allocation behaviour (such as 
control variables or other mediators) and examine the circumstances under which anticipated 
emotions plays a more or less pronounced role in the relation between SVO and allocation 
behaviour, in line with what was proposed by Rucker and colleagues (2011). 
With respect to the point about whether the ICE measure captures all emotions that 
are relevant to resource allocation decisions, future researchers could consider asking 
decision makers to report the emotions they anticipate as a result of their decision before they 
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make their decisions. This would allow researchers to build up an ecologically valid set of 
emotions (which may vary from one social dilemma to another). For example, feelings of 
loyalty or disloyalty might be relevant in a public goods dilemma but less so in an ultimatum 
game. In this way, researchers could develop a taxonomy of emotions relevant to resource 
allocation decisions. A measure of anticipated emotion based on such a taxonomy might have 
superior potential for fully mediating the relation between SVO and resource allocation 
decisions.
In the current studies, the ICE measure gauged how participants thought they would 
feel about certain outcomes. Future research could look into the actual emotions participants 
feel about their allocation decisions. After making a decision in an economic game, a post-
question should ask about the current emotions the participants is experiencing. Such a study 
would allow researchers to investigate whether prosocials actually feel more cooperative 
emotions (pride about being fair, regret being unfair) and whether proselfs experience more 
competitive emotions (pride about being unfair, regret about being fair). One possible 
prediction is that there is indeed a reliable relation between anticipated and experienced 
emotions (Baumeister et al., 2007), but research on affective forecasting has revealed that 
people generally tend to overestimate their feelings when thinking about future events 
(Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). It would be interesting to investigate how experienced emotions 
inform decisions in subsequent games. In addition, it could be relevant to investigate how 
successful an emotional down-regulation or up-regulation manipulation is in affecting actual 
feelings compared to anticipated feelings about allocation decisions.
6.5 Conclusion
Past research has established that there is a reliable relation between the social 
preferences that are captured by measures of SVO and the nature of the decisions that 
individuals make when asked to distribute resources between self and other. There is also 
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evidence that anticipated emotions are predictive of allocation behaviour. However, to my 
knowledge these two kinds of influences on allocation behaviour have thus far only been 
studied independently. In this thesis I set out to investigate anticipated emotions as the 
psychological process that mediates the influence of SVO on resource allocation decisions. 
The findings reported in this thesis add up to compelling evidence that anticipated emotions 
are at least one of the psychological mechanisms that explain individual differences in 
allocation behaviour. The vital role played by anticipated emotions in resource allocation 
behaviour was evident when the research results showed that down-regulating anticipated 
cooperative emotions decreased allocation behaviour directly. 
Thinking about the emotions you are likely to experience as a result of your future 
actions serves important functions. It stops you from doing things that you are likely to regret 
in the future. In this way, anticipated emotions operate as a kind of benign guide, helping you 
to make everyday life decisions that lead to valued emotions and discouraging you from 
making decisions that would lead to unwelcome emotions. Research on the influence of 
anticipated emotions in decision making is still growing. It is hoped that the research reported 
in this thesis has contributed to the this literature by showing that anticipated emotions play 
an important role in explaining why dispositional preferences lead to different social 
outcomes.
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Appendix A
Please remember that the other participant doesn't know about the possible differences in 
value of the tokens (points).
There are 36 tokens at stake, with each token worth 1 point for you and 1 point for the 
receiver, and if you were to divide them in the same way as listed below... 
Allocator (you) 24 tokens 24 points
Receiver (other) 12 tokens 12 points
.... to what extent would you feel: 
Emotions Not at 
all
A little 
bit
Moderately Quite a 
bit
Very much
Pleased o o o o o
Proud o o o o o
Regretful o o o o o
Sorry o o o o o
Satisfied o o o o o
Embarrassed o o o o o
Foolish o o o o o
Guilty o o o o o
Ashamed o o o o o
Disappointed o o o o o
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Appendix B
Please remember that the recipient (the anonymous other) has to accept the allocation you 
make, regardless of the amount allocated.
There are 36 tokens at stake. If you were to divide them in the same way as listed below... 
Allocator (you) 27 tokens
Receiver (other) 9 tokens
....to what extent would you feel: 
Emotions Not at 
all
A little 
bit
Moderately Quite a 
bit
Very much
Regretful o o o o o
Disappointed o o o o o
Pleased o o o o o
Proud o o o o o
Guilty o o o o o
Ashamed o o o o o
191
Appendix C
Proud Feeling deep pleasure or satisfaction as a result of one’s own achievements, qualities, 
or possessions or those of someone with whom one is closely associated. Bangga Rasa 
kenikmatan atau kepuasan atas pencapaian sendiri, kualiti atau harta benda sendiri atau 
terhadap orang yang berkait rapat dengannya.
Pleased Feeling or showing pleasure and satisfaction, especially at an event or a situation. 
Gembira Sangat suka dan besar hati atas sesuatu, terutamanya dalam sesuatu keadaan dan 
situasi.
Regret Feeling of sadness, repentance, or disappointment over (something that one has done 
or failed to do). 
Menyesal Berasa dukacita atas sesuatu kelakuan atau gagal dalam melakukan sesuatu 
perbuatan.
Disappointed Sad or displeased because someone or something has failed to fulfil one’s 
hopes or expectations. 
Kecewa Dukacita kerana tidak tercapai cita-cita (harapan, kehendak, dsb), hampa kerana 
tidak dapat memenuhi harapan atau jangkaan seseorang. 
Guilty Culpable of or responsible for a specified wrongdoing. 
Bersalah Keadaan fikiran seseorang yang diganggu dengan perasaan bersalah atau 
bertanggungjawab atas sesuatu kesalahan.
Ashamed Embarrassed or guilty because of one’s actions, characteristics, or associations. 
Malu Perasaan negatif yang timbul dalam diri seseorang akibat daripada kesedaran diri 
mengenai perlakuan, ciri-ciri atau sesuatu yang dikaitkan dengan dirinya sendiri.
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Appendix D
Please remember that the recipient (the anonymous other) has to accept the allocation you 
make, regardless of the amount allocated.
You are paired with Ali.
There are 36 tokens at stake. If you were to divide them in the same way as listed below... 
You (Allocator) 27 tokens
Ali (Receiver) 9 tokens
....to what extent would you feel: 
Emotions Not at 
all
A little 
bit
Moderately Quite a 
bit
Very much
Regretful o o o o o
Disappointed o o o o o
Pleased o o o o o
Proud o o o o o
Guilty o o o o o
Ashamed o o o o o
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Appendix E
Bangga Berasa gembira atau puas yang mendalam terhadap pencapaian, kualiti atau harta 
benda atau terhadap mereka yang mempunyai hubungan yang sangat rapat dengan diri. 
Proud Feeling deep pleasure or satisfaction as a result of one’s own achievements, qualities, 
or possessions or those of someone with whom one is closely associated.
Gembira Berasa atau menunjukkan perasaan gembira atau puas, terutamanya terhadap 
sesuatu peristiwa atau situasi. 
Pleased Feeling or showing pleasure and satisfaction, especially at an event or a situation.
Terkilan Perasaan sedih, kesal atau kecewa terhadap sesuatu yang telah dilaksanakan atau 
sesuatu yang tidak berjaya dilaksanakan. 
Regret Feeling of sadness, repentance, or disappointment over something that one has done 
or failed to do.  
Kecewa Perasaan sedih atau tidak menyenangkan kerana seseorang yang lain atau sesuatu 
yang telah gagal untuk memenuhi harapan atau jangkaan diri. 
Disappointed Sad or displeased because someone or something has failed to fulfill one’s 
hopes or expectations.
Bersalah Tidak berniat atau berasa bertanggungjawab ke atas satu kesilapan. 
Guilty Culpable of or responsible for a specified wrongdoing.
Malu Malu atau bersalah kerana perbuatan, sikap atau hubungkait diri. 
Ashamed Embarrassed or guilty because of one’s actions, characteristics, or associations.
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Appendix F
Instructions for the conditions:
Regret/Pride about being fair
When you play the game with the other person, you may find yourself thinking about 
how you would feel if you were to offer more or less to the other person. Specifically, you 
might think about how proud or how pleased you would feel if you divided the resources 
equally between yourself and the other player [how much you would regret it or feel 
disappointed if you divided the resources equally between yourself and the other player]. 
When you play the game, we would like you to put such thoughts out of your mind. Do 
not think about how proud or pleased [regretful or disappointed] you would feel. Try to 
play the game in a detached and dispassionate way.
Regret/Pride about being unfair
When you play the game with the other person, you may find yourself thinking about 
how you would feel if you were to offer more or less to the other person. Specifically, you 
might think about how proud or how pleased you would feel if you gave more to yourself
than the other player [how much you would regret it or feel disappointed if you gave more 
to yourself than the other player]. When you play the game, we would like you to put such 
thoughts out of your mind. Do not think about how proud or pleased [regretful or 
disappointed] you would feel. Try to play the game in a detached and dispassionate way.
